



THE DEMOCRATIC PROCESS

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THE DEMOCRATIC PROCESS

BY

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स्व० श्री बेनीप्रसाद टंडन
राजीवजी, इलाहाबाद
के सहपाठी से
दान में प्राप्त पुस्तक

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
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PREFACE

THIS book was practically completed in 1932 but for certain reasons its publication has been delayed for more than two years. In the light of what has happened in the meanwhile, it has been necessary only to insert a little additional matter in the text and the footnotes. The various chapters of the book are interdependent and the argument stands as a whole. I am indebted to several colleagues and friends for assistance. Mr. S. C. Varma of the Zoology Department, University of Allahabad, very kindly read Chapters II and IV and offered helpful suggestions. To Mr. Ram Nath Dubey of the Commerce Department, Allahabad University, and Dr. B. N. Kaul of Aligarh University I am indebted for suggestions about the geographical and population data. Professor C. D. Thompson of the Economics Department, University of Allahabad, kindly read Chapters VI-IX and offered valuable criticism. Mr. Ilyas Ahmad and Mr. Gauri Shankar Chatterji, my colleagues in the Politics Department, read the whole manuscript and made a number of suggestions. Mr. Ilyas Ahmad has also assisted me in seeing the book through the press. No words of mine can express my gratitude to Professor A. E. Zimmern of New College, Oxford, who read the whole manuscript and offered very valuable suggestions and criticism.

BENI PRASAD

30 October 1934

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CHAPTER I

REORIENTATION IN POLITICAL SCIENCE

The dynamics of the social sciences DEVELOPMENT is now the keynote of all systematized knowledge, specially in the realm of the social sciences. It is perceived more vividly than ever before that the world of man is a continuous flux, presenting ever-fresh integrations of factors which undergo endless permutations. Becoming rather than being sets the correct perspective for social studies. For them problems should emerge from historical processes and the search should be directed to principles and prospects of change. In this context, stability signifies balanced adjustment, the very antithesis of stagnation. The student should try to discern the flow and measure the strength of the deep-lying currents of social life. Nor can his own technique and categories remain stationary. They call for revision to meet the altered character and intricacy of situations. The social sciences must evolve in accordance with social evolution.


Evolution and political science Every age requires working principles and programmes of its own and adapts its spiritual heritage at numberless points to suit its environment.¹ The history of social philosophy is mainly a record of pamphlets addressed to the times. In point of range, scale and complexity, the problems of today are radically different from anything known to the past. Our social philosophy must represent a fundamental variation from those which expressed the spirit and aspirations of the ancient empires and kingdoms, or of city-states and nation-states. Some recent developments are leading our social disciplines to novel standpoints and are transforming their methods. Their bases have been broadened and new

¹ Cf. H. J. Laski, *A Grammar of Politics*, p. 15.

vistas opened before them by modern strides in knowledge, specially by the implications of the doctrine of evolution. Thus Politics must base itself on the biological and anthropological sciences, and its psychology must be broader than the starting-points of philosophers like Aristotle, Hobbes and Bentham. No longer is it permissible to erect a theory of society or State on a single tendency like sociality, fear, pursuit of pleasure and avoidance of pain, or on imitation, or consciousness of kind. A simplified, self-contained 'human nature' has broadened into a confluence of tendencies and potentialities going back to animal life at one end and touching almost super-human heights at the other.

**Synthesis of
the social
sciences**

The expansion of knowledge has not merely broadened the base and altered the method of politics, but it has also revealed a new synthetic relationship with the other social studies. In the nineteenth century, the social sciences emancipated themselves from philosophy and set out on independent careers. Specialization and compartmentalization were encouraged by the vast and growing accumulations of facts. But gradually 'the altogetherness of things' has forced itself on the social disciplines. For one thing, the unprecedented complexities of modern society react against circumscribed and artificial specialisms. Production, population, capitalism, groups, nationality, international contacts—all raise issues which no single science can hope to analyse and illumine. The fundamental problems of readjustment which quicken the development of the social sciences, now transcend their prescribed spheres. Accordingly every social science has expanded its orbit in order to comprehend social phenomena with some degree of fullness and to suggest lines of advance. The old barriers are crumbling and the sciences overlap one another. Every one of them tends to define its scope so as to cover the whole field of social life, though with special reference to certain categories. They have been growing into something like



complementary orientations to the same data. Moreover it has become more and more evident that intercommunication between the sciences reveals fresh standpoints, helps the birth of ideas, widens the perspective, and facilitates a truer synthesis. A recent historian of European thought shows how acutely has been felt the need of the *vue d'ensemble* afforded by the synthetic mode of approach. Organisms, men and institutions are to be regarded not as self-contained things, complete in themselves, but as nodes or meeting-points of all the forces in the world, acting and reacting in unlimited time and space.¹

Politics and other social disciplines

Politics can grow and fructify only in close intimacy with cognate disciplines. To detach it from economics, for instance, is to reduce it to a fragment. It has to work in the general context of sociology as the basic science of social evolution and organization.² Law belongs to its sphere as much as to that of jurisprudence.

Science and philosophy

It is, however, in their practical application, even more than in their theoretical development, that the social disciplines require co-operation. Science has such an intimate bearing on human welfare that the social scientist cannot escape questions of value. The normative standpoint has usually been prominent in the humanities and the few who have banished it at the front have admitted it by the back door. In fact, it is now being perceived that the line between science and philosophy was drawn rather rigidly in the nineteenth century. Essentially, philosophy represents the attitude of generalized total comprehension towards detailed facts. Science merges into philosophy as it moves from particulars

¹ J. T. Merz, *A History of European Thought in the Nineteenth Century*, Introduction.

² Cf. F. H. Giddings: 'To teach the theory of the State to men who have not learned the first principles of sociology is like teaching astronomy or thermodynamics to men who have not learned the Newtonian laws of motion.'

to broad generalities. Among the most striking intellectual advances of the age are the affiliations of the logic and the principles of higher mathematics and mathematical physics with the domain of metaphysics. In social studies a hard and fast distinction between science and philosophy in neither scientific nor philosophical. Ideals spring from realities, are indeed latent in them and form an integral part of behaviour. Cut off from a scientific study of facts, social philosophy may evaporate into Utopia, lapse into obscurantism, or entangle itself with programmes too costly in human energy. It is qualified to prescribe 'what ought to be' only when it has thoroughly grasped the development and working of social institutions. Purpose and plan are to be formed and valued in terms of evolutionary trends and probabilities. What is called social philosophy should approximate, in large part, to an observational discipline.¹ Philosophy is 'the process of reconstructing experience'.

**Telesis and
social
science**

At the same time, social science, however objective, cannot ignore the elements of telesis and value. We have moved far from that imperfect view of evolution which left man to the mercy of blind natural laws, or which ended in the hallucination of automatic progress. It is now recognized that telesis is an integral aspect of social evolution. Man is a creature of purpose and always plans, though often in an inadequate and shortsighted manner. His institutions grow but they are also made. Political science must *inter alia* trace the workings of his purposes as they are fused with the environment. It should unravel the strands and potentialities of planning in the present phase of development. This implies an integration of political 'science' and political 'philosophy' and the emergence of a new type of

¹ Cf. the Instrumental Theory of Knowledge which, as developed by the Pragmatists, teaches that 'the special function of philosophy is to rationalize the various possibilities that present themselves when social and moral interests are in conflict and thus to find the means for their adjustment and regulation'.

discipline. As an evolutionary and teleological study, Politics has to work with a technique different from that of the physical sciences on the one hand and that of Metaphysics and Pure Mathematics on the other hand. It must collect and classify facts, but it must also observe how they are interpenetrated with human wills. It retains its dramatic character and builds on a sympathetic understanding of motives. It must interpret and adjudge.

It is neither retrograde nor anomalous to call for the synthetic approach at a time when the data have grown to formidable, almost unmanageable, proportions. True, there is urgent need as there is abundant scope, for specialized investigations. But they should firstly be based on a thorough understanding of general principles, and secondly, their conclusions should be integrated into the body of social knowledge. All generalization should be built on large-scale, co-ordinated thinking, lest it be unduly simple, abstract or fragmentary. A complex world can be explained or guided only by a synthetic philosophy.

Science is inevitably influenced by the environment, sometimes in a very subtle way. For instance, it has been conjectured that the theories of Weismann were coloured by contemporary conditions in Prussia.¹ The vogue of a whole series of evolutionary hypotheses was determined by the economic and political environment. Social speculation is replete with dogmas which corresponded only to passing exigencies. Here is a danger-signal to politics more than to any other branch of knowledge. The scientific safeguard consists in widening the range of political science so as to bring all relevant phenomena into focus and in admitting frankly the change of scale. Political thought is liable to run off at a tangent unless it fully recognizes that modern conditions of life imply a radical difference in the plane

¹ J. A. Thomson and Patrick Geddes, *Evolution*, pp. 212-18.

on which it is to move and have its being. In Europe, Politics started as the science of the affairs of the city. Later, it broadened to comprise the large country-state. It has now to take the final step and stand forth as the science of world organization. The most striking feature of the Great Society is the large scale on which, consciously or unconsciously, it has to function. Distance has vanished before science; the world, so to say, has shrunk in dimensions, and all the peoples have been thrown together. It is a truism that the real unit of economic life is now the whole of mankind. The Great War and its aftermath demonstrate that countries and continents move in the same orbit of diplomacy. The rapidity of reactions today is absolutely beyond precedent. As Professor Zimmern says, 'It is as though the body politic had equipped itself with a new nervous system, with responses ten times more rapid than of old.' The line between domestic and foreign affairs is growing fainter and fainter. There is scarcely a vital national concern but is international in its ramifications and capable of satisfactory adjustment only on international lines. Inevitably, international consultation is broadening in range. International law is forcing recognition and the first beginnings, however feeble, of International Government are already visible, specially in the realm of economic life. The social disciplines have to transcend national horizons and move to the international plane. World economy is already a branch of study, but many economists are still under the sway of the older and narrower traditions. Economics should now be cultivated as the science of the welfare, not of the State, much less of a class, but of the whole world. The canvas of historical studies has necessarily broadened of late and the perception is dawning that the scientific study of history is that of world history. It is desirable to bring near the stage when French or German history, for instance, will command no greater vogue than French or German physics. Modern political science has for the

most part been concerned with national affairs. In its range and categories it has confined itself mainly to Europe and the Anglo-Saxon regions beyond. It has often denied the world a standpoint of its own, and occasionally reconnoitred it only through the mists of State sovereignty and nationalism. Asia and Africa have often been mere paragraphs in the chapter on Imperialism, and Latin America has served just for a warning in a footnote to democracy. Not only has a vast amount of political experience been ignored but the perspective has been narrowed and some of the fundamentals obscured or placed in an unreal setting. Signs of a change have recently been in evidence but the need of the situation is a full recognition of Politics as the science of world affairs. It implies a revision of theories not merely of sovereignty or nationalism but also of bodies of doctrine like Capitalism, Idealism, Socialism, and Fascism built on national postulates. It implies a restatement of the theory of Legislation and Government. This is the task set to political science by the logic of the position, intellectual and sociological, which the world has reached.



CHAPTER II

SELF-REALIZATION

ONE of the most potent influences in recent social speculation has been anti-intellectualism. It has thrown into challenging relief aspects and tendencies of life which the majority of philosophical schools had neglected or seriously underrated. Investigations into impulses, emotions and instincts have certainly enriched the content of Psychology, Sociology and Politics and brought them into closer touch with the realities of social existence. But instinctivism has suffered from a predominance of analysis over synthesis, from lapses into compartmentalism and specially from a supposed antithesis between reason and innate drives. The reaction against rationalism has gone too far and has provoked a counter-movement.

There is indeed nothing new in the perception of the so-called non-rational elements in the make-up of the human disposition. Not to speak of Plato and of theologians, some modern philosophers also realized that intellection did not constitute the dominant element in the psychic life. David Hume, for instance, declared that reason was and ought to be the slave of the passions and that it could never pretend to any other office than to serve and obey. This relationship of master and slave in the realm of human faculties has been conceded by many later philosophers. Thus Auguste Comte concluded that affection must be the central point in the synthetic organization of human nature and of society and that the intellect was permanently adapted only to be the servant of the social sympathies. Such a bifurcation is contradicted by the central idea of the evolutionary hypothesis but it has survived the overhauling which

Darwinism effected in methods of inquiry. Apparently it accords with certain powerful tendencies in human affairs. Presumably the force of the reaction against the over-simplified rational psychology has not yet exhausted itself. There are writers like Ribot who single out reason to consign it to insignificance and who hold that instincts, impulses, desires and feelings alone are fundamental in character.

Many psychologists have sought to explain all the various aspects of human conduct through the operation of innate, inherited psycho-physical dispositions called instincts. These have been enumerated and classified by William James, Thorndike and many others until the lists are counted by the hundred. They vary immensely and range from one to sixty or seventy while the word instinct itself has been used in general and philosophic literature in thousands of senses.¹ William McDougall has carefully worked out a whole system of psychology on the basis of instincts which he holds to be directly or indirectly the prime movers of all human activity, determining the end, and supplying the driving power, of all mental activities. 'All the complex intellectual apparatus of the most highly developed mind is but a means towards these ends, is but the instrument by which those impulses seek their satisfactions, while pleasure and pain do but serve to guide them in their choice of the means.' Without the instinctive dispositions 'the organism would become incapable of activity of any kind; it would lie inert and motionless like a wonderful clock-work whose mainspring had been removed or a steam-engine whose fires had been drawn'. The account is cast up to the effect that 'mankind is only a little bit rational, and to a great extent unintelligently moved in quite unreasonable ways'. A lofty role is assigned to

¹ Cf. L. L. Bernard, 'Address delivered before the Iowa Association of Economists and Sociologists', 1924; see the *Monist*, April 1927, p. 166.

instinct by Bertrand Russell. He declares it to be the source of vitality, the bond uniting the life of the individual with that of the race, and the means by which the collective life nourishes the life of the separate units.

The underlying truth which sustains the doctrine of instincts is the undoubted existence and strength of innate drives. Its error consists in building up a human nature on the basis of separate categories, so simple and rigid as to contradict the facts of experience and baffle explanation in terms of evolution. Instinctivism fails to grasp the interdependence of man and his environment and underrates the interfusion of human characteristics. The reaction it has provoked denies the existence of instincts altogether, regards them as hypotheses rather than facts, or stigmatizes instinctive theories as a refinement of the animistic interpretation, an explanation of something dark through something darker still.¹

Evolutionary psychology seeks to build on the plasticity which is the leading characteristic of life and which shows itself in a marvellous capacity for adaptation. The vital substance, protoplasm, tends by its nature to an enlargement of the sphere of its activity, to organization, to differentiation and aggregation of cells, and so on to further organization. The organism appropriates and assimilates new material, makes up for the inevitable waste and grows in size and complexity.

¹ L. L. Bernard, *op. cit.*, pp. 164, 177; J. Dewey, *Human Nature and Conduct*; C. S. Myers, *British Journal of Psychology*, 1910, p. 267; P. Sorokin, *Contemporary Sociological Theories*, pp. 615-16; also C. A. Ellwood, *The Psychology of Human Society*; J. R. Kantor, *Principles of Psychology*. 'One of the great evils of this artificial simplification is its influence upon the social sciences. Complicated provinces of life have been assigned to the jurisdiction of some special instinct or group of instincts; . . . All sociological facts are disposed of in a few fat volumes as products of imitation and invention or of co-operation and conflict.'—Dewey, *Human Nature and Conduct*, p. 132.

Nutrition is the prime demand of life and to its exigencies it has sought to adapt itself in numberless ways. To ascribe it to an instinct of self-preservation is tautological; it is tantamount to saying that life functions as life. But in the social no less than in the biological sciences it is important to bear in mind that the search for nutrition forms the salient factor in the history of life.

Reproduction Ceaseless wear and tear lead inevitably to the dissolution of the organism but life has successfully adapted itself to death. It has conquered death by means of reproduction. The process began with simple fission and, in highly developed species, works through differentiation of sex. The organism multiplies itself and, though individuals pass away, the race continues. With sexual reproduction life made the most momentous advance towards increase and also became highly complex. Reproduction is not the function of any single instinct; it involves the whole being of the organism. There still survive misfits among species in which reproduction means certain death to the parent or in which the male, diminutive in size, is eaten up as soon as his function is over. It is only natural that among the most highly developed species the exigencies of reproduction should suffuse the whole being. To explain nutrition and reproduction by hunger and sex is to be deceived by symptomatic urges. They are phases in the whole process of life. To regard them as instinctive only means at bottom that life sustains itself, in other words, that life behaves as life.

Adaptability Adaptability is the master feature of life and is responsible for the numberless forms it has assumed and for the characteristics of each species. Adaptation indeed is not so direct as the older biologists thought. 'The range of relations between the living creature and its surroundings is a very complex one—of functional dependence, of periodic punctuation, of transient adjustment, of more lasting adjustment, of

permanent modification, of variational stimulus, of elimination or selection, up to active initiative upon the organism's part. . . .¹ In the domain of biology nothing is so fascinating or so important as the urge towards the progressive adaptation of species to the totality of the environment in which they may find themselves. A single mutation in the process of growth calls out a number of corresponding adjustments. Every step in adaptation exercises a stabilizing influence and limits the possibilities of further development. The biological failures are not less instructive than the successes. But viewed as a whole, life seems to fit into every imaginable environment and flourishes in hot springs as well as below the freezing point. It adapts itself not only to the inorganic but also to the organic surroundings in numberless ways.² As Darwin pointed out, the structure of every organic being is related essentially to that of all other organic beings with which it has to compete for food or residence, on which it preys or from which it seeks to escape. It is by means of adaptation that life meets new demands and utilizes or masters the environment. There is a limit to biological adaptation, and further differentiation and specialization beyond it threatens the internal balance; but life has succeeded, though not without much waste, in forcing development along social and mental lines.

There are species in which individuals are not disparate at all but are joined together. In most cases, however, development has resulted in a break-up of the biological unity, that is to say, in discrete individuality; but the resulting needs of the adjustments of individuals to one another issue in inter-stimulation and response,—in social life. Here are the rudiments of mentality. Mentality and sociality constitute a single series of mutations in the life process—a higher

**Mentality
and sociality**

¹ J. A. Thomson and Patrick Geddes, *Evolution*, pp. 198-99.

² J. A. Thomson, *The Study of Animal Life*, revised edition, ch. ii-iv.

psychic variation of the primitive physical unity. Nutrition and reproduction involve the living together of members of the same species in groups and render their life interdependent. Mentality and sociality have the highest survival value, facilitating control over food and shelter, headway against obstacles and defence against enemies. The habits of group life are strengthened and biologically transmitted. The needs of new adjustments, of selection from among numerous stimuli, further develop mentality which indeed is essentially purposive and which attempts to bring the organism and the environment into mutual correspondence.

The severe competition for the means of sustenance and the preying of species on species consolidate group life. At the same time the impact of the environment, the obstacles, and the advantages of mutual aid, revealed gradually by experience, lead to a vast deal of intra-specific and inter-specific co-operation. Sociality has been a condition, so essential and indispensable to all higher life, that it seems almost to partake of its nature. There is scarcely a limit to the variety of its manifestations in accordance with the multifarious needs of species and exigencies of the environment. Life calls to life in myriad ways. For instance, insects and birds are instrumental in the fertilization of plants and in the blooming of flowers and illustrate inter-specific co-operation. Not less instructive are 'strange partnerships' like those of the beef-eater birds (*Buphagus*) perching merrily on cattle to extract grubs from the skin, and the Egyptian plover (*Pluvianus Aegypticus*) cleaning the gaping mouth of the crocodile. Swan-mussels attach themselves to small marine fishes. In their turn some small fishes (*Nomeus gronovii*), accompany the large Cœlenterate Physalia. And so on.¹ Gregariousness is a salient

¹ J. A. Thomson, *The Study of Animal Life*, revised edition, ch. v.

characteristic even of some very low forms of animal life. Under certain conditions protozoa and small crustaceans aggregate in multitudes in fresh as well as salt water. Lice collect on plants and ciliated infusoria on suitable spots. Lemmings gather together in large numbers before they migrate.¹ There are many animals like caterpillars, some butterflies, autumn salamanders, lizards, snakes, etc., which apparently live in solitude but which congregate to sleep, to breed, to hibernate or to migrate.²

Numberless species live in societies of different degrees of permanence, even forming families of various types within them. The societies of some animals are 'closed' ones, very helpful among themselves but rigidly trying to keep outsiders at a distance; while other societies are 'open', that is to say, more hospitable communities. Among these animals sexual behaviour ranges from promiscuity to seasonal or permanent mateship, of a polygynous, polyandrous or monogamous character. Among some of them sex-rivalry develops into deadly struggle, the victorious male assuming the leadership of the females and forming a regular harem. These harems may be exclusive societies as among the primitive Asiatic wild horses or they may be components of larger temporary federations as among the zebras. Beavers live in families of about six members each but many families congregate in communities and co-operate in log-rolling, wood-cutting, digging canals and damming rivers, sometimes on a stupendous scale. Birds nest together, migrate in large flocks and have been known in many instances to die away in solitude.³ Some other animals also grow melancholy, sometimes to death, in solitude. The gorilla has been observed to live in monogamous

**Animal
societies**

¹ Fr. Alverdes, *Social Life in the Animal World*, tr. K. C. Creasy, pp. 14-16. Thomson, *op. cit.*

² Fr. Alverdes, *op. cit.*, pp. 20-33. Thomson, *op. cit.*

³ Fr. Alverdes, *op. cit.*, pp. 24-82.

families in hordes with nests in ordered groups carefully rearing and training the young.¹

The relations of groups of the same species and of members of the same group certainly show instances of intolerance and strife, of deadly assault on the sick, of the incapable or wounded being killed and devoured.² Apart from self-assertion or perversion, there is the conflict from competition for nutrition, shelter or mates. But the internal relations of groups are also characterized by a high degree of co-operation and mutual aid, often accompanied by division of labour and organization.³ While some animal groups are leaderless,

¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 49-53, quoting *inter alia*, Reichenow, Von Kappenfels and Zenker. On the whole subject of animal social life see Thomson, *op. cit.*

² Fr. Alverdes, *op. cit.*, pp. 137-41.

³ P. A. Kropotkin in *Mutual Aid*, ch. ii-iii, has collected numerous striking illustrations of mutual aid among animals. For instance, pelicans 'always go fishing in numerous bands, and after having chosen an appropriate bay, they form a wide half-circle in face of the shore, and narrow it by paddling towards the shore, catching all fish that happen to be enclosed in the circle. On narrow rivers and canals they even divide into two parties, each of which draws up on a half-circle, and both paddle to meet each other, As the night comes they fly to their resting-places—always the same for each flock—and no one has ever seen them fighting for the possession of either the bay or the resting-place. . . . ' Pp. 23-24.

Cranes live amicably among themselves and in peace with most aquatic birds. 'Their sentries always keep watch around a flock which is feeding or resting. . . . If man has succeeded in surprising them, they will never return to the same place without having sent out one single scout first and a party of scouts afterwards; and when the reconnoitring party returns and reports that there is no danger, a group of scouts is sent out to verify that first report, before the whole band moves. . . . ' *Ibid.*, p. 27.

' Birds which have lived for months in small bands scattered over a wide territory gather in thousands; they come together at a given place, for several days in succession, before they start, and they evidently discuss the particulars of the journey. . . . All wait for their tardy congeners. . . . ' *Ibid.*, pp. 36-37.

'The villages of the prairie dogs in America are one of the

there are others in which a leader is more or less definitely marked out and in which 'the attitude towards him becomes a most important factor in the maintenance of social cohesion'.¹ All these features really represent the necessary adaptation of life to the conditions of existence. Darwin pointed out that sociability was the best means of escape from various dangers, that solitary life would mean death on a large scale and that the communities which contained the largest number of the most sympathetic members would flourish best and leave the most numerous progeny behind. It is clear that co-operative division of labour would enrich and prolong life, would enlarge opportunities of self-assertion and help modifications towards that variation which leads off in any evolutionary process.

It is necessary to emphasize the well-nigh universal role of sociability and co-operation as the condition of all higher existence and development. The early evolutionists brought into bold relief the

loveliest sights. . . . Whole families come out of their galleries and indulge in play. . . . They go visiting one another. . . .'
Ibid., p. 44.

'In Eastern Siberia hundreds of thousands of deer came together from immense territories at a single point for migrations.'
Ibid., pp. 48-49.

'Life in societies enables the feeblest insects, the feeblest birds, and the feeblest mammals to resist, or to protect themselves from, the most terrible birds and beasts of prey; it permits longevity; it enables the species to rear its progeny with the least waste of energy and to maintain its numbers albeit at a very slow birth-rate; it enables the gregarious animals to migrate in search of new abodes. Therefore, while fully admitting that force, swiftness, protective colours, cunningness, and endurance to hunger and cold, which are mentioned by Darwin and Wallace, are so many qualities making the individual, or the species, the fittest under certain circumstances, we maintain that under *any* circumstances sociability is the greatest advantage in the struggle for life.' *Ibid.*, p. 57.

On the whole subject, see W. Köhler, *The Mentality of Apes*, translated from the second revised edition by Ella Winter; also J. H. Fabre, *Social Life in the Insect World*, trans. B. Miall.

¹ W. H. R. Rivers, *Psychology and Politics*, p. 40.

facts of competition and struggle which agreed with the dominant political temper of the times. They were accepted without the requirements of discrimination and qualifications by many sociologists and they still colour some political theories. The struggle, specially among members of the same species, an incident of the paucity of the means of subsistence and shelter—and of recreation and sex-gratification has been fraught with momentous consequences for the evolutionary process. But there is nothing natural about it; it does not inhere in life; it is not a necessary condition of life.

Social evolution is fundamentally a continuation of, and a variation on, biological development and in its turn involves biological repercussions, some of them of the most direct and important character. It is responsible for the emergence of child forms which call for prolonged care on the part of at least one of the progenitors, lead to the family and deepen and extend co-operation. Hence it develops sympathy—feeling for others or like others—which has a high survival value and which assumes numerous forms. Its range varies according to the areas of interdependence, and at higher stages, according to its cultivation; but it is never altogether absent from any type of associated life. When the human stage is attained, development is intensified along social lines. Sympathy deepens into affections—appreciations of others—narrow and wide, according to the circumstances of the family or group life, traditions and moral culture. Affections may concentrate on specific objects or situations in all sorts of ways as sentiments. In this inter-play of psychic forces, institutions and of the environment, interstimulation and response lead to various forms of suggestion, imitation and repulsion, co-operation and hostility, fear and attachment.

The development of a rich and varied social life widens enormously the possibilities of individual expression and strengthens individuality. The individual is necessarily an

outcome of the same processes.

Society and the individual

There is a basic correlation between the development of individuality and sociability. Both, in fact, are aspects of the same factor. The self, the mind, or consciousness, is a social product. Various capacities have developed amidst group-life to facilitate adjustments and inter-actions. Personality is the subjective aspect of the opportunities and possibilities of social life. The last antithesis that science can admit is the one between the man and society.

Development of personality

The rudiments of 'individuality' are observable in some of the higher species of animals. It becomes more definite among men naturally with the maturity of intelligence and intensification of social life. Specialists have shown that individuality is not altogether lacking among savages. It expands and gains in strength as life becomes fuller, richer and more creative, receiving and giving help in an increasing measure. Individuality and sociality tend to ripen together and necessarily interpenetrate each other. The vital urge seeks satisfaction qualitatively as well as quantitatively so that satisfaction is always followed by fresh aspiration. The growth of opportunity for the ceaseless drive develops a dynamic personality which continually re-creates itself. Men are 'confluent' as William James put it, members of one another, as Saint Paul said. Man's whole being craves for response from others and is saturated with social relationships.¹ Individuals exist only in society, and individuals interdependence, exists only in individuals.

¹ Cf. F. H. Bradley, speaking of man: 'He is penetrated, soul within him is saturated with his fellows. . . . The assimilated, has built itself up, is qualified by, it has with, the universal life; as up from, it is one and the same life against himself; if he turns against this, he turns against it, he sets it from him, he tears his own vitals; the weapon against his own heart.'



another in the highest sense of the terms. There is 'transfer' of meaning between persons and society, as Giddings says, in interstimulation and response.

Human disposition The evolutionary background enables us to understand that the so-called instincts represent cumulative and inherited adaptations, more or less flexible, according to the exigencies of life. They involve the whole organism, not merely a specific physiological organ or psychological disposition.¹ They are fused together not as mechanical combinations but as chemical compounds. They function only in response to stimuli and the modes of their expression are determined by the totality of the environment. Intelligence or reason does not stand apart from them, but is latent and suffused in them. If the so-called 'instincts' could exist independently of reason, they would be too inchoate and indefinite to guide man through the mazes of the physical and vital environment, to effect the requisite adjustment, adaptation and control, or to impart any centrality to responses. They would not possess much survival value. They would be lost in entanglements which deliberation alone can resolve. Instincts have become rigid and mechanical among some insects and other lower forms of life because the development of their intelligence has stopped at a rudimentary stage. Nevertheless, there are animals which are known to learn from experience or through the method of trial and error. In the human phase, experience admits of infinite transmutation, sublimation and control. The whole attempt to distinguish instinct and intelligence in human life, must be given up as futile and unscientific.²

¹ Cf. J. Dewey, *Human Nature and Conduct*, pp. 148 ff.

² W. H. R. Rivers, *Psychology and Politics*, p. 30. Nearly all writers on instinct agree that 'whatever may be the case in such animals as insects, purely instinctive behaviour is almost unknown in the case of the higher animals, and specially in man. There is much reason to believe that it is only on the first occasion on which an example of innate behaviour occurs that it can be regarded as purely instinctive, and that directly this behaviour is modified by

As the Behaviourist psychologists have demonstrated, the mind of the child is highly plastic and a good deal of so-called instinctive behaviour really depends on conditions of the environment.

In its outward drive life explores the environment, adjusts itself to it and controls it in varying degrees. It develops the senses, mentality and sociality, with their levels of chemotropic, reflex and impulsive behaviour and a capacity for learning from experience. The raw material of character and institutions is always plastic and liable to run into divers moulds. All sorts of obstructions present themselves and give rise to all sorts of desires—forward urges to break through them—entailing fresh activities. Paradoxical as it may seem, the degree of rigidity and fixity which human dispositions actually show is due to their essential plasticity. Men fit themselves, according to their opportunities, into traditions and institutions which have acquired fixity and rigidity because of their past or present social utility. Habits, once formed, are strengthened through repetitions of similar activities and themselves become the central point of moral adjustment.

The social life of man is a network of endless processes, surges and setbacks, expansions and contractions in all directions. Consciously or unconsciously, men adapt themselves in various ways to climatic, economic and political conditions. In the life of groups, there are numerous adaptations which embody themselves in traditions, which are not biologically inherit-

experience, even by the experience derived from the first performance, it is no longer purely instinctive'. *Ibid.*, p. 31.

L. L. Bernard, *The American Journal of Sociology*, vol. xxix (1924), p. 671, concludes that the inherited equipment of man 'does not consist of Mr. McDougall's seven or twelve or thirteen or more instincts, nor of Prof. James's forty or fifty instincts, but of hundreds or even thousands of much simpler processes, reflexes, etc., which underlie habits and are lost in them in their completed form'.

ed, but which are socially transmitted. In terms of them individuals tend to adapt themselves to their circumstances and opportunities. To underrate the force and variety of adaptability is to open the flood-gates of sociological error. It is to confuse acquired with innate characteristics, and a specific social order with a so-called natural order. It is to mistake transient diversities for permanent barriers and seriously to under-estimate the capacity of man to overhaul his institutions.

Social development The development of personality depends on social organization and suffers, in proportion to the organization itself, from ignorance and error and environmental drawbacks. Civilized group life multiplies man's chances of pain and pleasure, of satisfaction, frustration and aspiration, of mutual help and obstruction. It implies a continuous morality and a ceaseless responsibility. Man has constantly to master afresh the art of living together and to develop an inner balance and harmony infinitely more subtle than what suffices for the simpler planes of animal life. Human development is an essay in the art of harmonious living and expansion, acquired through endless adaptation and trial and error.

No final goal The law of life rules out permanent satisfaction of a static character. Striving is of the very essence of the vital principle, specially in the human phase. No ultimate goal can be prescribed for human life; no perfect social organization can be postulated. Man will always move onwards and every possible state will be but the earnest of what is to follow. We cannot imagine a state in which all potentiality and realization are exhausted. New knowledge and desires, new satisfactions and aspirations, new situations and organizations will always be in store. Nor can personalities be standardized in any age or clime. Human mentality possesses a degree of elasticity that spells a difference of outlook and taste between every two persons. Every

individual seeks expression in his own manner, in spite of any standardized social education or outward conformity to a common way. There is no single formula of self-realization. Happiness, said Aristotle, is a complete living out of all a man's possibilities. These possibilities are, however, infinite and can neither be foreseen nor defined in their totality. The role of social philosophy is not to lay down immutable ideals true for all time nor to devise short cuts, simple and direct, to happiness. It is enough to discover conditions favourable to the development and expression of the personality of all and to draw attention to the means of bringing about those conditions.

The conditions of development must vary with time and place, but there are a few considerations of such rigidity and general character that they may be said to hold good of human society at large. The foundation of all favourable conditions is that social organization should never be so rigid as to discourage all change. It should never regard mere stability as the main object, and blind conformity as the virtue *par excellence*. Secondly, every person should have the chance to exercise his pull on society and the rest of the environment. Otherwise he will fail to develop his personality, to rise to the full stature of his capacity, and to participate fully in the large life of which he is a part. He needs liberty which has been best defined as capacity for continuous initiative. Under normal circumstances, man's sociability will tend to harmonize his liberty with that of his fellows, that is, with the general interest. High social development rebases and multiplies opportunities of contact and initiative and widens the scope of liberty, which, indeed, subject to social accommodation, can never be too large. Liberty is really an aspect of the endeavour which is life and is an end so far as life is an end. Without it, life would be truncated and incomplete, out of harmony with itself and the environment. The greatest of all tragedies is to suppress liberty under the weight of custom

or convention, education or ignorance, poverty or riotous abundance.

Akin to this is the third condition that every person should have his share of activity and creative-
Creativeness ness. Men like to work, for inactivity would be tantamount to a denial of the principle of life. Pure idleness is a malady. Activity as such requires no motive; it is natural, as the life of birds and other animals and children shows. Human likes and dislikes relate to the kind and direction of activity. And here the most important fact is that every job is not congenial to every one. Taste and temperament differ so widely that subject to the social interest, every person should have the widest latitude and, therefore, a thorough general equipment, for choosing a vocation. Habit does render initially unpalatable work more than tolerable and engages the deeper interests in it. But the fact remains that only to the extent that his work becomes congenial to him, does a person delight in it, put his best into it, and, by virtue of creative activity fulfil himself. The creativeness of nature is the place, a synthesis of Bergson and the leading idea in Lloyd Morgan's *Emergent Evolution*. For human life it has the deepest be said significance and points to one of the basic conditions of most ion shood life.

It Poets, painters, writers, preachers in truths. They ve & Leisure others whose vocation accord stimulate further nd their temperaments and calls ng-stones to real ties into play have been known to be co the environment. in their work and to labour unremiti levied a heavy manual work, specially when bereft o is a source of exhausts the interest sooner. Long hours and which is the threat of starvation not merely rob mena, it acts as pleasure but play havoc with life and ction. From the of creativeness. i clings to error

In any case a fair margin of recreation to the growth of personality. Adequate l ignorance and makes work more endurable but preserves ble to this day

and affords opportunities of some creative work outside the main occupation.¹ The need of leisure and of its creative use is greater in proportion as work is uncongenial, arduous or prolonged.

Growth of
personality

Such are some of the major conditions of growth or self-realization, the *sine qua non* of happiness.

The
democratic
process

Liberty, creativeness and leisure are not static conceptions. They are capable of expansion and enrichment with the progress of mental and social development. They are possible to the many only in proportion as the material environment has been brought under control to provide a secure material basis for common life. They depend also on the efficiency of organization conceived in the general interest. To the extent that material welfare, liberty, creativeness and leisure are secured and the avenues of aspiration opened, not to a few here and there but to the mass of the people under all skies, can democracy, in the deeper sense of the term, be said to have been achieved. The democratic process consists in the movement towards conditions favourable to the whole of humanity for growth, expansion and enrichment of personality. Democracy is as yet an aspiration rather than a reality, but it is instructive to to rise the chief historical factors which have helped or fully in the progress of humanity towards it.

liberty which has art and play is to engage and release impulses ous initiative. Tent from those in which they are occupied and ability will tend any activities. . . . Art releases energy and fellows, that is, quillizes it. It releases energy in constructive development re Human Nature and Conduct, pp. 161-62, 163.

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CHAPTER III

DRIVES AND OBSTACLES

THE powers which man has developed confront him with the task of balancing his wants, satisfactions and aspirations and synthesizing them with his growing knowledge, resources and organization. His life is a perennial adventure, fruitful in proportion to intelligent control of the environment and of his own impulses and dispositions. It is this control which must be regarded as the criterion of civilization and progress. It depends primarily on the acquisition of knowledge, its diffusion and its application, along with expansion of the social sympathies. It is, however, only slowly that the human mind has pierced the mysteries of nature and of its own constitution and working. Knowledge is still, and perhaps will always be, far from perfect.

Ignorance Ignorance has always exposed man to risks from the physical and organic environment, fraught with privations, suffering and death. Ignorance hampers the adoption of right attitudes of mind and the discernment of the means of satisfying human needs. The intellectual search has often led to partial truths. They contribute to well-being so far as they stimulate further investigation, serve the purpose of stepping-stones to real knowledge and enhance the control over the environment. But elements of error in half-truths have levied a heavy toll on personality and happiness. Here is a source of discomfort from which animals are free and which is peculiar to man. Like some other phenomena, it acts as both a drive and an obstacle to self-realization. From the force of habit and tradition, the mind often clings to error with tenacity.

The misery and suffering produced by ignorance and error are writ large on history and are visible to this day

in every land. Under their influence, curiosity and fear have peopled the earth and the waters, the winds and the heavens, with gods and devils, sometimes calling for human mutilation and sacrifice and waste of hard-earned treasure. Primitive man stood in terror before his own shadow and trembled at the echo of his own voice. Dreams and hysteria and ecstasies left him bewildered and clouded his vision. Magic alone has led to horrible suspicions and atrocities. Divination, as the art of healing, has often intensified suffering. The nature of life and death has been misunderstood so that man has betaken himself to asceticism and inflicted gratuitous tortures and even death on himself. Certain practices observed by travellers and anthropologists among backward peoples furnish gruesome reading. Darwin recorded of a New Zealand tribe that after the death of a chieftain's daughter the relatives tore the flesh of their arms, faces and bodies and were covered with clotted blood. Among the Mandans and the Charruas, the death of a relative or the head of the family was the occasion of the cutting off of fingers, while among Mexicans and some other American tribes it was preceded or followed by holocausts of slaves and the suicide of wives, concubines, relations, friends, or followers, expected to accompany the deceased. Human sacrifices were offered to the gods or the spirits of the dead in many parts of the world. As late as 1880 it was reported that seven hundred men, women, boys, girls, priests and followers, were sacrificed at Mandalay for the restoration of the Burmese king Thebaw's health. On a still larger scale, as Lester F. Ward points out, has been the destruction of property at funerals. Vast stores of food, clothing, furniture, boats, ornaments and other valuables have been buried or burnt with the dead, to the ruin of the survivors.¹

¹ For the matter of this paragraph, the writer is chiefly indebted to L. F. Ward, *Dynamic Sociology*, vol. ii, pp. 288-96; *Applied Sociology*, pp. 68-75 and the references cited by him,

Illustrations
of the effect
of ignorance
and error

With the advance of civilization, science and philosophy have conquered large tracts from ignorance and error; but only a few rays of enlightenment have so far reached the mass of humanity, so that the favoured few are also dragged down by the force of dynamic pseudo-knowledge. Error is still lodged, for instance, in theological dogmas, in notions about the superiority and inferiority of groups, in narrow views of interests and means of their fulfilment. Naturally, error grafts itself on law, custom, traditions and institutions. It does sometimes open the avenues to the discovery of truth and prompt the relief of suffering. But in so far as it hampers large-scale reform, it obstructs human betterment.

Next to ignorance and error, indeed in alliance with them, material insufficiency has exerted the most potent influence on the career of man. It is, in fact, largely responsible for the sub-human processes of evolution, leading to adaptations through competition and conflict. The colossal destruction of life is matched by stupendous fecundity which in its turn intensifies the struggle until nature is literally red in tooth and claw.

Groups in various species partly meet the situation by striving at the exclusive appropriation of certain materials, annexation of areas and accumulation of supplies. So begins property, which has had an instructive history among sub-human species. It is the natural concomitant of foresight; of intelligence acting with the vital urges and evolving a characteristic which is strengthened by its survival value and which is transmitted. For instance, some fishes at pairing-time annex areas for exclusive use, driving the others away. Pairs of birds assert proprietary rights in their nests and in the neighbourhood. Communities of house-sparrows bitterly fight others who may chance specially Herbert Spencer, *Principles of Sociology and Ceremonial Institutions*.

to invade their domains. Dogs, apes, antelopes and others carve out domains and contest their possession with all their might against any intruders. Communities of ants have their special hunting grounds which other ants can enter only at deadly peril. Colonies of ants, termites, wasps, bees and beetles accumulate huge amounts of food in their habitations. Birds, apes, even leopards, are known to store. All this is mostly group property, open to the use of members, but not to others, except sometimes by way of hospitality. Among animals which have developed something like families, property tends to assume the more exclusive form of family property. Scarcity may now and then result in a scramble among members of the same group or family. It is at this point that individual property appears and its emergence is assisted by the growth of individuality, competition for mates and delight in playthings. The 'harems' observable among some species partake of the nature of property. Among some birds, females fight one another to secure males who may be in possession of some territory. Captive monkeys, baboons and others have been known to regard tin cans, rubber balls, corks, etc. as private property, to lodge small objects in their cheek-pouches, and to carry them to their sleeping-places at night or to hide them.¹ Among some species of animals, group property preponderates, while family property and individual property are not unknown—all of them, of course, in a rudimentary form.

The human phase marks a continuation of this development in some respects. Tools, weapons and
Property among men adornments were among the earliest human possessions. But a series of revolutions radically transformed the situation. Physiological and psychic

¹ Fr. Alverdes, *op. cit.*, pp. 160-63; P. A. Kropotkin, *Mutual Aid*, pp. 24, 37. See also W. M. Wheeler, *Social Life among the Insects*; W. Köhler, *The Mentality of Apes*, trans. Ella Winter; J. H. Fabre, *Social Life in the Insect World*, trans. B. Miall.

development greatly reduces fecundity in man, but the birth rate still outruns the natural death rate. At the same time, the increasing control over the environment, especially the marked superiority over animals, partly arrest premature loss of life. The needs of food become greater and greater and are largely met by co-operative hunting and fishing, the domestication of animals and above all, the practice of agriculture. But the increased supply, in its turn, facilitates the growth of numbers and the balance is redressed, only in part, by natural cataclysms, famines, voluntary restriction of population and later by wars and epidemics. The pressure on the means of subsistence prompts exclusive possession by groups, families and individuals.

There is not a phase of human life and history but has been coloured by property. The growth of human needs and aspirations enhanced the utility of property. The sense of possession was deepened and transmitted by social tradition, and property became almost an extension of personality. Pasture, agriculture and industry extended the tentacles of property through the entire range of social life and gave rise to new needs and aspirations. A fresh significance was added to property when it became exchangeable and a rough measure of human convenience, comfort and leisure. The competition for its acquisition has not merely affected its accumulation but also tended to make it one of the standard measures of human worth.

Property has always been held on a variety of tenures. As a rule, every organized group has simultaneously exhibited group property, family property and individual property without clearly demarcating one form from another. Among backward peoples, the pasture lands and natural resources are tribal property, largely divided among various branches or families of the tribe, to be used in the common interest. At the same time there is a great deal of family property,

The significance of property


Tenures of property

while strictly individual property often appears in weapons, tools, playthings, etc. The use of the last type of property is roughly subject to the interests and convenience of the family, while a general control over it as well as over family property is exercised through tribal custom.¹

Social control of property In advanced civilizations, property has followed countless tenures with various groups and times, ranging from complete communism to the most exclusive possession by families and individuals. Often, several forms have co-existed in the same community at the same time. From the standpoint of practical use, it has not generally been possible to draw a hard and fast line between the property rights of the community, sub-groups, families and individuals. An invariable concomitant of the institution has been a certain measure of social control exercised through custom, law and opinion. The dominant attitude towards property in a group has usually been determined by the form of tenure dominant at the time. The sentiments associated with it are partly a matter of social heritage. But there is no particular system of property ordained by nature and instinct. All property is a function of social requirements and its tenure is always liable to change with the changing ideas and environment.

Social stratification The history of property is dovetailed into that of social stratification, which indeed arose at the same time and partly from the same causes as led to systems of property. Groups were formed on the bases of kinship, endogamy, exogamy and neighbourhood. Whenever they coalesced, a composite community came into existence. Material insufficiency and the hard labour often inseparable from acquisition lie at the root of the division of groups into classes and castes. In spite of pasture, agriculture and industry, in fact partly because of them, population tended to increase beyond those means of subsistence and comfort which were within easy reach

¹ Franz Boas, *Anthropology and Modern Life*, pp. 227-28.



of a group. The growth of the means of luxury and decoration added to objects of jealousy. Hence conflicts between groups for the appropriation of territories, resources and accumulations of all kinds. The need or lust for women supplied a contributory cause. Defeat might be followed by the total or partial extermination of a group or, specially after the adoption of agriculture, by the capture of men for toil and of women for toil and concubinage or marriage. So began the process of enslavement of which the world has not yet seen the end. Since early times, however, slavery has often been mitigated into, or supplemented by, somewhat milder subjection, calculated to confer leisure, if not plenty as well, on the conquerors. Thus there would arise a community of a new character, comprising a section of masters and other sections of slaves, serfs or subjects.

**Amalgama-
tion**

But developments of a different character would soon set in. Time would soften the animosity between the conquerors and the conquered; old memories would fade and the natural play of the human sympathies would often bring the two nearer. Sex would overstep any barriers and concubinage or intermarriage would rapidly fuse the border-line sections of the two groups, sometimes creating new classes. Many slaves would win emancipation and become something like wage-earners. The stress of war might mean comradeship in arms between the two groups and gradually relax the stringency of the servile status. The dominant group would not always be united within itself and its factions might call the aid of the lower classes to redress the balance, thus bridging the gulf of old. The subject groups might, under favourable circumstances, successfully agitate for the removal of their grievances or silently work their way up. New and sometimes old vocations might draw recruits from various sections of the community and create fresh groups before which the ancient divisions would fade into insignificance.

Economic groups Social stratification is brought about concurrently by economic and cultural causes. Differences of efficiency, foresight and luck would lead to inequalities in the possessions of families and individuals and ultimately issue in relations of lordship and service.¹ The rise of handicrafts and commercial vocations would lead to the formation of fresh groups on the principle of the division of labour.

Priests On a wider scale, the same principle would throw up classes of magicians, rain-makers and priests. It would be their function, after a certain stage of religious development, to preserve intact the beliefs about spirits and gods and the corresponding ritual, to divine and influence the intentions of the higher powers, to offer libations and sacrifices to them on behalf of the community and to uphold the social *mores*. The priests would tend to function as the spiritual guardians, law-givers and judges of the community. A new class would thus spring up in course of time and often become hereditary. It may be added that the inevitable diversity of religious notions and ceremonies would often exert a centrifugal influence. Animism or polytheism is not

¹ Cf. F. Oppenheimer, *The State*, pp. 34-35:—

Among herdsmen, 'an especially clever breeder will see his herd increase rapidly, while an especially careful watchman and bold hunter will preserve his from decimation by beasts of prey. The element of luck also affects the result. One of these herders finds an especially good grazing ground and healthful watering places; the other one loses his entire stock through pestilence, or through a snowfall or a sandstorm. . . . The herdsman who has lost all must hire himself to the rich man; and sinking thus under the other become dependent on him. . . . Meitzen reports of the Lapps, nomadic in Norway. "Three hundred reindeer sufficed for one family; who owned only a hundred must enter the service of the richer, whose herds ran up to a thousand head." The same writer, speaking of the Central Asiatic nomads, says: "A family required three hundred head of cattle for comfort; one hundred head is poverty, followed by a life of debt. The servant must cultivate the lands of the lord."'

usually intolerant and persecuting but its diversities help the sense of separation and hamper intermixture.

Another social class would be produced by the necessities of actual and latent struggles. A body of captains and warriors would arise to form the nucleus of any tribal mobilization to defend their community and to attack others, to hold down subject populations and, often in co-operation with priests, to conduct such government as might be needed. The martial, religious and economic groupings are supplemented by other interest groups and associations. Heinrich Schurtz and other anthropologists have collected evidence to prove that interest groups and associations sprang up in early societies on the bases of sex, age, matrimonial status, amusements, neighbourhood, common sympathies and tastes. Societies would thus comprise primary as well as secondary associations, horizontal as well as vertical groups. The various divisions would overlap so as to render society more and more complex. When such a composite community was defeated and subjugated by another, some of its groups or associations might wholly or partly disintegrate and the status of others might alter in various measures. The intricate processes of subjection, amalgamation and adjustment have continued up to modern times and have, for the most part, enlarged and complicated the social structures.

This social development is profoundly influenced by, and at the same time influences, the distribution of wealth and culture. The conquering groups exercise lordship over a disproportionately large area of the land and establish the first claim on all the produce. They enjoy greater opportunities of profiting by industry and commerce. Social changes necessarily modify this monopoly or advantage; the traditions of lordship and inequality shift their incidence; but in any case one or more groups stand out as wealthier than others. The advantages of large landowning remain

The distribution of wealth

with the few, but social development throws open other forms of wealth to competition. On the one hand, wealth has a tendency to impart solidity and permanence to groups. On the other hand, its distribution shifts with discovery and invention, and leads to a fresh equilibration of the social forces. The energetic pursuit of wealth calls forth all the energies of man, enhances the social dividend, brings out new conveniences and comforts and raises the standard of life of many sections of the community. But it also gives its possessors power over the careers and services of others. It annexes a great deal of political power and becomes the sure mark of rank and superiority.

The distribution of wealth has a natural, though rough, correlation with that of culture. As society develops, knowledge accumulates; hypotheses and dogmas multiply; social experience is analysed and codified; literature and art each follow diverse paths. Normally the cultural tradition is transmitted from generation to generation but a familiarity with it, a life of culture that is to say, depends on leisure and facilities of education. The priestly and wealthy classes have, in historical times, been the depositaries of culture and exercised the power which knowledge imparts. In part, indeed, culture has filtered down to the mass of the people but mostly it has been the prerogative of the few. The vehicle of higher culture has sometimes been a dead or artificial language, incomprehensible to the common man and requiring, as in the case of Sanskrit, long years of leisure to master. Modern philology has revealed the existence of many such aristocratic speeches in historical times. Also, some ancient priestly codes, which were based largely on custom, expressly forbade the communication of sacred lore to the 'lower orders' under threat of dire penalties to all concerned.¹ Knowledge and culture have

¹ Cf. the *Dharmasutras* of Gautama, Baudhayana, Apastamba and Vasishtha and the *Dharma Shastra* of Manu in ancient India.

been instrumental in advancing human-happiness, but the incidence of their distribution has not merely slowed down their progress but also intensified the domination of the few over the many.

Conquest, subjection, partial amalgamation, division of labour, unequal distribution of wealth and culture, have, along with kinship, endogamy, exogamy and neighbourhood, made social stratification a wellnigh universal phenomenon in historical times. It took the form of caste in ancient India, Babylonia, and other extensive regions in the Middle East and Near East, as also in Japan. Classical society rested on a basis of slavery, while the free citizens were also divided into classes.¹ In Sparta, the conquered helots were somewhat like public slaves, while the mixed *Perioeci* paid tribute to the Spartans and, in historical times, had neither any civic privileges nor the right to intermarry with the Spartans. In later Roman society, status, wealth and occupation were for the most part hereditary. In medieval and modern Europe and in many other regions, the gradation took the form of classes. Many societies have been divided into priests, chieftains, commoners and slaves.

The gradation represents a stage in evolution inevitable under conditions of insufficiency, severe toil, struggle and grave inequalities of culture. It ensured a certain degree of security, comfort, leisure and culture to the higher classes. The groups socialized their members, promoted habits of toleration and co-operation within their ranks, and preserved and transmitted traditions of culture. They deepened the sympathies and formed the object of loyalties so that the individual would transcend himself and realize his identity with a larger whole. They established traditions of hard work and, to that extent, assisted the exploitation of natural resources.

¹ One of the most noteworthy divisions was that between the patricians and plebeians in Rome.

At the same time, the exclusiveness of classes and groups and the domination of some over others have obstructed the attainment of the good life in many ways. The out-flow of sympathies has been checked and the formation of larger groups often hindered. The pride of birth or wealth undermines the dignity of man as man. The devices of domination curtail the liberty and moral growth of the masters. As Herbert Spencer pointed out, the Assyrian conqueror was tied to the rope with which he held his captive. Frustration has been the lot of the submerged classes. The vital urges, it is true, cannot be completely inhibited and some elemental gratifications have been open to most people. Men and women often accommodate themselves to the status of tutelage, subjection and even slavery, and manage to discover some avenues of pleasure and some aspirations to higher things. But for the most part life among the 'lower orders' remains incomplete and fragmentary, compared to the possibilities opened out by the progress of knowledge and culture. Barred from their share of the gains of civilization, the poor and the ignorant have been specially exposed to the terrors of superstition, mutual rancours and privations.

The darkness and indigence in the life of the masses has so far been the most glaring drawback of civilization. Slavery blighted the glory that was Greece and the splendour that was Rome. Caste was a doleful accompaniment of the flights of Indian metaphysics. Admiration of the pyramids of Egypt is tempered by the reflection that it was the lash which raised them aloft. Serfdom existed by the side of medieval chivalry and art. Until the nineteenth century women were rarely admitted to the higher cultural and political life of the community. Nor is their emancipation yet complete in many lands. Political prestige and economic exploitation are responsible for the bondage of millions in Asia and Africa in contrast to the loftier ideals which have emerged.

The root causes of this phenomenon are to be sought in the primordial insufficiency of the means of subsistence, their insecurity, the drudgery entailed by them, the consequent competition and struggle leading to various degrees of overlordship and subjection, development of caste and class, ignorance and error and the uneven distribution of leisure, wealth and culture. The surplus wealth which civilization rendered possible was mainly appropriated by the dominant classes and buttressed the class system. The traditions which grew out of this conjuncture of circumstances have grafted themselves on custom, law, institutions, ethics and opinion. The situation has been accepted by the majority of the people in history, especially by those who were more favourably situated than others.

Moral and social philosophy has often taken the facts of gradation for granted and sought to justify them. For ages it was believed that women were created for the pleasure and service of the other sex. Aristotle summoned nature to sanction the slavery of non-Greeks to those who were born masters. Hindu writers openly proclaimed that Sudras had been created from the feet of Brahma to minister to the higher 'twice-born' castes. Karl Marx quotes Joseph Townsend, an English clergyman, who wrote in 1785 that the poor multiplied in order to furnish a constant supply for the most servile, sordid and ignoble offices in the community. The more delicate were thus relieved from drudgery in order to pursue the appropriate higher callings and so the stock of human happiness was much increased.¹ Another

¹ Joseph Townsend's work was referred to approvingly in several government reports in England and enjoyed great popularity. Michael Thomas Sadler who enjoyed the reputation of a philanthropist, said in 1828: 'Poverty is the great weight which keeps the social machine going; remove that, and the gilded hands would not long be seen to move aloft, nor the melodious chimes be heard again.'

writer, Patrick Colquhoun, regarded poverty as an indispensable stimulus to labour and industry and thus a cause of wealth, comfort and refinement for the more fortunate. Civilization, he was convinced, could not exist without poverty. Treitschke declared that culture would be impossible without kitchen-maids, that millions must plough and forge and dig in order that a few thousands might write and paint and study and that the masses must remain the masses for ever. He conceded that it was the task of Government to reduce and mitigate distress; but the abolition of distress, he declared, was neither possible nor desirable. History records conscious attempts to keep the 'lower orders' in their place through the denial of opportunities for betterment. The Russian Tsardom was not the only despotism which deliberately refrained from adopting a policy of educating the masses. In some South American countries the hacendados were loath to place education within reach of the peon and *inquilino*, lest the *status quo* be disturbed.

**Drives and
obstacles**

In wealth and culture man had found the great instruments of developing his powers and of realizing his potentialities. Broadly speaking there was a general improvement in the level of his life. Many regions passed from savagery to barbarism and thence to civilization. But all along man had to struggle against environmental difficulties which, while certainly stimulating effort, discovery and invention, slowed down the pace of progress and generated conflict, inequalities and harsh conduct. Distributed unequally, wealth and culture often allied themselves to group selfishness and became instruments for maintaining relationships of exploiters and exploited. The same factors have served as drives and obstacles in social development. This dual role is explained by the difficulties of the environment and haphazard adaptation to the totality of a changing situation.



CHAPTER IV

ORGANIZATIONS

EVERY society as a whole, and often its component groups

Institutions also, develops usages to govern the reciprocal

relations of its members and to organize its material and moral resources for common ends. Time, utility and special interest win attachment and loyalty for these usages, so that they stand out as principles of social life. As such they are embodied in institutions which have well been defined as the 'established and recognized apparatus of social life,'¹ 'the modes or organs through which forms of society operate'.² The ideas and habits underlying institutions find objective expression in associations of a permanent character, assisting the fulfilment of the purposes of life. Thus the institution of marriage gives rise to

Associations the family; religion to churches; agriculture to

the village communities; industry to the guild; social order to the State, and so on. The associations rarely function in isolation from, or in perfect harmony with, one another. They cross at numerous points, tend to expand their jurisdiction and struggle among themselves. Their relative position and character alter with changing needs, ideas, and social stratification. As a whole, they conserve the gains of experience, maintain continuity with the past, guide the steps of every new generation along tried paths and, to a certain extent, harmonize and regulate the expression of personality.

According to their standards and resources, the associa-

The dual tions minister to the interests of their

role of asso- members. But their practical character is

ciations necessarily tinged by the spirit of exclusiveness

and domination which pervades most communities.

¹ L. T. Hobhouse, *Social Development*, p. 48.

² H. J. W. Hetherington and J. H. Muirhead, *Social Purpose*, p. 119.

Like the ideas, institutions and groupings already dealt with, the associations have played a dual role and both helped and hindered self-realization. Not only have they rendered undoubted services to humanity but they have also caused a great deal of social disharmony and damage to personality. They represent an endeavour, partly successful and partly frustrated, towards human development.

This is illustrated by the history of the most important of all associations—the family and the State.

The family

The family goes back to the sub-human stages of evolution; indeed, its rudiments can be discerned in some rather low forms of life. As a sort of fraternity, it has great survival value and is intertwined with groups which animals develop in quest of food, shelter and safety. Species of *Thaumtopoea*, like processionary caterpillars, emerging from the same mass of eggs, often live together. Child families, readily mingling together, are known to exist among *Hyponomeuta* caterpillars, herrings and other fishes. Among the mammalia, cachalots and their young stay together, with or without the mother, until maturity and even later.¹ The harems among animals and simian families have already been spoken of.²

The early human family was dovetailed into the kinship group and developed along various distinct lines. It is needless to enter here into the details of group marriage, exogamy, endogamy, matriarchy and patriarchy. The clan often eclipses the family but never supplants it. As social life develops and community is differentiated, the family is disentangled more and more from wider groups and limited to fewer functions. Whether joint or single, it gains in efficiency and, while discharging its essential functions, serves as an economic and cultural unit. It has been the greatest school of education and has often had a large share in setting the tone of society. It has canalized the most

**The family
and kinship**

¹ Fr. Alverdes, *op. cit.*, pp. 69-71.

² *Supra*, ch. ii.

powerful emotions and served to harmonize and sweeten the expression of life. It has lifted the individual beyond himself and has led him to identify his welfare, almost effortlessly, with that of a group. It can intensify the sympathies to the point of self-effacement and enable man to realize his spiritual possibilities. It has well been said that the first lesson of citizenship is learnt between the mother's kiss and the father's caress. On the other hand, the exclusiveness of the family has narrowed the range of fellow-feeling. Nature's own clique, it has appropriated a good deal of the affection, devotion and exertion which might have gone to the wider world. Here the evil spirit masquerades as an angel of light.¹ Long ago, Plato contemplated the abolition of the family for the Guardians in his ideal republic. An identical note has often been struck in later Utopian literature. In *The City of the Sun*, for instance, Campanella argued that self-love sprang from the family and that with its disappearance there would remain only love for the State. Sir Thomas More would place the family under rigid State control. Giovanni Rossi would prefer the suppression of the family to the banishment of the plagues, famines, wars and other great afflictions.

The larger organization, of which the family formed a part, was based primarily on kinship and
Leadership later on neighbourhood also. All co-operation rests on some division of labour and therefore on leadership, regulation and organization. Societies of animals show leadership, here and there of a very advanced and efficient type. Leadership develops further in human society. It has well been pointed out by Franz Boas that Eskimo society is fundamentally anarchical, but the tribal movements within it are determined by leaders of superior skill, energy, and experience. Among North American Indians, the food requirements of tribes demanded

¹ J. S. Mackenzie, *An Introduction to Social Philosophy*, p. 316. But see also pp. 315, 317.

co-operative instead of individual buffalo-hunting and led to strict police regulations binding on all.¹

In co-operation lies the germ of the association called the State. It seems that the imperative need of concerted effort to control the devastating floods was one of the reasons for the development of the State in China. A similar influence was exerted by the necessities of large-scale irrigation in Egypt and Mesopotamia. In general, the multiplication and division of wealth would offer many occasions of dispute which, in the interests of the group, required a machinery of adjudication. The needs of commerce in particular and of property in general would call for peace and security in a comparatively large area and facilitate the development of leadership and regulation, in fact of a state. Intermarrying and neighbouring tribes sometimes coalesced and the new common organization would contain all the essential elements of statehood. From the start the State had an executive organ, that is, the Government. For practical purposes, the latter has often been indistinguishable from the State.

It was the prevalence of conflict with all its incidents of subjection and lordship, alliance and federation, exploitation and revolt, which constituted the most important single factor in the further evolution of Government. Defence and aggression depended on mobilization of men and resources, on organization, division of labour, energetic leadership and prompt obedience. Warfare was so frequent, or rather so continuous, that leadership and organization acquired permanence. The other purposes which they served lent additional importance and prestige to government and enabled it the more easily to function as an agency of coercion. Coercion was specially requisitioned to hold any conquered groups in subjection, to prevent or quell their insurrections. There is an important element of truth in the sociological theory of the State, enunciated by Gumplowicz and Ratzenhofer

¹ F. Boas, *Anthropology and Modern Life*, pp. 222-23.

who discovered the basis of the State in group-conflict and class-supremacy.¹ It must, however, be pointed out that other factors had all along co-operated to develop the State and that functions other than those of coercion had never been absent from its purview. Nor did the vast significance of state and government for social life diminish when the various processes of amalgamation, accommodation and consolidation transformed the relations of the erstwhile hostile groups. The possibilities of war with other groups or states were as acute as ever. In fact, the growth of population and commerce, cultural pride or prestige, the rise of military autocracies and castes supplied fresh reasons for conflict. In the second place, the unequal distribution of wealth roused fears and jealousies which only a strong authority could guard against. Thirdly, the complications arising from the multiplication of sub-classes, functional groups, churches, and other associations called for authoritative co-ordination and correction. Fourthly, the environment often stimulated conduct which was out of accord with the accepted *mores* and which necessitated examination and chastisement. Lastly, the holders of power were inclined to strengthen their authority by all possible means.

Character of
the State

The State became an association comprising all members of the community, wielding coercive power, and endeavouring to co-ordinate communal activities. It could never completely monopolize social control. That had to be shared with custom and opinion, priestcraft, family, functional and other organizations in various measures.² History records numerous instances of churches, landholders, industrial and commercial magnates eclipsing the authority of the State. But, on the whole, the State has in civilized times

¹ Cf. F. Oppenheimer, *The State*.

² *Infra*, ch. xv.

been the great depositary of authority and the most powerful of all associations.

To the cause of human development, the State has rendered momentous services. It has established more or less durable peace within specified areas. It has provided security of economic and cultural development to many of its members. It has roused and canalized patriotism, lifting the individual above himself and widening the horizon of the family and other associations. It has often encouraged art, literature, music, etc., and, sometimes in antiquity and more often in modern times, has organized education, sanitation and communications for all. Latterly, some States have sought to guarantee a certain minimum of comfort to all their citizens. It is, however, only natural that the State should reflect the dominant temper, opinion, principles, and forces of the times. Its government has often fallen into the hands of religious groups,¹ military bands, holders of wealth or possessors of brain power who, as it were, constantly mutter to themselves, 'we are the State'; and who legislate, administer and adjudicate in terms of their own experience and supposed interests, sometimes outrunning the limits of prudence and decency and causing internal conflicts. The State has sometimes led reform, but more often it has been the conservator of the *status quo*, blocking the path of social and economic change and provoking violent revolution. It has sometimes sought to alleviate distress, but it has also been the guarantor of inequalities. Outside its frontiers it has sometimes promoted international concord but it has more often hampered international co-operation and succumbed to temptations of aggrandizement. It has become a law unto itself and stood in a condition of nature, as Hobbes said, in regard to other

¹ F. Ratzel and others have pointed out that the chiefs of tribes have often been priests or that they have often monopolized trade.

states. History has been busy mainly in recording wars, waged by states, for territory, concessions, trade, prestige and revenge, or from sheer caprice of the will to power, or for propagation of some religion and culture. So, force has been elevated to a principle of human organization and used as an ever-present remedy for the achievement of any object.

Like the social stratification and gradation which it reflects, the State has been both a stimulus and an obstacle to human development. Once again, the obstructive role is to be explained by the spirit of exclusiveness, and the scramble for material resources which until the nineteenth century entailed hard toil to acquire. The traditions developed by the pain economy coloured the entire social life, and by sheer force of momentum, have outlived their original causes.

The same dual role has been generally played by the majority of the other associations which society has developed. Their membership has usually been limited and beyond it they have relaxed their beneficent motives and sometimes turned hostile to others. Economic associations have promoted industry and commerce and increased the wealth of the community but they have also competed where co-operation was better calculated to enhance the general well-being. Churches have sometimes blessed warfare, persecuted 'heresy', discouraged freedom of inquiry and identified themselves with the *status quo* with all its antiquated and iniquitous arrangements.

The good which has resulted from associations, including the State, is attributable largely to organization. The concerted use of physical and mental resources, the habit of team-work and the accommodation of the individual or group to the general interest, are essential to the promotion of common welfare. Organization, however, is the most delicate and difficult

of all arts, always liable to perversion in the hands of those who practise it. It calls for a balance between the intensive expression of part-personality and the opportunity of full expression, a balance between devotion to communal service and spontaneity of personality. Philosophically, such an antithesis is apparent rather than real. Communal provision and personal growth are aspects of the same social process. But factors may supervene to separate the two aspects and partly sacrifice the one to the other, almost atrophying certain faculties of many members of the community. The point is best illustrated by the history of some lower creatures which have had to use their small stock of intelligence—consolidated and inherited as innate tendencies—to cope against stupendous difficulties presented by the environment.

The organization developed by some of the oldest and most intelligent of creatures—the coral, the wasp, the bee, the ant and the termite—has attracted great attention. A colony of hydractinia polyps, physically united, is often divided into three or four 'castes', each restricted to a special function and truncated for specialization. The reproductive members have no mouths, the function of nutrition being reserved for tubular zooids with extensible bodies and terminal mouths, wreathed round by mobile tentacles. Long, lank, mouthless members serve as the organs of the colony in detecting food or danger.

The termite, driven to bay by an implacable, invincible enemy, the ant, has resigned itself to a dark, subterranean life and perfected an iron organization which sacrifices individuality to the group interest with a staggering thoroughness. Each species is divided into workers, soldiers, and reproducers. The first two have renounced their wings and sex and the workers their sight and size as well. The Queen Mother, who alone is entitled to lay eggs—which she does at the rate of about

**Illustrations
from animal
life**

**Hydractinia
polyps**

The termite

30,000 or 86,000 a day (according to different estimates) for months together—has a huge belly, with a sunken corslet. Her legs are so small that she can scarcely move at all. She is fed and her eggs carried away by hundreds of workers, among whom order is kept by the soldiers. As soon as her fecundity dwindles, the Queen is starved to death and eaten up by her fellows. So far as human judgement and standards are applicable to the termitary, none is permitted any independent individual life there and every one lives in unremitting toil and devotion to the safety and sustenance of the group.¹

The ant, which is responsible for what appears to us the gloomy life of the termite, is itself exposed to danger from other species and has evolved a high degree of division of labour to provide for subsistence, abundance and safety. Numerous species of ants attack and enslave others, or convert their bodies practically into honey-pots, or maintain breed and milk aphides ('ant-cows'), or cultivate fungus gardens. They live in colonies, highly organized communities in which no individual is allowed full growth, in which different classes are adapted to specialized functions and in which all are rigidly subordinated to the interests of the community.²

Among the bees, the Mother or Queen, who sometimes lays eggs at the rate of from two to three thousand a day, is practically a prisoner after fecundation, rigidly confined to her vocation. The males are sluggish drones, mercilessly expelled or slaughtered at times of scarcity, with the sole exception of one who has

¹ J. A. Thomson, *The Study of Animal Life*, revised edition, pp. 90 ff. W. M. Wheeler, *Social Life among the Insects* (Lecture VI), pp. 237-83. For graphic descriptions see M. Maeterlinck, *The Life of the White Ant*, tr. A. Sutro. Cf. also David Livingstone, *Missionary Travels and Researches in South Africa*.

² W. M. Wheeler, *op. cit.*, pp. 147-235; MacCook, *Ant Communities*; J. A. Thomson, *op. cit.*, pp. 84 ff.

to die soon after the nuptial flight. The workers sacrifice their sex and live in ceaseless toil.¹

Among certain wasps, the male is doomed to death when his function is over, that is to say, some hours after the nuptial flight. After sleeping for about five months, the Queen founds a city in the early summer and her descendants store it abundantly with food. Only when her vitality declines are her daughters—such of them as alone are 'marriageable'—and their possible suitors, brought out of the different cells. Fresh nuptial flights are arranged, to result in fresh colonies. But the erstwhile wasp-workers, rendered idle, lose their balance. They pull the half-developed grubs out of the cells and leave them to perish at the entrance of the nest. The workers themselves fly away to meet an early death. Only the future queens survive the winter.² The organization of the wasps is not as thorough as that of the bees or termites. But so long as the colony or city lasts, every one performs the allotted function for which alone he or she is fit. The break-up of the city deprives most of the wasps of their functions and is followed by their death. Only the founders of the future cities have a function and they alone keep alive.

If human organization does not show such rigidity and specialization, it is because of the high development and flexibility of human intelligence, great capacity of rational adaptation and control of environment. But the risks have never been altogether absent. Primitive man was in the grip of custom and had to conform to numerous taboos. It is symbolical that among backward peoples a certain harsh-

Risks of
human
organization

¹ W. M. Wheeler, *op. cit.*, pp. 91-146. For graphic descriptions, M. Maeterlinck, *The Life of the Bee*. It may be added that of the nearly 10,000 described species of bees only about 500 are social, belonging to the Trigona, Melipona, Bombus, Psithirus and Apis genera.

² W. M. Wheeler, *op. cit.*, pp. 43-89.

ness is associated with organization. Initiation and puberty rites for boys and girls are attended with great cruelty, and the preceding discipline or hardening involves positive tortures. Organization consigns large classes to hard, monotonous humdrum life and tends to keep them there in the real or supposed interests of group-efficiency. It puts a premium on conformity to routine, tradition and prescription and discourages spontaneity, adventure and experiment. It annexes large tracts of life which lend themselves pre-eminently to personal choice and satisfaction. For instance, old Japan made laws prescribing the details of food, clothing, housing, ornaments, presents, weddings, festivals, ceremonies, etc. Hindu law-givers prescribed all the duties of all the castes and sought to bring the whole field of life under rigid control. It has well been said that organization deals with the common denominators of personality—the abstract elements of will—that it has a tendency to substitute a generalized human being for concrete selfhood and that organizations are in danger of getting clogged with the waste products of their own working.¹

Associations and the individual All this is inherent in the social traditions which the individual breathes and which affect all his habits. Every group has an ethos, an atmosphere, to which the young adapt themselves, with the help of the training in the family and general education. All associations represent effort for some common good and help the career of their members in some respect or the other. They evoke the loyalty of their members so that they rise to meet one another, apparently at the shrine of the common good. The individuals submit to the smothering of their personality often without being conscious of it, but an internal disharmony, a frustration of personality, is the inevitable result.²

¹ E. A. Ross, *Principles of Sociology*, pp. 274 ff.

² See also *infra*, ch. xv.

CHAPTER V

ACCOMMODATION AND ASPIRATION

IN spite of all the force of tradition, the spectacle of unhappiness grates on human sympathies and affections and the frustration of personality creates an inner discontent. Unrelieved, the pain and dissatisfaction would prove too much for the human mind. Indeed, the mind is occasionally unhinged and driven to thoughts of suicide. But for the most part man accommodates himself to imperfections through a series of psychological reactions which usually become part of the social inheritance.

Psychological reactions to unhappiness

Man has sought to reconcile himself to the stern realities of suffering and death by contemplating an unseen hand of justice or beneficence in the ordering of the universe. It has been a deep consolation to think that some omniscient, omnipotent and all-merciful Being has called the world into existence and shape, that he has designed everything for the best and that he will ultimately confer salvation on all, or at least, on the deserving. Evil, however, cannot altogether be overlooked. So it is ascribed to some malignant spirits, or to the fall of man through his own sin, or it is looked upon as something mysterious, defying explanation but scarcely marring the great design. A relentless logic has been employed by Hindu metaphysics to equate all suffering, like all enjoyment, with justice, as the result of one's own actions in this life or in the countless incarnations which preceded it. A still higher flight is taken by Vedantism to proclaim the non-existence of evil as of all else except Brahma. It is *maya* or illusion which envelops the soul and leads it to imagine anything apart from Brahma. The soul itself is a manifestation of Brahma which is the

Religion and metaphysics



one reality and which is all bliss. In earnest communion with the divine, man should eliminate all desires, rise above pain and pleasure, and become indifferent towards the world.

The impulse to escape from unpalatable facts must be counted, along with curiosity and a belief in the efficacy of supernatural means, among the formative influences in theological and metaphysical systems. It is indeed one of the standpoints from which the whole history of religion and philosophy can be surveyed. Human speculation abounds in ways of escape, in 'Edens of compensatory refuge'. It has been sedulously inculcated that in the duration of eternity this life is insignificant. In itself it is scarcely worth worrying about but it can be utilized as a period of preparation for the life beyond. Man should believe in the Divine Truth and so order his worship and conduct as to make sure of bliss after death. Heaven represents the perpetual intensification of whatever is enjoyable and beautiful in this world, free from all pain and turmoil. Better still, the soul should attempt to merge itself in the universal spirit from which it derived its temporal manifestation. This salvation negates all evil and pain for all time to come. Buddhism envisages the goal of Nirvana, the utter annihilation of self, and *ipso facto* of the very possibility of worry and unhappiness. So eagerly have the hopes of heaven or salvation been clasped to the bosom that theological literature has often painted the earthly life as even darker and more vicious than the sombre realities justified. If the great teachers pointed to a rather strait path and narrow gate to eternal happiness, there have been others ready to devise short cuts. A bath, a sacrament, a sacrifice, a meditation, or a gift, performed in appropriate style, time and place has been recommended as enough to atone for sins and to assure a rosy and cheerful life hereafter. To this system of concessions and reprieves, the average man has been deeply attached.

Hopes of
heaven

All this is high solace, but free inquiry, often stimulated by contact of divers beliefs and by social changes, threatens to prick holes in the system. **Revelation** Theology, metaphysics and popular beliefs have often had to adapt themselves to changes in the intellectual climate and to alter their tenets and emphasis. But they have usually sought stability and completeness of influence by raising themselves to the rank of revelation, beyond the reach of reason and logic. Theology has often decried reason as puny and presumptuous, almost contemptible, while metaphysics has discovered the springs of truth in intuition, the inner voice, conscience or the light within.

Dogmatic religions, specially of the monotheistic type, have often poured anathema on one another and indulged in persecution. But the underlying spirit of them all has generally been the same. **A function of religion** They have performed many functions, and not the least important of them is social cohesion through spiritual adaptation and psychological compensation for the tribulations of this life. Some recent thinkers have denounced religion as transferring the centre of gravity from this to the other world and withdrawing social thought and energy from the tasks of amelioration. Karl Marx saw in it the opium of the people. Science has dealt shock after shock to systems of supernatural beliefs and sought to alter the habits of thought on which they rest. But except for limited circles of intellectuals, theology has retained its hold on humanity. Nor will it adjust itself to the scientific method while repression and misery endure and call for recompense and harmony through spiritual contemplation and blissful anticipation. Religion is partly the sublimation of discontent, the safety-valve of imperfect social life. The human mind has devised many other escapes.

Other escapes

There are those who seem to live in two worlds—an inner mysterious ideal realm which no evil can penetrate and to which they can always retire from the other, the actual world. Others have found

solace in thoughts like those of Hegel, who concluded that 'the insight to which . . . philosophy is to lead us is that the real world is as it ought to be'.

On an humbler pedestal, man has bethought himself of a relentless fate, an inexorable destiny, universal in operation, beyond the scope of human manipulation. Nothing can alter its course.

Fatalism 'What is not destined to happen shall not happen,' says a Sanskrit poet, 'what is destined to happen shall not be otherwise. Why not take this medicine (this conviction), which kills the poison of anxiety?'¹ So, a release from the worry of discontent has been sought in resignation, in accepting a situation as cheerfully as possible. From the buffets of misfortune and the tragedies of miscalculation, man has found comfort in the inevitability of things. It has often been rendered more delicious and dignified by an added conviction that everything ultimately works out for the best.

From this mood modern science itself has not been altogether free. It set out to explain everything in terms of reason but it clutched without adequate warrant at the dogma of inevitable, almost automatic progress. There is a ring of theology and of the fatalism of the cheery type, for instance, in Herbert Spencer when, dilating on the course of evolution, he concludes that the well-being of existing humanity and its unfolding into ultimate perfection are both secured by that same beneficent, though severe, discipline to which the animal creation at large is subject and which is pitiless in the working out of good. It is a law which pursues felicity and which never swerves for the avoidance of partial and temporary suffering. 'The poverty of the incapable, the distresses that come upon the imprudent, the starvation of the idle, and those shoulderings aside of the

¹ Cf. also the great Hindi poet Tulasi Das. 'As is the destiny, so are the (attendant) developments. Destiny does not come to the man: it beckons the man to itself.'

weak by the strong, which leave so many in shallows and misery, are the decrees of a large, far-seeing benevolence.'¹ Nor did Karl Marx, the apostle of social revolution, disdain to use the idea of predestination in his endeavour to place Communism on a scientific basis.

It is not merely through mental attitudes and religious 'works' that man has escaped from the realities of life. There are whole aspects and whole tracts of mundane behaviour which at bottom represent more or less successful devices of escape. There are many who dare not face the whole problem of life, or plan for the whole of personality and who cover them up by fond prejudices and attachments. Accumulating wealth, security, power or popularity with single-minded devotion, they run away from many of the problems, suppress a great deal of personality in a subtle manner and consign themselves to a sort of automatism and to complexes. Whenever awkward questions intrude themselves, they are handed over to priests and masters, traditions or prejudices. There are many who lose the courage to be mentally alert, who are willing to be caught up as cogs in a machine and who are content to be something like typewriters.

There are, however, others who fail to find satisfaction in religion or metaphysics, fatalism or traditionalism. With some of them discontent tends to sink into pessimism which may colour the whole outlook on life. The mood has found eloquent expression in literature and philosophy. 'Not to be born is the most reasonable,' says Sophocles in a well-known passage in *Oedipus Coloneus*, 'but having seen the light the next best is to go thither whence we came as soon as possible.' On metaphysical and psychological grounds, Schopenhauer held life to be but a swing of the pendulum between pain and ennui. To him the sum of possible joys was far out-

¹ *Social Statics*.

weighed by the sum of possible sufferings. Man, whether savage or civilized, was threatened constantly by different kinds of dangers from all sides, by a thousand accidents and enemies. Life with its ceaseless misfortunes, delusions and miscalculations, could only produce disgust and bar all hopes of happiness or thankful enjoyment. To the great majority it was a constant struggle for mere existence.¹

But pessimism and escapes do not exhaust the reactions against the imperfections of life. Even some
Protests of those who resort to them protest against the
against ills of society and try to discover better
civilization types of behaviour and organization. Denunciations of society have been cast in a variety of styles.

The persistence of suffering has evoked a protest against civilization itself and 'back to nature' is a
Golden Age slogan which has often been heard. A Golden Age of innocence and happiness, independently of civilization as we know it, forms part of the ancient cultural tradition in many lands. More than two thousand years ago the Buddhist account of the world began by conjuring up ethereal beings of effulgence and splendour, dancing merrily in the air. Then appeared differences of sex and colour which dragged life down to the physical plane. The family, private property and hoarding followed, to destroy innocence and purity and to cause heart-burning. With the foundation of villages, cities, and states, the Golden

¹ Cf.—

'Ah, love, let us be true
 To one another! for the world, which seems
 To lie before us like a land of dreams,
 So various, so beautiful, so new,
 Hath really neither joy, nor love, nor light,
 Nor certitude nor peace, nor help for pain,
 And we are here as on a darkling plain
 Swept with confused alarms of struggle and flight,
 Where ignorant armies clash by night.'—*Matthew Arnold*.

Age came to an end.¹ In Jaina mythology the Golden Age was one of ethereal communism and was terminated by the paraphernalia of civilization.² Similarly, the Brahmanical Puranas related that the perfect virtue, beauty and happiness of the Kritayuga vanished with the emergence of greed and passion, distinctions of high and low, the introduction of clothing and furniture, the establishment of social institutions, the erection of forts and the foundation of villages and towns.³ Parallels to these descriptions are supplied by the ancient lore of Persia, Greece and other countries.

There are moods in modern literature which decry civilization by glorifying the savage life⁴ and lamenting, in contrast to nature's holy plan, what man has made of man.⁵ To the Rousseau of the *Discourses* it appeared that 'so long as men were content with their rustic hovels, so long as they confined themselves to stitching their garments of skin with spines or fish bones, to decking their bodies with feathers and shells and painting them in different colours, to perfecting and beautifying their bows and arrows . . . in a word, so long as they only applied themselves to works that one person could do and to arts that needed no more than a single hand, then they lived free, healthy, good

¹ *Agganna Suttanta*, *Dighanikaya*, vol. iii, section 27; *Mahavastu*, ed. Senart, vol. i, pp. 347-48; Rhys Davids, *Dialogues of the Buddha*, pp. 175-77; W. W. Rockhill, *Life of the Buddha*, . . . derived from *Tibetan Works*, pp. 1-7.

² *Adi Purana*, parvas iii and xvi.

³ Cf. *Vayu Purana*, ed. Rajendra Lal Mitra, canto viii.

⁴ Cf. Dryden, *Conquest of Granada*:—

'I am free as Nature first made man
Ere the base laws of servitude began,
When wild in woods the noble savage ran.'

Also Pope, *Essay on Man*:—

'Pride then was not, nor art that pride to aid.'

⁵ Wordsworth.

and happy, so far as it was compatible with their constitution, and continued to enjoy among themselves the sweetness of independent intercourse'. As the state of nature declined, bondage and misery began.

Tolstoy, who was influenced by Rousseau and Schopenhauer set his face resolutely against modern civilization, often denounced culture as antagonistic to happiness and attempted to show in *The Cossacks* that the life of beasts of the field was superior to that of civilized men. Already Hartmann had undertaken to demonstrate, in a yet more philosophical vein, that there was an irreconcilable conflict between happiness and civilization which developed wants more quickly than the means to satisfy them and that comfort was not worth the cares and trials it entailed.

Anthropology has pricked the bubble of the happy, noble savage and science has banned the harkening back to the past. Yet eminent scientists have yielded to none in deploring the shortcomings of civilization. For instance Thomas Huxley, writing in 1890, felt that the condition of mankind, exhibited by even the best of modern civilization neither embodied any worthy ideal nor even possessed the merit of stability. 'I do not hesitate to express the opinion that if there is no hope of a large improvement of the condition of the greater part of the human family; if it is true that the increase of knowledge, the winning of a greater dominion over nature which is its consequence, and the wealth which follows upon that dominion, are to make no difference in the extent and the intensity of want with its concomitant physical and moral degradation amongst the masses of the people, I should hail the advent of some kindly comet which would sweep the whole affair away as a desirable consummation.'¹

¹ 'Government: Anarchy or Regimentation', *Nineteenth Century*, May 1890.

In this background it is possible to understand the defiant note struck by the philosophic anarchists who unanimously denounce law, State and property as engines of oppression, as enemies of all that makes life worth living. Thence it is a short step to unmeasured anathema against civilization—a mood that finds expression, though not quite consistently, in some ardent spirits in moments of exasperation. ‘I shall arm myself to the teeth against civilization,’ exclaimed Proudhon. ‘I shall begin a war that will end only with my life.’ ‘God—that is folly and cowardice; God is tyranny and misery; God is evil. To men, then, Lucifer, Satan! whoever you may be, the demon that the faith of my fathers opposed to God and the Church!’ Bakunin’s favourite toast was: ‘To the destruction of all law and order and unchaining of the evil passions!’

It is, however, constructive plans and movements for reform which constitute, historically, the most important reaction to the persistence of suffering and privation in human society. Utopia has served partly as a region of refuge, but from Plato to H. G. Wells philosophers and litterateurs have addressed idealistic programmes of radical reorganization to their contemporaries. Here the family and property, there law and the State, are to vanish or to transform their character, so that an era of equality, perfection, or complete happiness may be ushered in.¹ Religious and ethical teachers, from Confucius and Buddha to the present day, have sought to work a change of heart and establish the kingdom of love and justice. Political philosophy, with rare exceptions, has inculcated reform in organization.

¹ For brief summaries of Utopian thought, see L. Mumford, *The Story of Utopias*, and J. O. Hertzler, *The History of Utopian Thought*.



**Movements
of reform**

In the domain of practical politics kings and statesmen have, specially in the modern age, endeavoured to strengthen the material foundations of the good life and to promote culture and virtue according to their best lights. Their hands have often been forced by popular movements which have come to the fore whenever any large or influential body of people have, socially or intellectually, outgrown their institutions, and which have been directed towards a breach in privilege and monopoly and a share in power and prosperity. History bears ample testimony to the partial success which teachers, reformers and statesmen, along with popular movements and risings, have achieved in the furthering of human development in specific regions or among specific groups. But the fact remains that in no period in history have the mass of the people attained to the level to which civilization has brought the few. The causes are not far to seek. Knowledge was scanty and fragmentary and, for the most part, confined to narrow circles. Error sat on human progress like the Old Man of the Sea. Man was not able to extract from nature enough to place everyone above want and drudgery. And the art of organization failed to keep pace even with the progress actually made in knowledge and control of the environment. The inertia of social accommodation, sanctified by the accepted *mores* and buttressed by theology, fatalism and pessimism, offered tenacious resistance to the inception or continuation of reform.



CHAPTER VI

TURNING THE CORNER

THE obstacles to human development have been inextricably intertwined with one another and with the whole texture of social life. What strikes deep in one quarter strikes deep all round. The accentuation or mitigation of one obstacle is likely to affect the others and touch organization at many points. This is specially true of the foremost of all handicaps to self-realization—ignorance and error. Not only do they expose man to groundless terrors and suspicions but they also hamper his control over the environment, keep the standard of life down and precipitate a scramble. They prevent the art of organization from progressive harmony with surroundings and mar the chances of intelligent expression and enrichment of personality. But at long last the sway of ignorance and error has received some staggering blows and a substantial control established over the means of sustenance so that the way has been cleared for development on an unprecedented scale. It has been rendered feasible for mankind to turn the corner and, in spite of all that may still seem disappointing and revolting, the beginnings of a new era are already discernible.

A new turn

The cognitive interest took hold of man at the start of his career but it was only slowly and imperfectly that he could unravel the mysteries of the universe in which his lot was cast. His steps faltered and his vision was often blurred. In the course of hundreds of thousands of years he succeeded in establishing but little control over the environment. At last he discovered fire, invented the canoe, the wheel, the bow and arrow, and learnt to domesticate animals, control vegetation and devise industrial arts. Advance was accelerated through transmission, imitation and conscious

Early discoveries and inventions

borrowing. Ideas grew up about the heavenly bodies, earthly phenomena, life and death, spirits and gods; and were woven into systems of belief. The invention of writing imparted stability and a fresh impetus to culture in all its aspects.

The intellectual progress of the last five thousand years, as compared with the preceding thousands of centuries of human history, has indeed been marvellous. But until a short while ago it was attended with grave drawbacks. The yield of the discoveries, inventions and arts was not intrinsically adequate to the requirements of the growing population for food, clothing, shelter and furniture, for communications, security, leisure and creativeness. Nor had science and philosophy progressed enough to make a deep impression on the mass of ignorance and error. Not only was the stock of knowledge meagre in itself but it was practically monopolized by the small leisured classes. Even if the will were there, the conditions were none too favourable for a wide diffusion of the fruits of intellectual achievement. The majority of men and women were far too deeply engrossed with their routine, often precarious, of livelihood, and sunk in poverty, serfdom or slavery to develop the craving and command the leisure for higher pursuits. Manuscripts could not be easily multiplied for general use and travel was not only risky but very costly in time and money.

Nor was civilization, or rather civilizations, quite safe from deadly perils. Apart from plagues, famines and wars, they were exposed to destruction or serious setback from beyond their frontiers. Being regional rather than universal, civilization was in a state of constant siege. Barbarism was always at the gate and now and then descended like an avalanche, sweeping away the gains of centuries and leaving desolate lands to begin civilization afresh. Historical evidence shared the general ruin but archæology has

Drawbacks

**Insecurity
of past
civilizations**

unearthed enough to show that from the fifth to the second millenium B.C., one civilization after another perished on the Aegæan littoral, in the Middle East and in the Indus valley. In the fourth century B.C., the fountain-heads of European culture were choked by the Macedonian phalanx, assisted by some internal decay. Similarly, the Roman Empire, a marvel of organization and confident of eternal duration, was destroyed by the barbarians and followed by at least five centuries of darkness. Islamic culture never recovered from the blows which the Mongols dealt to the Abbasid caliphate in the thirteenth century A.D.

A break from all this is represented by the Modern Age which marks the climax of a long process of development. The fifteenth century witnessed the commencement of geographical discoveries which for the first time brought the world as a whole within human ken, which certainly raised terrific problems in the relations of races but which have rendered it possible for progress to become rapid and universal through the cross-fertilization of cultures. After tense struggles, the human intellect has been emancipated to pursue the truth with greater devotion and energy than ever before. Ignorance and error have been dynamited by science, and the ground cleared for systems of verified knowledge. The highest triumphs have been achieved in mechanical invention, which is the essential feature of human intelligence.¹

¹ Cf. H. Bergson, *Creative Evolution*:—

'As regards human intelligence, it has not been sufficiently noted that mechanical invention has been from the first its essential feature, that even today our social life gravitates around the manufacture and use of artificial instruments, that the inventions which strew the road of progress have also traced its direction. . . . If we could rid ourselves of all pride, if, to define our species, we kept strictly to what the historic and the prehistoric periods show us to be the constant characteristic of man and of intelligence, we should not say *homo sapiens* but *homo faber*.'

TURNING THE CORNER



To quote Walter Lippmann, man has achieved the *invention* of invention and *discovered* a method of discovery. It is needless to relate the story of the physical sciences which have revolutionized transport, communication, production, war, medicine, in fact the whole aspect of life, and which are creating a new outlook. It is enough to point out that for the first time, man has mastered the environment, so as to be able to wrest from it, with comparative ease, enough, perhaps more than enough, for a life of material comfort for the whole of his kind. At the same time science has powerfully reinforced the influences which make for voluntary restriction of the birth-rate. It is possible for all to live on a plane of sufficiency with leisure. The achievement may be far away or it may be within striking distance, but for the first time it has entered the range of practicability. The root causes of conflict and subjection have been removed, though the traditions which grew round them remain and complicate the new problems which have arisen. Aristotle who compared servants to instruments said: 'If every instrument could accomplish its own work, obeying or anticipating the will of others, like the statues of Daedalus or the tripods of Hephaestus . . . if, in like manner, the shuttle would weave and the plectrum touch the lyre without a hand to guide them, chief workmen would not want servants, nor masters slaves.'¹ That is exactly what science has accomplished. Already slavery and serfdom have for the most part disappeared and increasing numbers have been brought to higher planes of living. Similarly it is for the first time that the psychological and social sciences have rendered it feasible to revise social organization on scientific lines and avoid waste or repression of human energy. In every

Bergson adds that intelligence, considered in what seems to be its original feature, is the faculty of manufacturing artificial objects, especially tools, and of indefinitely varying the manufacture.

¹ *Politics*, trans. B. Jowett, p. 31.

branch of knowledge, research moves with such rapidity as to guarantee more and more knowledge for social use and improvement. Man can know and understand himself with a thoroughness which was not possible before the recent advances in biology and psychology. As he grows in self-knowledge, he will be able to exercise better control over his passions. Man is gradually realizing that he is now master of his own destiny and that he need not submit patiently to the evils inherited from less enlightened ancestors. Sociology teaches that there is a better way of solving the problems of life than by muddling through them or through cataclysmic changes.

From the sociological standpoint, the most significant aspect of scientific achievement is the amazing development of the means of its own diffusion. Printing has placed culture within easy reach of all who can read. The cost of books is negligible as compared to that of manuscripts. Periodicals circulate by the hundred thousand and newspapers by the million. The cinema is more than a rival to the press and can develop into a great instrument of education and enlightenment. They all present to the individual the wide world of which he is part. The radio can bring the voice of the greatest of musicians, speakers and teachers from all over the world to every hearth. The railway, the steamship and the aeroplane are universalizing the pleasure, and may universalize the educative value, of travel. The cheap post, telegraph and telephone which were beyond dreams until the seventeenth century, now make communication easy for all.

It is one of the functions of education, in the broader sense of the term, to bring scientific knowledge to the doors of all who may need it, to universalize culture, to train the mind and to create the Socratic temper. It demands concerted social effort. But it is important to note that in the general advance of psychology, education itself has become a science such as

**Diffusion of
knowledge**

Education

it never was before. For the first time we have understood that the gulf between scientific and common knowledge is a menace to human welfare. The conditions of modern life have made education a necessity and forced it at numerous points upon the average man. Ideas now float in the air, so to say, in every civilized land. As the sequel will show, science is also creating that leisure which is essential to the proper instruction of children and adults. Universal culture is still an ideal, but for the first time the realization of the ideal on scientific lines has been rendered possible. As it is, free and compulsory primary education prevails in many of the European countries, in the British Dominions (except in the case of the 'natives'), in the United States and the Philippines, and in Japan. It is making headway in Latin America, in Turkey, Egypt, Persia, Afghanistan, India, China and the East Indies. Secondary education has made marvellous progress in some countries and compulsory provision for it is a plank in the platform of advanced parties in several countries. The further education of workers has been accepted as an indispensable social service.¹

The educational millennium may appear to be distant, but science has constructed a highway to reach it. Enlightenment has certainly spread by leaps and bounds since the nineteenth century. In the eighteenth century judges in Europe and America solemnly tried cases of witchcraft and sentenced old women to the flames. Today the ground is being cut beneath the feet of the rain-maker and medicine man in backward regions. All over the world religions are gradually shifting the emphasis from theological dogma to human fellowship and service. Libraries and universities have shown an unprecedented growth in modern times and their

¹ For a philosophic appraisalment of the Workers' Educational Association in England, see A. E. Zimmern, *Nationality and Government*, pp. 101 ff. Also Reports of the various Adult Education Societies.

benefits have been shared, for the first time on any considerable scale, by women, workers and peasants.

As the world outgrows the notions and traditions generated by a social order now obsolete, enlightenment may be expected to spread rapidly not merely among the so-called 'lower classes' in advanced countries but also among the peoples whose development has been retarded by certain geographical and historical causes. Already a point has been reached when civilization may be regarded as reasonably safe from any assault of barbarism. Its appeal is now wellnigh universal. If ever it collapses, it will be from internal maladjustment and not from any attack from beyond.¹


It was, however, only to be expected that new problems should follow in the wake of new developments and that old problems should reappear in a new guise. Discoveries and inventions release power but the use of power depends at first on social traditions and ethical standards which have taken form largely under older conditions. The press and the cinema have readily lent themselves to the propagation of rancours and obliquity. The cheap novel with its insidious appeal to the semi-educated may turn out intellectually and morally expensive. Big industry tends to consign the

Security of
civilization

Problems old
and new

¹ Lord Olivier, *White Capital and Coloured Labour* (1929), p. 43, quotes the following from Dr. J. J. Jabavu, Professor of Bantu Languages in the South African Native University, Fort Hare:

'We are ranged on the side of civilization. Our interests are intertwined with civilized interests. We would not like to go back naked to the kraals and live a barbarous life. We have renounced that life once and for all. If today there were a war between barbarism and civilization we would be found on the side of civilization. The Europeans regard us as a solid block of undifferentiated barbarism and the Europeans as a solid block of innate capacity to govern; whereas the division is not on these lines. The division is between civilization and ignorance, which may be found in both blocks. . . . The fact is, we are growing and developing under civilization and we shall be more and more a power on the side of civilization.'



many to dead routine, hard toil and starvation wages. Science invents weapons and gases before which the last horrors of savagery pale into insignificance. The juxtaposition of races and cultures raises new antagonisms and rivalries appalling in their intensity and magnitude. None of these problems can automatically solve themselves. They require far-reaching changes in our economic, political and educational systems, carefully planned and skilfully executed. But in their nature the problems are no more insoluble than those which must have been created, in the distant past, by the discovery of fire which could be used to burn the person and property of anybody; or those created by the canoe which must have disturbed many frontiers; or those created by writing which must have rudely disturbed the old order; or those created at first by any of the thousand appliances which are now taken to be part of the common run of life. If our problems are vaster and more complex, our material and intellectual resources are also immeasurably greater.

In any case, it is important to note that the long process of human evolution has now brought about conditions under which all can find scope for development and that democracy, in the deeper and ethical sense, can be translated into fact. Classes, groups, and associations can relinquish, in an increasing measure, their obstructive role and serve as more powerful drives to development all round. Under older conditions universal self-realization could be little more than a dream and only partial advances were possible towards the democratic ideal. Now that a great change in the scale and scope of development has been brought about, it is imperative to revise the standpoint of social and cultural traditions. Economics and Politics must analyse the trend and implications of the new factors, integrate them into a new synthesis and enhance the working intellectual capital of humanity.

**Prospects of
democracy**

CHAPTER VII

PRODUCTION

Economic factor in history DURING the last hundred years the cardinal importance of the economic factor in human history has been emphasized by geographers, sociologists and economists. Karl Marx held that 'the method of production of the material life determines the social, political, and spiritual life process in general'. He concluded that legal relations, like the form of government, could not be understood of and in themselves nor as the result of the so-called general progress of the human mind but that they were rooted in the material conditions of life. The totality of the necessary relations of social production constituted the economic structure of society—the real basis on which was erected the legal and political edifice and to which there corresponded definite forms of social consciousness.¹

¹ Cf. Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, *The Communist Manifesto*. On the whole subject see E. Seligman, *The Economic Interpretation of History*. Friedrich Engels, *Socialism, Utopian and Scientific*, observes: 'The materialist conception of history starts from the proposition that the production of the means to support human life, and next to production, the exchange of things produced, is the basis of all social structure: that in every society that has appeared in history, the manner in which wealth is distributed and society divided into classes or orders, is dependent upon what is produced, how it is produced, and how the products are exchanged. From this point of view the final causes of all social changes and political revolutions are to be sought, not in men's brains, not in man's better insight into eternal truth and justice, but in changes in the modes of production and exchange. They are to be sought, not in the *philosophy*, but in the *economics* of each particular epoch.'

Economic difficulties in the past Karl Marx or rather his followers underrated the role of the mental factors and failed to perceive that the latter largely determined the play of the economic forces, but the fact remains that sustenance is one of the pivots round which human life, indeed all life, moves. Its dominant role in the emergence of co-operation, conflict, groupings and classes, and in the development of the family, the tribe and the State has already been touched on. The difficulties in the acquisition of the means of sustenance have been responsible in a very large measure for the low standard on which the mass of humanity has so far lived its life. The productive capacity of some regions was seriously limited, and that of others entailed hard, unpalatable drudgery, while plentiful resources ran to waste elsewhere. Transport was so costly, dilatory and generally so difficult that a deficiency could not be easily relieved by a comparatively prosperous neighbourhood. Famine often exacted a heavy toll of death, disease and general dislocation of life.¹

¹ It has been calculated that up to the eighteenth century famine was 'in some sort a permanent institution on the fertile soil of France'. In the twelfth century it made its appearance over fifty times. In 1663, 1690 and 1790, 'large numbers of people were absolutely dying of hunger.' Conditions were worse in some other European countries. In India, famine often devastated a whole province. The Sanskrit historian Kalhana, describing the Kashmir famines of A.D. 917-18 (*Rājatarangini*, Book V, verses 272-75) observes that the Jhelum was covered with corpses and the land was one great mortuary. Gujarat was visited by famine in 1594 when the streets were choked with dead bodies and cannibalism was believed to have been practised. (Nurul Haq, trans. Elliot and Dowson, *History of India as told by its own Historians*, vi, p. 193.) In the famine of 1630 in the Deccan 'life was offered for a loaf, but none would buy it; rank was to be sold for a cake, but none cared for it; the ever-bounteous hand was stretched out to beg for food'. (Abdul Hamid Lahori, *Pādshāhnāmā*, trans. Elliot and Dowson, vii, pp. 24-25.) The city of Surat alone paid a toll of 30,000 lives. (W. Foster, *English Factories in India, 1630-33*, pp. 180-81.) In the famine of 1770 one-third of the population of Bengal perished. (Sir William Hunter, *Rural*

Until the eighteenth century articles of comfort could not be easily multiplied, so that while a few might flaunt their luxury the mass of the people were sunk in misery.¹

The pain economy has lasted into the present age but science has already effected an amelioration and promises to lead to a welfare economy. Not all the regions and sources of supply have yet been explored and the application of scientific discoveries and inventions still admits of extensions and improvements all round. But the resources already available render it possible, for the first time in history, for all men to live in comfort, with a fair margin of creative leisure and a fair chance of intellectual and aesthetic cultivation.

According to the figures published under the auspices of the League of Nations in 1932, the present population of the world is slightly over 2,000 millions.² But it is rather unevenly distributed over the

Bengal, p. 402.) Millions died of starvation in the North-West Provinces in 1860, in Orissa in 1867 and in the South in 1877. The noteworthy feature is that all these famines were local and could not be easily relieved from the comparative plenty of the neighbouring provinces. The railroad has now facilitated a scientific policy of famine relief which makes the recurrence of past horrors impossible, despite equally grave failures of the monsoon. See the various provincial codes of famine relief.

¹ It has been estimated that in the eighteenth century in France 'white bread was a thing unknown; once or twice a year, at Easter or at other high festivals, a piece of bacon was regarded as a luxury. Oil of rape-seed and beech-oil were used to render the most common vegetables palatable. The ordinary beverage was water; beer was dear, cider not less so, and wine was a luxury exceedingly rare'. For France, as for some other countries, all this is a thing of the past.

² According to one estimate, the population of the world stood as follows in the year 1921:—

	MILLIONS		
Asia	1,006
Europe	453
Africa	141

cultivable areas, which forms roughly 30 per cent of the land surface of the globe, and of which only about two-fifths is actually under cultivation.¹

North America	145
South America	67
Oceania	8
Total			1,820

But the figures for Africa are partly conjectural, while the estimates for China vary from 300 to 450 millions. The estimate of the Chinese postal administration in 1921 placed the population of China, Manchuria and the Chinese dependencies at 445 millions.

In 1926 the following three noteworthy estimates of world population were offered:—

1,879,595,000	...	The International Statistical Institute.
1,894,979,723	...	The International Institute of Agriculture.
1,926,715,000	...	The League of Nations, Economic and Financial Section.

But they place the population of China at 433 millions or more. Walter F. Willcox brings it down to 300 millions. A study group of the Royal Institute of International Affairs estimates the world population for 1930 as follows:—

	MILLIONS		
Europe (ex-Russia)	379
Russia	161
North America	134
South and Central America	117
Africa	142
Asia	1,070
Oceania	10
Total			2,013

World Agriculture (Oxford University Press), p. 3.

¹ The total land area on the surface of the world is 56 million square miles, of which 40 per cent may be regarded as desert, dry and cold; 30 per cent as poor grazing land, marsh, waste and high mountains; and 30 per cent as cultivable land. Fawcett, *Geographical Journal*, December 1930, pp. 504-509.

increase the supply considerably.¹ The potentialities of forests for produce of various kinds are still greater. There are forests in China, South America and Africa which have yet to be explored and mapped out fully, while the exploitation of those in India and Siberia has barely commenced.

Forest produce

The regions rich in forests are still richer in mineral resources, a great deal of which awaits prospecting. To take a single illustration, the reserves of hard coal have been estimated at about four billions of tons which, at the present rate of consumption, would suffice for more than 3,000 years.

Mineral resources

It is in the realm of agriculture that the greatest increase of supply has occurred and enormous potentialities of expansion revealed. According to recent statistics which formed the basis of discussions at the World Population Conference in 1927, there are about 13,000 million acres of tillable land on the earth's surface but about three-fifths of this area has not yet been brought under the plough.²


Agriculture

¹ For some other aspects of fish supply, see J. Russell Smith, *The World's Food Resources*, pp. 329 ff. The fishing industry has been so far developed to an appreciable extent in the temperate seas only. There are, however, numerous varieties of fish in the tropical seas which can be easily exploited for human food when necessary. Taste for the tropical fishes can be acquired. (See Russell Smith, *Industrial and Commercial Geography*, chapter on fisheries.)

² Considerable scope still exists in bringing new lands under the plough. There are large areas in Argentina, Brazil, Canada, Australia, East and South Africa, Manchuria, and Russia where valuable crops can be raised. In Russia alone there are about 800,000 sq. miles of Chernozem soils (suitable for wheat) and about 600,000 sq. miles of chestnut-brown soils which are indifferently cultivated or not cultivated at all at present. These can be easily put under crops.

See 'Russia, U.S.A., and Wheat', *Geographical Review*, January 1931.

PRODUCTION



There are two factors which make the outlook yet more hopeful—irrigation and improved cultivation. The former has already enhanced the productivity of Egypt and of India. The canals in the Punjab irrigate land which was hitherto desolate and have filled it with peasant colonies. The Sukkur Barrage, nearly a mile long, and the connected seven systems of canals, distributaries, minors and water-courses, 6,166 miles in length opened in 1932, are expected to irrigate five-and-a-half million acres in Sind, Khairpur State and Baluchistan.¹

¹ The Sukkur Barrage is a great feat of engineering. The excavating capacity of the forty-six drag line machines employed was 74 tons of earth-work per minute on the basis of 5½ days of 24 hours per week. They equalled the labour of 32,000 workmen for the whole year or of 77,000 workmen for five months, which is the normal working season in the hot climate of Sind. The requisite number of workers might not have been forthcoming and the cost of excavation would have been 50 per cent higher. The barrage has 66 spans, each 60 ft., separated by 58 ordinary and 7 abutment piers, each 10 and 25 ft. wide respectively. The steel gates, each 50 tons in weight, are operated electrically to regulate the water-level of the canals.

The new area of virgin soil which the barrage is to bring under cultivation in British India is classified as follows:—

	ACRES		
A class land	1,058,928
B " "	602,205
C " "	289,400

In British India alone the barrage is expected to irrigate 5,013,000 acres as follows:—

CROPS		ACREAGE	ANNUAL PRODUCE
Wheat	...	2,440,000	11,333,000 tons
Cotton	...	790,000	500,000 bales
Rice	...	625,000	447,000 tons
Jowari, bajra, etc.	...	695,000	298,000 "
Pulses	...	53,000	15,000 "
Oilseeds	...	410,000	117,000 "

Farming is still conducted practically everywhere (outside Russia) on the basis of the peasant family. The co-operative method would doubtless enhance its efficiency and mitigate its toil.¹ The possibilities of scientific agriculture are well illustrated by a comparison of Indian agriculture, still conducted on old lines, with Belgian and Japanese agriculture. In fertility Indian soil as a whole is not inferior to that of the other countries. But it yields only 7.5 quintals of wheat per hectare as compared with 26.2 quintals in Belgium, and 15.2 quintals of rice per hectare as compared with 33.5 quintals in Japan.² In agricultural efficiency the index

The wheat crop will approximate to one-tenth of the total wheat produce of the country.

In Egypt the second heightening of the Aswan Dam will further increase the irrigation capacity of the dam by 3,000 million cubic metres of water. The Gebel Aulia Dam, which is about to be begun, will provide Egypt with about 2,000 million cubic metres of water, which will be used for converting an area of basin lands in Upper Egypt and extending cultivation in another area of waste land in Lower Egypt. See 'Egypt', *The Manchester Guardian Commercial Supplement*, 25 March 1933, p. 13.

¹ Over the greater part of the newer agricultural lands the method of farming is extensive rather than intensive. Thus in the Cape Province of South Africa in 1929, 63 per cent of the farm holdings were over 10,000 acres. In Australia in 1927-28, 23 per cent of the farmers had farms of over 1,000 acres. The consequence of this extensive farming is that the yield per acre of crops is lower in these new lands than in the old agricultural areas where the method of farming is intensive. Thus, for example, the yield per hectare of wheat in Australia was 8 quintals as against 27 quintals in the Netherlands (average of 1923-27). There is thus a great scope for increasing the yield in Australia.

By the use of suitable manures, high yielding seed, and by proper crop rotation, scientific agriculture is capable of increasing our food supply to a much larger extent than we imagine at present. Cf. *World Agriculture*, ch. iv and *The International Year-Book of Agricultural Statistics*, 1931-32.

² *The International Year-Book of Agricultural Statistics*, 1931-32, Tables 54 and 61. The comparison is based on the averages of 1924-27.

number of India is 85, while that of Belgium is 221. Apart from the annexation of virgin soil to agriculture and irrigation, the produce of India can be doubled and even trebled by scientific appliances.¹ The same is true, more or less, of other Asiatic countries and extensive regions in Latin America. Agriculture on a great deal of tribal area in Africa is more than primitive; it is prodigal in waste. The soil is quickly exhausted and erosion and aridity set in.

Since the middle of the nineteenth century, artificial fertilization has progressively increased the quantity and enriched the quality of agricultural produce. The nitrogenous fertilizer rendered possible by the fixation of atmospheric nitrogen is only one of the many facilities secured by chemistry to agriculture.

Mechanization of agriculture The modernization of agriculture spells a transformation in the whole tenor of rural life. It would render it feasible to organize peasant families into a co-operative society and to replace drift by co-ordinated enterprise. Mechanization is calculated to set free a great amount of human labour and also to dispense with a large number of horses or bullocks for whose fodder extensive areas are excluded from crops for human consumption. For instance the internal combustion engine, the tractor and the combined harvester-thresher are revolutionizing the extent of wheat crop in Canada, Australia, Argentina and the United States. In the last named country, the manufacture of tractors rose from 60,000 in 1917 to 229,000 in 1929 and of the combined harvester-thresher from 270 in 1914 to 37,000 in 1929. The number of combines in use in Western Canada rose from 5 in 1924 to 7,250 in 1929.

¹ H. Stanley Jevons, *The Economics of Tenancy Law and Estate Management*.

Economy of
labour

In point of economy of labour, the results are thus summarized by an American authority. 'When wheat was harvested with the sickle and threshed with the flail, from thirty-five to fifty hours of labour were necessary for harvesting and threshing an acre of wheat with a yield of fifteen bushels. The introduction of the cradle effected a saving of about ten hours per acre. At present, farmers in the Great Plain usually use from four to five hours of labour for harvesting and threshing an acre of wheat when it is harvested with a binder and threshed from the shock with a stationary thresher; and an average of three-quarters of an hour of labour when the combined harvester-thresher is used.'¹ The 'peak' in the labour curve at the time of harvesting has been smoothed; farming has extended into areas with a rainfall of only ten inches, in the United States and Australia. Large areas hitherto deemed hopeless are now covered with crops.² A single individual can, with the help of the tractor, cultivate no less than 1,600 acres. Between 1918 and 1928 the chemist and the engineer in the United States increased the output per agricultural labourer by about 25 per cent, and released for human food 25,000,000 acres which had so far been required for horses. If progress has not been equally rapid on the European continent, it is because the peasant tradition and the exigencies of military recruitment have hampered rationalization of agriculture.³ As it is, the application

¹ R. H. Tolley, quoted by R. R. Enfield, *The Economic Journal*, December 1931.

² R. R. Enfield, *op. cit.*

³ R. R. Enfield, *op. cit.*

The use of mechanical appliances in agriculture is not confined to the U.S.A. It is common in Australia, Argentina, Canada, etc. Russia is a new and enthusiastic convert to the use of machinery in agriculture. The following table shows the num-

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of scientific methods has helped the rapid recovery of Russian agriculture after the havoc wrought by the Great War, the blockade and internal disturbances. The first

ber of combined harvester-threshers and threshers exported from the U.S.A. during the period 1925-30:—

YEAR	TOTAL	To CANADA	To AUSTRALIA	To ARGENTINA	To RUSSIA
1925	1,720	110	—	619	21
1926	4,444	368	97	3,637	4
1927	4,705	819	261	3,097	—
1928	7,317	3,560	3	3,116	33
1929	10,887	3,103	37	6,214	435
1930	6,578	1,531	—	2,622	1,376

(Table from 'The Wheat Situation, 1931', *Report of the Imperial Economic Committee*, 1932, p. 63.)

Figures of the export of tractors from the United States are even more remarkable for the above period.

EXPORTS OF TRACTORS FROM THE U.S.A. 1925-30

YEAR	TOTAL
1925	45,946
1926	51,242
1927	58,279
1928	57,869
1929	60,155
1930	49,896

The effect of plant breeding also tends to increase the output from land. The biologist has already shown that he can assist in providing food and raw materials for a much larger world population. The extended use of fish oils in the feeding of cattle, not only as a source of valuable proteins but also of vitamins, and the possible utilization of cotton-seed meal for human food may be cited as examples of the assistance of the chemist. The Marquis wheats of Canada, the Howards of India and the P.O.J. No. 2878 sugarcane of Java furnish other illustrations of the scientists' help to agriculture. Cf. *World Agriculture* (Oxford University Press), pp. 44-52.

unsafe to accept any uniform standard.¹ But adopting the higher figure of $2\frac{1}{2}$ acres *per capita*, and making some allowance for possibilities of scientific improvement, the world is capable, under the present standard of agricultural efficiency, of sustaining a population of 5,200 millions at something like the present level of comfort. This estimate of Dr. East falls far short of those recently published by other authorities. After investigations in eleven different climes, the German geographer, Professor Penck, concluded that the density of population depended on the level of civilization in a given area and that with the maximum degree of cultivation of the soil, the earth could nourish a population of 7,689 millions. Sir George Handley Knibbs is even more optimistic and put the maximum at 8,000 millions. Even on the lowest estimate it is obvious that the world is now capable of supporting nearly three times the present population on a plane far removed from starvation.

As regards the other material perquisites of life, the resources now at the command of man are more than enough to supply the needs of all. Applied science has multiplied manufactures almost in a miraculous fashion and opened up vistas of expansion which stagger the imagination. Yet immense reserves of raw materials in Asia and Africa await scientific utilization. Latin America is still in the initial stages of modernizing its economic structure, while India and China lag further behind. Big Industry has yet barely

Manufac-
tures

¹ It has been estimated that a person needs a food supply of 1.27 million calories a year. According to the French physician M. Maurel, the number of calories necessary for a male adult, weighing 55 kilograms and performing light work varies theoretically from 1,650 in hot seasons in hot climates to 2,750 in cold seasons in cold climates, per day. Cf. *Proceedings of the World Population Conference, 1927*.

For a detailed discussion on supplies of corn, vegetables, meat, fruits, tea, coffee, etc., cf. J. Russell Smith, *The World's Food Resources*.

touched countries like Persia and Afghanistan. At the same time chemistry is demonstrating the feasibility of replacing some natural by synthetic products and thus diminishing the quantity of raw material to be grown for human consumption. Here then are abundant potential supplies. If the world as a whole submits its economic life to scientific control, it would easily be able to produce clothing, shoes, houses, furniture and other necessities and comforts for a population more numerous than the present. The genius and energy now devoted to perfecting the instruments of destruction could, in a more peaceful future, reinforce industrial technology and discover new sources of power, ways of avoiding waste, and improving the processes of manufacture. Rationalization, which brought about a second industrial revolution, promises economy of labour on a stupendous scale. Planned economy, already on trial in Russia, has proved the feasibility of rapid industrialization on up-to-date lines and of enormous saving of labour and organizing energy in industrial processes. Even at the present stage of economic evolution, the enforced unemployment of millions in England, Germany, the United States and other countries shows that output would easily go up if the purchasing power and effective demand could increase. The tariff walls rising higher and higher in recent years indicate that the world is already manufacturing more than it has, under our present arrangements, the power to purchase.

The incontestable fact emerging from a survey of economic history is that the situation of the past has been reversed during the last hundred years. Today the world does not suffer from any intrinsic scarcity of food and other commodities. It can produce more than enough of them all. As a matter of fact, the world today consumes more per individual than it did, with scarcely half the population, in 1800. Yet under-consumption is the great problem which confronts humanity today. For instance, a substantial

Under-
consumption

fraction, estimated from one-third to two-thirds, of the Indian population lives perpetually on the verge of starvation. In other Asiatic countries, in Eastern Europe and Latin America there are various percentages of population, under-fed, under-clad and unfamiliar with modern comforts. The natives of Africa are in a worse plight. Even the most prosperous regions in Western Europe, the United States, and the British Dominions have a submerged tenth far below the national average and occasionally sinking into deep distress. Colossal indeed is the potential demand for clean clothing, furniture, books, art products and means of entertainment.

This poverty in the midst of plenty, actual and potential, is directly traceable to conditions which keep down the purchasing power of large masses of people in various countries. That power was always low, in fact, lower in the past than at present. The anachronism is that it has not increased in proportion to productive capacity. The disparity is due to the fact that the standard of life, while it has certainly risen in the world as a whole, is still low in the case of large sections of mankind, because of certain reasons to which men have failed to pay adequate attention.

The low standard of life is a continuation, with some modifications, of the pain economy which had developed under the pressure of want and ignorance during thousands of years. The mass of the people had accommodated themselves to the economic plane on which they had perforce to live. Their personality was frustrated, their growth was handicapped in many ways; but there was no easy way of escape, and the ignorance which was part of their lot prevented a clear consciousness of their plight. It was in accordance with this environment that their customs and institutions took form. Round it clustered their ideas and sentiments. By it was determined their philosophy of life, their *Weltanschauung*. The groups which were somewhat

more fortunately situated had adapted themselves to their own conditions of life and developed a habit of dominating others, of making them work, sometimes at unpalatable tasks, and enjoying a somewhat disproportionate share of the social dividend. All this was connected with social stratification and with that group solidarity and exploitation which in the modern age has come into prominence in the twin processes of nationalism and imperialism.

The Industrial Revolution The Industrial Revolution was so sudden and rapid that men failed to grasp its deeper implications and to adjust themselves to its possibilities as they unfolded themselves. The new power which science placed at the disposal of humanity was never used in any systematic manner in the universal interest. Largely, though not entirely, it was forced into adjustment with the inherited economy and employed by the dominant groups and countries to enrich themselves without adequate regard to the betterment of the conditions of others. Those who had always been accustomed to a low standard of life were employed to work hard for humble wages, and the resulting profits were largely appropriated by those who alone could supply capital or managing ability. The low wages kept down the purchasing power and perforce restricted the volume of industrial output. Weaker peoples were made to supply raw materials and to use such imported goods as they had the capacity to purchase. Economic imperialism was a phase of an endeavour, necessarily on an extended scale, to fit the new power into the old order instead of adapting the latter to the new situation.

World-wide stir Inevitably, however, a readjustment began in ideas and in practice. Social literature struck a defiant note and filled the air with new ideas on the creation, distribution and consumption of wealth and on the mutual relations of groups. The new resources and enlightenment encouraged labour unions and reformers to agitate, with varying measures of success, for higher

wages, shorter hours, better conditions of work, various types of insurance, etc. Peasants also felt the new impulse and bettered their condition in several countries. Before the nineteenth century drew to its close, Japan, China and India had begun to feel the anomaly of the old order and to grope for different arrangements, partly in antagonism to western imperialism. All these currents of thought and movement have been flowing with greater velocity during the present century and have disturbed the placidity of the ancient contentment and resignation in every continent. Over and above it all, the inherent contradictions of the present maladjustment have been brought to the fore by unemployment and recurring economic depression.

**Re-
adjustment** A readjustment is in rapid progress but it has neither been planned on an adequate scale nor informed by a true understanding of the new conditions. As it is, it has not gone far enough and haphazard transition sometimes presents the appearance of chaos. In the light of productive capacity the logical line of advance is an appreciable rise in the standard of life all over the world so that work may be available to all on terms of higher remuneration and shorter hours. The vast majority of mankind do not yet use enough clothing, furniture, conveyances, books, musical instruments or products of the fine arts. They do not travel enough and do not enjoy leisure enough for cultivating the intellectual and aesthetic life. If there could be an effective universal demand for the comforts and refinements of life, all would be working for all.

**Un-
employment** This is the only effective safeguard against unemployment. The present unemployment in industrialized countries has been diagnosed as technological unemployment, among others by J. M. Keynes, who adds that it might be possible in the near future to perform all the operations of agriculture, mining and manufacture with a quarter of the human effort to

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which we have been accustomed. Indeed the fear of unemployment is calculated to hamper technological advance. For instance one of the deeply rooted objections to the mechanization of agriculture in India and elsewhere is that it would mean the collapse of prices and unemployment on a colossal scale. It is clear that technical improvement by itself may throw large numbers out of work, but it can be timed with a largely increased demand for various commodities to absorb the displaced labour. Besides, child labour can be eliminated from industry and hours of work curtailed. It may thus be possible for agriculture and industry to maintain continuous operation without dislocating social life. The new economy demands a stimulation of wants all round, a consumption at the highest possible level, and consequently plentiful markets. The standard of life could rise in this manner if mankind got rid of the outworn imperialism which hampers free expression of life and adjustment to new conditions, if enlightenment were universalized so as to awaken new cravings, and if the social organization were brought into line with the new economy. All this implies an internal economic readjustment in every country. It also implies world co-operation in place of cut-throat competition, and universal peace in place of actual or potential warfare, as part of the general adjustment to the new order.¹ The process is obstructed by the persistence of the habits engendered by the old accommodation, especially by the philosophy of the aggrandizement of one group at the expense of another which the economy of want and hard drudgery had naturally brought into being, but which is, speaking scientifically, now out of date. The nations should have co-operated to facilitate the release of personality all round, to universalize education, to adopt all necessary measures to raise the real income and purchasing power of peasants, labourers and others, and thus to evoke

¹ *Infra*, chs. xii, xiv.

new wants and create new markets. Instead they arm themselves to the teeth to wrangle over the available meagre markets and hedge themselves round with tariff walls to prevent encroachment on the 'home' market.¹

Unfortunately the past offered no guidance in the new adjustment and it is not surprising that in face of economic troubles resort is had even now to remedies which cannot touch the roots of the malady. Symptoms are mistaken for causes and the disease is only aggravated. For instance a serious fall in prices may theoretically be due to over-production but it is generally a matter of under-consumption. To speak of over-production of commodities in a world in which millions of men, women and children are still under-fed, under-clad, and scantily supplied with comforts is, to say the least, premature. But if the only genuine remedy of a universally higher living is not adopted, it is only natural that efforts should have been made to restrict the production and importation of necessities so as to keep prices from falling below the cost of production. For instance the International Conference of Wheat-Growers

¹ Severe economic crises now and then bring home this view of the matter to practical business men. Thus the Manchester Association of Importers and Exporters, in their Report for the year ended February 1933, deplore that 'in world commerce distrust and animosity prevail everywhere making it akin to destructive military warfare, that every country is feverishly devising measures to decrease imports and to increase exports and that this process must end in absolute bankruptcy'. Referring to India it expresses the view that a very small improvement in the earning power of the people 'would cause an enormous increase in the demand for cottons, irrigation machinery and transport equipment' and that 'an honest and persistent endeavour to raise the economic status of over 300,000,000 hard-working small farmers . . . would make such an addition to the demand for commodities that there would be constant work for the mills, factories and all kinds of industries in Britain, India and elsewhere'.



has been recommending a curtailment of the area devoted to wheat-growing in the world. According to the wheat agreement signed in August 1933, substantial reductions in wheat acreage are to be effected in several countries for the years 1933-34 and 1934-35. The American Federal Farm Board, which seeks to apply the principles of co-ordinated planning and centralized control on a national scale, advanced loans to wheat-growers in the autumn of 1929 to enable them to hold supplies off the market. Futures were bought by the Grain Stabilization Corporation in 1930. In the same year the Farm Board advocated a substantial reduction of wheat acreage. Both the Farm Board and the Canadian Wheat Pool are believed to be responsible for keeping large supplies off the market to prevent a further fall in prices. On 1 August 1931, the total American carry-over of wheat was officially estimated at 319 million bushels. Actually the wheat acreage was reduced in the United States, Canada, Argentina and Australia by about 13½ millions in 1931. Nor is the so-called over-production confined to wheat. It was estimated

during the early months of 1930 that a million
Sugar tons of sugar were added to the already 'excessive surplus' stocks in 1929 and that the world price was below cost of production everywhere except possibly in Java.¹ Early in 1931, the International Sugar Conference concluded an agreement for an all-round reduction of sugar production,² and further reductions have since been effected.

¹ W. O. Gore, 'The Sugar Crisis', *Nineteenth Century and After*, May 1930, pp. 662-69.

² In view of the rapid accumulation of stocks and a drop in price, the International Sugar Conference held at Brussels in January-February 1931, arrived at the following agreement:

Cuba to reduce her production to 3,800,000 tons, that is to say, by 25 per cent a year; Java to reduce her production by 11 per cent, the production of beet sugar in the United States and of cane sugar in Hawaii and the Philippines to remain at the 1930

In 1930 it was similarly estimated that there was a surplus of coffee in Brazil, of cheese in Switzerland, of wool in Australia and of silk in Japan. In May 1931 the Indian Merchants' Chamber requested the Government of India to prohibit the entry into India of Japanese rice which seemed to be a menace to Indian agriculture. They represented that India including Burma had herself an enormous surplus of rice for export. Yet the fact remained that millions were underfed in India. The climax was reached early in 1934 when a conference met, under the auspices of the Government of India, to restrict crops in a country of whose population a large percentage lived admittedly on the verge of starvation. After the Great War there seemed to be a shortage of meat in the United States. But the release of meat stores by the Army and Navy departments called forth protests from the Chicago meat-packers. Eventually the supplies were either bought by the latter or withdrawn from the domestic market. Again, in the winter of 1919-20, none could perceive that there was enough milk on the market to feed all the children in New York. But the distributors of milk in that town felt constrained to represent to the producers that the supply should be curtailed so as to yield profits. Concerted attempts have been made to restrict the supply of rubber in the Malay Peninsula and the East Indies, though the supervision of native production presents serious difficulties. Against this background it is easy to understand that pools and cartels are among the most important features of the present economic phase. For instance cotton, maize, arrowroot, pigs, eggs, butter and cheese have been pooled in Queensland and New South Wales. International cartels have begun to regulate the output of various commodities. High tariffs on

levels; the chief European countries exporting beet sugar, Germany, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Belgium and Hungary, to limit their output; the accumulated stocks to be fed to the market gradually over a period of five years.

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agricultural produce and manufactured goods hinder the free flow of commodities and in many cases lead automatically to reduction of output in the world as a whole.¹

The haphazard character of these attempts at the solution of economic problems is well illustrated by the juxtaposition of the economic nationalism of tariffs and the perverted internationalism of cartels. The course of events since 1929 is one long commentary on the futility of all endeavours to settle economic difficulties in terms of nationalism or the interest of classes of producers. The economic crisis since that year is more than monetary and is due to causes more fundamental than reparations or war debts. It admits of palliatives in the form of stable money and cancellation or reduction of international dues. But failing an adequate increase in consumption it is sure to reappear and leave unemployment behind as a symbol of deeper ills. The wheels of production revolve too fast for artificial restriction. The acute contrasts of overlordship and subjection, riches and poverty, inflame resentments which also interfere with the economic processes. A more logical adaptation to the new forces is needed, the introduction of scientific planning and

¹ The Agricultural Report of the World Economic Conference, 1927, at which fifty nations were represented, recommended the removal of hindrances to the free circulation of agricultural products, the reduction of customs tariffs and the abolition of the system of export prohibitions and duties. These recommendations were endorsed, among others, by M. Michelis, President of the International Institute of Agriculture and Prof. Sering of Berlin. Cf. the views of M. Theunis who stated, in the course of his closing presidential address to the conference, that 'except in the actual fields of conflict, the *dislocation* caused by the war was immensely more serious than the actual *destruction*. The main trouble now . . . is all in one form or another a maladjustment—not an insufficient productive capacity but a series of impediments to the full utilization of that capacity. The main obstacles to economic revival have been the hindrances opposed to the free flow of labour, capital and goods'.

guidance and, above all, based on principles of international solidarity and co-operation.

**International
co-operation** The real crisis before the world is one of anarchy and the only effective solution consists in international co-operation in the universal interest. Every country must plan its economic life and co-ordinate its plans, so far as possible, with those of other countries in the general interest of humanity. This is the logical conclusion of the new technique of production and the logical continuation of the rationalization which has been one of the most conspicuous features of industry for a generation. The solution carries with it political and social implications of a far-reaching character which will be examined in the sequel. The underlying idea is that every effort be made to maximize the effective demand all over the world so that humanity may rise to the highest possible standard of living.

**The
economic
foundations
of demo-
cracy** Along these lines it is now *possible* to lay the economic foundations of democracy, safe and secure, for humanity. The resources of science and technique can be organized so as to guarantee a plentiful subsistence and leisure to all. It follows that political institutions must be brought into harmony with the new possibilities in order to enable men to derive the fullest benefit from the opportunities of self-realization, and, not least, to encourage creative use of leisure for political and other purposes.

CHAPTER VIII

POPULATION

THE economic standard and the quality of human life are necessarily bound up with the density and distribution of population. Social philosophy has always entertained apprehensions of over-population which might lower the plane of living or mar the harmony of life. Plato severely limited the population of his ideal city and prescribed that the Guardians should not propagate faster than the social necessities demanded. Aristotle was convinced that the population of the State should be adjusted to its economy. In modern times the question has attracted attention, specially since the seventeenth century. Bacon uttered a warning against excessive population which might result in want and weakness. Giovanni Botero in Italy and Sir William Petty in England explained that there was an inevitable limit to increase of population. In 1696, Gregory King calculated that the population of England would double and reach the figure of 11 millions by A.D. 2300, that it would probably mount up to 22 millions by A.D. 2500 or 3600, 'in case the world should last so long,' and that this was the utmost that his country could sustain.¹ In the following century Montesquieu pointed out the dangers of unrestrained increase of population. In 1751, Benjamin Franklin published *Observations concerning the Increase of Mankind and the Peopling of Countries* in which *inter alia* he declared that Europe was almost

¹ Harold Wright, *Population*, pp. 12-13, quoting Gregory King's *Natural and Political Observations and Conclusions upon the State and Condition of England*, 1696.

fully populated and could increase but little and slowly.¹

Malthus

In 1798 Malthus elevated the discussion to a scientific plane and brought out the *Essay on Population* which, through its influence on Darwin, transformed the vital sciences. It called attention primarily to the fact that population was treading close on the heels of subsistence,² tending to multiply beyond the means of subsistence, and that it was sternly kept in check by the various forms of misery or fear of misery.

The course of the Industrial Revolution since Malthus has altered the perspective of the problem and modified the attitude of economic theory towards the growth of population. To Malthus 'the problem was one of the relative increase of population and of food; with us it is one of the density of population and of the productiveness of industry. To Malthus the position was much the same in all ages; in his view population, except under unusual circumstances, had in any country at any given time always increased up to the limit of subsistence and was in process of being checked, chiefly by vice and misery. In the modern view increase in skill has brought to an increasingly dense population a larger income per head'.³ Under modern conditions a small population does not necessarily mean an intrinsically large share *per capita* in the social dividend. A certain density of population is needed for agricultural and industrial mass production, for making the development of transport and communication worth while, and for an adequate supply of capital, talent and labour. It is no longer quite correct to say that while population is capable of increasing in geometrical progression, subsistence can expand only in arithmetical progres-

Change in perspective

¹ Harold Wright, *op. cit.*, p. 15.

² For an interesting account of the circumstances under which Malthus wrote his *Essay*, cf. James Bonar, *Malthus and His Work*, chs. ii and iii.

³ A. M. Carr-Saunders, *The Population Problem*.

sion. The optimum population means a balance between the expansibility of the resources and the population's capacity for work and consumption.

None the less the fact remains that unless some checks are applied population will outrun the means of subsistence or at any rate exist on an extremely low plane. Accordingly the old misgivings have not disappeared and have, in some quarters, been accentuated by the doubling of the population during the last century. The late Professor Alfred Marshall argued that the pressure of population on the means of subsistence could not be held in check for more than 200 years.¹ Knibbs, whose estimate of 8,000 to 9,000 million as the potential population which the earth can sustain has already been quoted, fears that population increasing at the rate of 1 per cent a year would double itself in 80 years and become 15,000 millions in A.D. 2169. And so we come to *Standing Room Only* as the tell-tale title of one of the latest contributions on the subject, that by Dr. E. A. Ross.

If these apprehensions were well founded, they would be enough to blight our hopes for the ultimate welfare of mankind. Amelioration would only put off the evil day and might even aggravate the disease

¹ 'Taking the present population of the world at one and a half thousand millions, and assuming that its present rate of increase will continue (about 8 per 1,000 annually; cf. Revenstein's paper before the British Association in 1890), we find that in less than 200 years it will amount to six thousand millions, or at the rate of about 200 to the square mile of fairly fertile land. (Revenstein reckons 28 million square miles of fairly fertile land, and 14 millions of poor grasslands. The first estimate is thought by many to be too high; but allowing for this, if the less fertile land be reckoned in for what it is worth, the result will be about 30 million square miles as assumed above.) Meanwhile there will probably be great improvements in the arts of agriculture; and, if so, the pressure of population on the means of subsistence may be held in check for about 200 years, but not longer.'—*Principles of Economics*, 8th edition, p. 180.

it was designed to cure. The pressure of the population would perpetuate, and might be invoked to justify, struggle for territories and materials. In short, the old conditions would persist and man would never move away from the system based on want and conflict. The whole theory

**Potential
resources**

is, however, invalidated by two weighty reasons, the force of which has not always been adequately realized. In the first place, it is premature to assign any upper limit to the population which the earth can sustain in comfort. Large regions are still under-populated.¹ None can foresee what science may do with desert or poor land or how it may further enhance the fertility of good land. It is still more difficult to foresee any limits to industrial output. It is interesting to note that between 1913 and 1925 the world output of raw materials and foodstuffs, according to the available indices, increased by 16 per cent and population by 6 per cent.² In regard to some countries Professor Seligman remarks that 'instead of population pressing upon food supply, food supply is pressing upon population'.

¹ Australia could support a population many times bigger than the present one. The New Hebrides had a population of 1,000 whites and 60,000 natives in 1930. It is capable of sustaining a million people. Borneo, the Moluccas, the Sunda Islands, specially the smaller ones, are similarly underpopulated. Brazil can absorb large numbers. Both Canada and the United States can support much larger populations than they do at present. The habitable parts of Siberia have yet to be filled up.

² Cf. *Report on the Course and Phases of the World Economic Depression* presented to the Assembly of the League of Nations at Geneva, 1931. The report states that taking the world production of foodstuffs in the period 1909-13 as 100, in the years 1923-25 it averaged about 106, while the world index of raw material production, on the basis of 1913, stood for these three years at 113, 119 and 130. The output of the manufacturing industries probably increased more. Between 1913 and 1925 Asia and Oceania had increased their production by about 20 per cent, North America by 25 per cent and South America and Africa by more than 25 per cent.

In the second place there is little reason to fear that population will continue to increase at the rate of the last century. Prudential restraints, indeed, have never been altogether unknown to man. It is a mistake to suppose that the pressure of numbers among backward peoples, or in ancient times, was kept down only by war, disease, heavy infant mortality, flood and famine. There were also practices like abortion, infanticide and senilicide. Recent research has accumulated a good deal of evidence on the regulation of numbers among primitive races through the operation of certain initiation ceremonies, postponement of marriage, abstention and crude practices of contraception.¹ Civilization favours an increase in numbers² but it also reinforces the prudential restraints to excessive growth of population.³ On a balance there does result a net growth in numbers but it is kept within limits *inter alia* not only by infanticide (among some backward peoples), postponement of marriage, moral control, religious or compulsory celibacy but also by contraceptive methods. These are now known to have been employed in ancient Greece and Rome, among the Jews and Arabs and among the Franks before their conversion to Christianity. Nor were they unknown to the Hindus and the Chinese. Men have always attempted, in howsoever haphazard and crude a way, to keep the population roughly within limits of subsistence, though so far on a very low standard of life. The nineteenth century witnessed an exceptional increase in numbers largely because the means of sustenance had suddenly multiplied and so the standard of life showed an upward tendency.⁴

¹ See A. M. Carr-Saunders, *The Population Problem*, chs. vii-ix and the references cited by him.

² *Ibid.*, ch. v.

³ *Ibid.*, chs. x-xi.

⁴ According to recent estimates, the population of Europe stood as follows in various epochs:—

Beginning of the sixth century A.D.	...	40,000,000
Beginning of the sixteenth century A.D.		70,000,000

Limitation of families Already some important developments have taken place which are calculated to slow down the rate of increase. The growth of enlightenment and economic comfort among a few sections of the population, chiefly in the west, has led to voluntary limitation of families. Parents cannot afford a numerous progeny without risking the cultural and economic future of all concerned. Indeed, the fall in the birth rate among the higher classes in some countries is so marked that it has lately caused some searchings of the heart and has even been represented as calamitous.¹

The emancipation of women Another important cause of the limitation of families is the altered status of woman. In the United States and the greater part of Europe the subjection of woman is already a tale of the past and her emancipation is proceeding apace in Japan, Turkey, India, China and Egypt. Education, the professions and public life are now open to women to an extent which could scarcely have been imagined up to the eighteenth century. The new position of the hitherto weaker sex marks in itself a great step in the democratic process. It is no less important in its bearing on the problem of population. A certain percentage of educated women in every country seem to prefer the single life, while others marry late and refuse to be treated as mere child-bearing machines. The vogue of large nurseries is disappearing among the educated classes and four or five children seem to constitute the optimum of the family.

Birth control Lastly modern birth control will rank among the greatest discoveries ever made by man. It has made tremendous headway in the west during the last two generations and is now spreading fast in

Beginning of the nineteenth century A.D.	170,000,000
At present	400,000,000

¹ Cf. W. McDougall, *National Welfare and National Decay*; Dean Inge, *Outspoken Essays*, pp. 59 ff.; L. Stoddard, *The Revolt Against Civilization*; K. Pearson, *National Life and Character*.

Japan, China, India,¹ Turkey, Egypt and Latin America. As its vogue spreads, the population markedly slackens its tendency to tread close on the heels of subsistence. Once the new family traditions take deep root, the producing of large families will be regarded, as John Stuart Mill desired, with the same feelings as drunkenness or any other physical excess.

Already stationary populations are in sight in many lands. In France the birth rate fell from 31·8 in 1811-20 to 20·6 in 1901-10 and during the last two decades the population has shown no tendency to increase at all. The last census revealed an actual diminution in the population of Scotland which indeed may be a passing phase; but the tendency to the restriction of population is there unmistakable. In England and Wales the rate of population increase declined from 14 per cent in 1811 to 10·9 per cent in 1911. It has been calculated that births per 1,000 women of all ages in England and Wales declined from 34·6 in 1841-50 to 26·3 in 1906-10 and 23·6 in 1911-15.² Professor E. Cannan estimates that England and Wales are steadily tending towards a stationary population. Calculating on the basis of the present dimensions of the birth rate and death rate in Great Britain, Professor Bowley concludes that the population is likely to amount to 48½ millions by 1951 and then to remain nearly constant for the next sixty years.³ Sweden with its unusually long record of vital statistics shows a decline in legitimate births per 1,000 married women between the ages of 15 and 50

¹ As a sign of the times it may be noted that the All-India Women's Conference at its session at Lucknow in the last week of December 1932 passed a resolution by an overwhelming majority that men and women should be instructed in methods of birth control in recognized clinics.

² For statistics cf. Harold Wright, *Population*, pp. 103 ff.

³ Quoted by A. M. Carr-Saunders, *op. cit.*, pp. 50-51.

from 251 in 1756-65 to 219 in 1896-1905. Between 1871-80 and 1901-10, the Swedish birth rate on the whole fell from 30.5 to 25.8. During the same period 'the rate fell in Denmark from 31.4 to 28.6; in Norway from 31.0 to 27.41; . . . in Finland from 37.0 to 31.2; in Austria from 39.0 to 34.7; in Switzerland from 30.7 to 26.9; in Germany from 39.1 to 32.9; in Holland from 36.2 to 30.5; in Belgium from 32.3 to 26.1; in Italy from 36.9 to 32.7.' Southern and Eastern Europe also show a decline in the birth rate. In the United States the birth rate fell by nearly 50 per cent between 1820 and 1920. Australia showed a decline in the birth rate from 41.92 in 1861-65 to 26.35 in 1901-09 and in the net natural increase from 25.17 in 1861-65 to 14.96 in 1901-9. In India the birth rate declined per 1,000 inhabitants from 37.7 in 1905-9 to 33.4 in 1921-25. The decline in the birth rate is indeed a world-wide phenomenon, with the one notable exception of Japan where the birth rate increased from 25.1 as the annual average in 1871-1880 to 31.9 in 1905-9 and to 34.6 in 1921-25,¹ and the possible exception of certain African regions.

The death rate has also declined : for instance, between 1876 and 1926, from 20.9 to 11.6 in England; from 19.9 to 11.8 in Sweden; from 26.3 to nearly 11.9 in Germany; from 18.8 to nearly 16.8 in Italy; from 11.8 to 8.7 in New Zealand. But of course it is only the check to infant mortality that actually affects the population ratio in the long run.

¹ For the statistics cf. E. Cannan, *The Economic Journal*, December 1931, pp. 519-33; Harold Wright, *Population*, pp. 103, 105-6, 111-12; Harold Cox, *The Problem of Population*, pp. 16, 18; R. R. Kuczynski, *The Balance of Births and Deaths*; R. Peabody, *Studies in Human Biology*, chs. xxi-xxv; B. K. Sarkar, *The Jaypee Review of the Indian Medical Association*, May 1932 and Revolt Randive, *The Population Problem of India*.
ster.

The net result is that population has not been increasing at the earlier rate, except in Japan. In regard to Japan, Dr. Teijiro Uyeda of the University of Tokyo has recently calculated, on the basis of the figures of the last three censuses, that the rate of increase of population in the past is not likely to hold good for the future. 'There are already indications of decline in the Japanese birth rate. It is likely to decline further, reaching that of many occidental races.' Dr. Uyeda anticipates a practically stationary population for Japan after 1970.

There are reasons to believe that the rate of population increase in the world as a whole will slacken yet further. The limitation of families is not yet evenly distributed in any country. For instance, Mr. Harold Wright classifies the births per 1,000 married men under fifty-five years of age according to the rank or occupation of the father as follows :¹

1. Upper and middle classes	119
2. Intermediate workmen	132
3. Skilled workmen	153
4. Intermediate	158
5. Unskilled workmen	213

In the world as a whole, the birth rate is lowest in the upper and middle classes and generally rises inversely with the average earnings of each class.² The progress of birth control, the diffusion of enlightenment and higher standards of life may be expected to reduce the birth rate among what are now 'the lower classes' of the community. Secondly the religious opposition to birth control is rapidly losing in effectiveness. Clear indications are now visible of a decline in the Catholic birth rate in predominantly Protestant as also in Catholic countries. In India the precepts of the Dharma Shastras are now powerless to check the new tendencies. If militarism gives way to

¹ Harold Wright, *Population*, p. 154.

² *Ibid.*, p. 115.

international concord, the policy which certain States have adopted to stimulate the birth of future soldiers is likely to be revised. Lastly the progress of enlightenment, comfort and the emancipation of women in Asia and Africa may bring the birth rate in those regions into line with that of western countries and incidentally dissipate the perils which often scare the numerically weaker communities.

The problem of population is indissolubly bound up with that of human advancement not merely in the sense that the latter demands an optimum population but also in the sense that the problem itself depends for its solution on a general betterment. The birth rate will approach the optimum in direct proportion to the cultural and economic progress of humanity and to international concord. The dominant tendencies of the time promise to keep the future population well within manageable limits. For a very very long time we are not likely to reach the figure of 5,200 millions, much less 8,000 to 9,000 millions, which the earth is capable of sustaining. In any case the remedy lies in our hands with the modern methods of family limitation. Every step in economic advance, the enlightenment, world peace and liberation of women is calculated to checkmate the excessive growth of population. The imperative condition, however, is that progress in all these directions should be shared by all classes and countries. Jingoism in one country will provoke martial preparations elsewhere and put a premium on the growth of numbers, which in its turn will inspire dread in weaker populations. Already the 'multiplication' of classes or peoples has led to doleful prophecies or prompted efforts, hitherto unsuccessful, to counteract neo-Malthusianism in specific communities. In this as in other respects the fortunes of classes and races are bound together and the surest guarantee of lasting improvement anywhere is the universality of the improvement itself.

Population
and progress



CHAPTER IX

MAN AND MACHINE

Achievements of modern science MODERN science is mainly responsible for the change and ferment which have marked the last hundred years and more. It has stirred the waters deeply and roused ardent hopes no less than grave apprehensions for the future. It can certainly claim some solid achievements. It has dissipated a good deal of superstition and error and released many from terror and hallucination. It has deepened man's comprehension of the universe and his insight into his own being. Ways and means have been invented for the wider diffusion of culture which had so far been the monopoly of the few. Diversions and amusements, whatever their deficiencies, have been brought to the doors of millions. In many lands the triumphs of sanitation constitute a veritable romance; health has improved; infant mortality has diminished and longevity has risen. For instance, in several countries the expectation of life has increased by nearly one-third, that is, to nearly sixty years, during the last two generations; while it still lingers between 20 and 30 in countries which have not taken full advantage of scientific progress. No statistics can express the relief brought to humanity by the strides in medicine, especially in surgery and anæsthetics.

New plane of life Applied science has revealed a new plane of life. It has multiplied the supply of the material requisites and comforts of life and raised the standard of living of large sections of the race. Man has obtained partial release from the thralldom of crushing toil and has been enabled to abolish slavery for the most part, to mitigate forced labour and to reduce hours of work in many countries. No longer need woman be engrossed completely in household work. Leisure for

recreation, culture and aesthetic enjoyment has been placed within the reach of larger numbers than ever before. In fact vast stores of energy have been set free for the re-fashioning of civilization. There is a deep spirituality in the new phase of the environment, just because it is so conducive to the development and release of human personality. Most significant of all, the present achievement is but an earnest of the future to come.

But in the meanwhile the adjustment of social ideas and habits to the new phase of intellectual and technical development has raised some grave problems. It has been largely devoid of plan, and above all, too narrow and too piecemeal.

**Difficulties
of adjust-
ment**

The new forces have sometimes been harnessed to the service of the old antagonisms and exclusive traditions of classes and nations and sometimes almost left to run wild. The earlier phase of the industrial transition entailed hardships and evils which seemed to many to prove the bankruptcy of modern civilization and scientific advance. The hard toil of men, women and children, on starvation wages under insanitary conditions, evoked strong protest and agitation in England and then elsewhere. The mushroom growth of towns, studded with workshops and overcrowded with slums, presented problems in hygiene and morals which have not yet found their solution. New wealth was created in abundance but its uneven distribution and novel ostentations evoked social jealousies and conflicts. The rich were certainly getting richer and it seemed to many, though the surmise was rarely correct, that the poor were getting poorer. The contrast between the classes certainly became more and more glaring. Labour organized itself; capital followed suit; and industrial disputes, strikes and lock-outs threatened to dislocate the whole framework of economic life at frequent intervals. Recurring unemployment was an inseparable accident of unplanned Big Industry and added the terrors of insecurity to the demoralization of idleness.

**Monotony
of labour**

The breathless hurry and bustle of the new life seemed to shatter the nerves. The mechanization of industry separated design and organization from craftsmanship. Millions of men and women laboured on an infinitesimal part of an industrial process for long hours, on scanty remuneration and under directions from above. They lost all sense of pride and satisfaction in work, all joy of creativeness and spontaneity. Scientific improvement often made the work more and more monotonous, so that the individuals were consumed in the service of an 'external impersonal inhuman power'. As Goldsmith would have said, wealth accumulated but men decayed. All this had been perceived long ago by Adam Smith. A somewhat isolated passage in *The Wealth of Nations* deplores that under the monotonous labour involved in the progressive division of labour, the labourer lost his inventive faculty, and that he generally became as stupid and ignorant as it was possible for a human being to become. It seemed that his dexterity at his own particular trade was acquired at the expense of his intellectual, social and martial virtues. His mental torpor seemed to bar rational conversation and generous, noble or tender sentiment.¹ Long afterwards when Big Industry was at the height of its prestige, the same ideas were echoed by Karl Marx. 'All methods of raising the social productiveness of labour,' he said, 'are effected at the cost of the individual labourer; all means for the development of production transform themselves into means of dominating and exploiting the producer. They mutilate him into a fragment of a man, they degrade him to the level of an appendage to a machine. Every remnant of charm in his work is destroyed and transmuted into a loathsome toil; he is separated from the intellectual possibilities of the labour process in the same degree that science, as an independent agency, becomes a part of it . . .'

¹ *The Wealth of Nations*, Book V, Part III, Art. ii.

The new power of science, monopolized by a few nations, often exerted on weaker peoples a pressure so organized, so relentless, so overwhelming that it appeared to them to be the very embodiment of heartlessness. Big Industry has written some terrible chapters in the history of the relations of Europe with Africa and Asia. Science has also revolutionized the time-honoured institution of war and has rendered it so expensive and terrible to combatants and non-combatants as to menace the future of civilization.

**International
repercus-
sions**

It is therefore scarcely surprising that the present phase of civilization has revolted some of the noblest minds of the age and has been denounced as sordid and materialistic, destructive of the deeper values of life. Carlyle roundly condemned it. Ruskin railed against machinery and the science of economics. William Morris protested against its ugliness and commercialism. Tolstoy preached a return to the simple life and Gandhi stands forth as the apostle of the spinning-wheel, symbolic of the cottage industry and simple life.¹ In eastern countries there are many who still refuse to reconcile themselves to modern civilization and look for human happiness in plain living, restricted wants and spiritual endeavour as against the ruthless competition, acute discontent and 'materialistic' life of the present age in the west.²

**Criticism of
modern
civilization**

It is necessary to set the present stage of development in the correct historical perspective. The evils complained of are inherent neither in scientific progress nor in mechanization. Most of them are as old as humanity, in fact, even older. In some cases the momentum of the new power has enhanced the scale and the intensity of their operation. But in other

**Historical
perspective**

¹ See M. K. Gandhi, *Indian Home Rule* (Madras, 1922), pp. 33 ff. and 86 ff.

² Cf. M. K. Gandhi, *op. cit.*, pp. 19-23, also pp. 49 ff.

cases they have been mitigated even to vanishing point. The scientific revolution has been a curse to the extent that its power has been annexed by the traditions engendered by the economy of want and conflict. But it has not itself created any exploitation or imperialism as such. For instance, the low wages of workers have been due principally to the low standard of life which prevailed before the Industrial Revolution set in and which led millions to accept just enough to keep body and soul together. Nor was hard monotonous toil a new experience to man. Again, the relations of overlordship and subjection in various degrees had always been a feature of human life. They just continued to exist in the new era though with differences of detail and incidence. Wars had always been orgies of loot, rapine and indiscriminate slaughter, brutalizing and demoralizing to all concerned. It is the persistence of old habits of thought and old standards of conduct which lies at the root of modern militarism. Apart from minor factors, the one fundamental change is that the scientific revolution contains the promise of universal enlightenment and plenty; that for some it has already raised the standard of life, lightened toil and created more leisure; that it has in many instances softened the rigours of ascendancy; and that by removing the root causes it has brought the abolition of war within the range of practical politics. The world is in the midst of a transition from a *pain economy* to what may, under informed planning and humanitarian effort, become *the economy of universal welfare*. There is no warrant for the assumption that civilization based on applied science is necessarily bound up with the social and economic order of the present day.

History does not countenance the legend of the happy and glorious past, and social philosophy cannot seriously advocate a return to 'the good old days'. Even if it were possible, it would certainly cause greater suffering and frustration of personality than what can justly be attributed to the modern phase. The task

Problems

before humanity is to smooth the transition to an order based on applied science and to accelerate the pace, by a readjustment of habits and institutions to the new situation and by correcting the evils incidental to the scale, the complexity and the intensity of modern life. The major problems centre round international relations, distribution of wealth and organization of work.

Activity being natural to life, every normal human being delights in work and longs to suffuse it with his personality. If the job accords with the temperament, it summons all the faculties into play, engages the whole being and brings the joy of self-realization. The creative vocation has been a joyous expansion of personality to numberless artists, poets, writers, scientists, statesmen, engineers, organizers, explorers and others. Then there are those whose career is determined for them partly by a fortuitous concourse of circumstances but who soon adapt themselves to its conditions and derive a great deal of satisfaction from it. Within wide limits the internal conflict from work can be resolved into harmony. On the whole, men can derive pleasure from any work which is not positively out of accord with their temperament, which does not imply sweated labour, which carries what they regard a fair remuneration, which is not performed under unpleasant surroundings, physical or moral, or under autocratic command from above, and which is not despised by society at large. If these conditions are not fulfilled, work may become wearisome or hateful and suffer in quality and output. For instance, slavery cut off the springs of industrial improvement for generations and, along with serfdom, doomed agriculture to primitive and wasteful methods. Forced labour has never proved a business proposition in the long run. Under unscientific agriculture, the peasant often wearies because of the long hours he has to toil in the fields and because of the scanty net returns to him. Large-scale industry has created serious

**Mechanical
work**

problems because of long hours, inadequate wages, insanitary conditions, and the monotony of its operations.

Psychological aspects The psychological aspects of the situation are well brought out in replies to questionnaires which social investigators have in various countries addressed to working men and women. Graham Wallas gives the following summary of answers furnished by working class students of Ruskin College, Oxford: 'With regard to pleasure in work. Engineers say generally it is all toil. They admit there is a certain pleasure in a job well done, but they say the bad conditions knock the pleasure out. Coal miners generally say the work is all toil. But one man said he would sooner be at work than be idle, another that he can take pleasure in the work for half a day when he knows he is going to have a half-holiday. A third says that there is a certain pleasure in digging out the coal when you have a good place, but that pleasure is just in the expectation of making a good wage. Factory workers, i.e. textile, boot-making, etc., agree that the work is all toil. One man remarks that he has known girls of good position work ten hours a day for 9s. a week, but he believes that the attraction is purely the independence thus obtained. Ashby, our agricultural labourer, was very emphatic with regard to the pleasure to be obtained from agricultural work.'¹

Turning to women workers, inquiries at Boston laundries and hosieries in 1910 revealed that the girls were happier at work than they would otherwise have been. 'One said that work took up her mind; she had been awfully discontented. Another that "you were of some use". Another "thought that it was because the hours went so much faster. . . ." A little girl said "she enjoyed her work. It made her feel she was worth something". At another laundry, a girl wept because she was about to move with her father "apparently into a better position

¹ *The Great Society*, pp. 323-24.

in another city. She would not work now, but would stay at home with her mother, where it would be so awful lonesome". . . . A working girl at a hosiery was not always happy because "I'd like to be away some day. I don't mean home alone, but I could have a companion and go off in the country some day". Another was not happy because she was not among ladies and gentlemen."¹


It will be observed that even mechanical work is capable of yielding satisfaction. It is the bad conditions which 'knock the pleasure out' and which must be altered if the gains of the Industrial Revolution are to be consolidated. Remedies are available in the resources of technique, organization and wealth which the progress of science has placed at the disposal of humanity.

The abolition of child labour and a general rise in the school leaving age would not only raise the intellectual level of the community but also serve to mitigate unemployment. Above all, it would prevent a good deal of bitterness and discontent which spring from frustrated personality. H. G. Wells has depicted a feeling which does not always come so clearly to the surface but which invariably produces inner tension and complexes. 'When I was a boy of fourteen,' he writes, 'I was a complete Marxist, long before I had heard the name of Marx. I had been cut off abruptly from education, caught in a detestable shop, and I was being broken to a life of mean and dreary toil. I was worked too hard and for such long hours that all thoughts of self-improvement seemed hopeless. I would have set fire to that place if I had not been convinced that it was over-insured.'²

For young people entering on work it is now possible to use psychological tests of aptitude on a large scale. Everyone may not secure exactly the work which suits his temperament best but the tests

¹ *The Great Society*, pp. 341-44.

² *Russia in the Shadows*.



which experimental psychology is devising should prevent numerous misfits, to the lasting benefit of all concerned.

Electric power can now be cheaply conducted to the countryside and can decentralize some branches of industry to a certain extent. It can thus lighten the burden on the big industrial centres and can, for large numbers of workers, mitigate

**Industrial
decentraliza-
tion**

the evils associated with huge factories and slums. A higher standard of life all round would increase the demand for

artistic productions which can be executed only by the hand and which could afford opportunity for the expression of a good deal of creative

**Artistic
products**

talent. In many countries agricultural methods admit of vast improvement which would lighten the peasant's toil and increase his returns. In centralized urban industries, better surroundings can relieve the tedium and increase the efficiency of work. There is no reason why factories and offices should be ugly, ill-ventilated or insanitary.

An interesting experiment is reported to have revealed that frescoes inside a factory increased the average efficiency of the workers by 1.03 per cent. It is the hurry of the cut-throat

**Improved
methods and
surroundings**

competition between industrial or commercial firms and nations which is largely responsible for the divorce of art from modern industry. Art would become a commercial proposition if industry could be informed by the spirit of co-operation and if the purchasing power of the people could rise. In any case a great improvement in the physical environment of work is possible. Even the conditions of mining have undergone a great change in recent years and admit of further improvement on similar lines.

In Big Industry, the long hours of work are more fatiguing than in agriculture and, in spite of human adaptability and force of habit, render work positively hateful. It has been scientifically proved that fatigue is responsible for nervous disorders

**Shorter hours
of work**

and that it heightens suggestibility and stimulates the craving for drink and unhealthy amusement. Under these circumstances the little leisure available may be worse than wasted. In occupations like coal-mining, eight hours a day is perhaps too much. As already pointed out, shorter hours all round will largely solve the problem of unemployment which would otherwise be accentuated by rationalization of agriculture and industry. International co-operation in this matter would remove the fear of undercutting which is at present one of the chief obstacles to the amelioration of conditions of work.

International co-operation could also facilitate higher wages which would increase the purchasing power of the community and make work more attractive. The world requires a code establishing an international minimum, including adequate measures of old age pensions, maternity benefit, and insurance against sickness, accident and unemployment. A feeling of security and justice would make most work tolerable and even pleasurable.

Apart from strictly economic measures it is also necessary to generate that pride in work, the absence of which has been one of the most tragic features of manual labour. Under modern conditions the worker fails to see the wood for the trees and gets tired of the insignificant role to which he is doomed. Education should enable him to grasp the entire industrial process in which he is collaborating with thousands of others. A vivid understanding of the connexion between the parts, howsoever small, and the whole, should invest work with a new dignity in the eyes of the worker. It is even more important to extend self-government in industry to the farthest extent that may be compatible with efficiency and national plans and their international co-ordination. It is scarcely desirable that all the discipline and regulation should be foisted on the industrial worker or the peasant from above.

Higher
wages

Pride in
work

Self-Govern-
ment in
industry

They should have a share in the formulation of national or international economic policy through representation on functional chambers, as well as legislative bodies and deliberative conferences. They should be represented on all bodies charged with the examination of economic conditions, the settlement of industrial disputes, the regulation of wages, hours, grades, promotion, and cognate matters. Within the framework of national or international regulation, the management of the workshop and the co-operative farm should be based on democratic principles, providing for common consultation on purely internal affairs.¹ This would largely reduce the subjective cost of production.

Profes-
sionalization
of economic
activity

Lastly it is necessary to professionalize agriculture, industry and commerce and lift them from the plane of individual profit-making to that of ventures in social service. The complexities of modern economic life forbid the assumption that the play of individual interest would by itself secure the general interest. It is desirable to bring social responsibility to the forefront. To that end international regulation, national legislation and above all the forces of education and public opinion should be directed. The professionalization of economic pursuits would rid the workers of the feeling that they are toiling to swell the profits of masters, perhaps 'idle', invisible masters.²

¹ Cf. G. D. H. Cole, *Self-government in Industry*; and *Guild Socialism*; S. G. Hobson, *National Guilds and the State*; H. J. Laski, *A Grammar of Politics*, pp. 438 ff.

² See R. H. Tawney, *The Acquisitive Society*, pp. 105 ff. 'A profession may be defined most simply as a trade which is organized, incompletely, no doubt, but genuinely, for the performance of function. It is not simply a collection of individuals who get a living for themselves by the same kind of work. . . . The standard which it maintains may be high or low: all professions have some rules which protect the interests of the community and others which are an imposition on it. Its essence is that it assumes certain responsibilities for the competence of its members or the quality of its wares, and that it deliberately prohibits certain kinds of conduct on the ground that, though they may be profitable

Machine and
personality

With its present resources, industry can be rationalized on the basis of the happiness of those engaged in it. The psychological strain and tension associated at present with a great deal of mechanical work are due not so much to the character of the work itself as to its duration, inadequate reward and the conditions under which it is carried on. These conditions admit of transformation because of the ease and abundance of production which the machine has rendered possible and because of the enlightenment which has perceptibly advanced and which can be diffused among the masses. Given international co-operation and large-scale planning, agriculture, industry and commerce can be so developed as to make work not merely a source of pleasure but also a means of self-realization. It will indeed be a ghastly tragedy if men are left to find the zest of life outside their principal vocations. There is no antithesis between man and machine; between happiness and mechanical labour. Rather it is on the foundations of well-regulated mechanics that humanity can realize its spiritual possibilities.

Machine and
aesthetic
values

Nor is the machine inherently antagonistic to aesthetic values. Machine industry offers abundant room for designs and if these have too often been cheap and commonplace it is because our economic life has, in the absence of planning, been dominated by competitive profits. When industrial enterprise has become more co-operative, it will pay to turn out more aesthetic products and place them within reach of all. On the other hand, art itself would remain exclusive and aristocratic without the aid of machinery. It is this aspect of the situation which has escaped the great advocates of manual craftsmanship.¹

to the individual, they are calculated to bring into disrepute the organization to which he belongs. . . .’ *ibid.*, pp. 160-7.

Cf. also H. J. Laski, *A Grammar of Politics*, pp. 517 ff.

¹ Graham Wallas, *The Great Society*, p. 326, comments as

It may be emphasized once again that the application of science to agriculture, industry and transport all over the world is the condition precedent to the realization of universal democracy. Nothing else can alleviate the toil and poverty which choke the springs of life. Nothing else can obliterate the ancient grounds of conflict and subjection. Whatever the difficulties of the transitional period, it is clear that scientific appliances contain the promise of universalizing the conditions favourable to self-realization on the part of all.

follows on the philosophy of William Morris: 'Once, while I listened to him lecturing, I made a rough calculation that the citizens of his commonwealth, in order to produce by the methods he advocated the quantity of beautiful and delicious things, which they were to enjoy, would have to work about two hundred hours a week. It was only the same fact looked at from another point of view which made it impossible for any of Morris's workmen, or indeed for anyone at all whose income was near the present English average, to buy the products either of Morris's work-shop at Merton or of his Kelmscott Press. . . .'

CHAPTER X

MILITARISM

MODERN knowledge, transport, industry and commerce have brought humanity to a point when further development depends partly on international co-operation. Common sense and prudence call for that co-operation but it is hampered by the persistence of militarism, race and colour prejudices, political and economic nationalism and imperialism and imperfections in the existing international organization. It is necessary to understand the genesis of these obstacles, to see how far their force has been weakened by recent developments and to discover how they can be overcome by concerted effort.

Obstacles to co-operation There are psychologists who find the roots of war in an instinct of pugnacity. It has already been pointed out that in regard to man the whole theory of instincts is based on a fragmentary view of personality and misses the real springs of action.¹ But not even instinctivist psychology can regard pugnacity as an instinct like self-preservation or sex. McDougall admits that pugnacity has no specific object or objects, the perception of which constitutes the initial stage of the instinctive process, that the condition of its excitement is rather any opposition to the free exercise of any impulse, and obstruction to the activity to which the creature is impelled by other instincts and that its impulse is to break down any such obstruction, and to destroy whatever offers this opposition.² Pugnacity represents one of the reactions of the vital urge against obstacles, a temporary but recurring adaptation to the environment. The other possible

¹ *Supra*, ch. ii.

² *Social Psychology*, nineteenth edition, pp. 59-60.

reactions are submission and any of the numberless compromises between utter submission and downright assertion. Pugnacity is capable of assuming divergent forms in struggles against natural forces, animals and men, ignorance or error, physiological inclinations, temptations of all kinds or social situations. By frequent stimulation and indulgence, strengthened by intellectual conviction, any of these struggles may become a habit and help to produce the determined, assertive temper—the temper of the investigator, the explorer, the reformer, the diligent worker, the warrior, etc. Not only are there many intellectual and moral equivalents of war, as William James phrased it, but in all cases the pugnacious temper must coexist with other traits and its expression must necessarily be integrated with the totality of the expression of personality in society. Pure pugnacity, issuing in war for its own sake, is a fiction.

**Develop-
ment of
warfare**

Co-operation and struggle alike have been the means to sustenance and the fulfilment of diverse requirements in the history of life. Man, like most other species, has used the two means in conjunction with each other. He has co-operated with some to struggle against others and often followed up the struggle with co-operation on a new scale. The refinements of intelligence, invention and the team spirit developed the primitive struggle into regular warfare. The arts of war have since been advancing; they have formed the subject matter of elaborate sciences, and mighty traditions have gathered round them. All this, however, does not alter the fact that the war of man against man is not the outcome of any innate craving, and that it is natural only in the sense in which every human device may be regarded as natural. War acquired a vogue because groups of men scrambled with one another for such limited resources as were within easy reach. The demand for women for marriage or concubinage outside the taboos furnished another *casus belli*, because in many

cases, no regular social relations had developed between groups. The development of the various forms of property and luxury furnished fresh grounds for conflict because they were not universally distributed and because they entailed hard labour.

War originated in want and lust but it was always a co-operative enterprise, that is to say, it was waged by group against group and called forth group loyalty in the most intense form. It evoked extreme courage, devotion, heroism and sacrifice and lifted the individual beyond himself. It was at the same time marked by cruelty, brutality, deception, arson and plunder, but as these were directed against the enemy, they were condoned as inevitable, or applauded as evidence of efficiency and thoroughness. They were the direct expression of the vengeance excited by conflict and were often sanctified by the spirit of group-exclusiveness. This 'ethical dualism' has always been one of the salient characteristics of war.¹ While it has merged the individual into the group, it has prevented the group from merging itself into humanity. However, the valour, endurance and transcendent selflessness which were associated with

The halo
of war

¹ The ethical dualism was exposed long ago by the Motze School in China. 'If a man kills an innocent man, steals his clothing and his spear and sword, his offence is graver than breaking into a stable and stealing an ox or a horse. . . . Any man of sense knows that it is wrong, knows that it is unrighteous. But when murder is committed in attacking a country it is not considered wrong; it is applauded and called righteous.' Liang Chi Chao, *History of Chinese Political Thought*, p. 9. Military manuals frankly throw moral rectitude overboard and inculcate the code of the jungle. Cf. 'As a nation we are brought up to feel it a disgrace to succeed by falsehood; the word spy conveys in it something as repulsive as slave. We will keep hammering away with the conviction that honesty is the best policy, and that truth always wins in the long run. These pretty little sentences do well enough for a child's copy book, but the man who acts upon them in war had better sheath his sword forever.'—Lord Wolseley, *Soldier's Pocket-Book*, quoted in J. A. Hobson, *Imperialism: A Study*, p. 118.

war elevated it to the supreme duty or vocation and cast a halo round it. War satisfied at once the call of comradeship and the call of adventure. It was idealized by opinion, and poetry wove an endless romance round it. Martial glory soon became an end in itself, a *sine qua non* of human worth and dignity. To miss it was to be doomed to servility, to the appellation of an old woman or a nobody, among the Creek Indians, for instance. The Gallas of Africa did not regard a man as a man until he had slain a foe. In neighbouring Abyssinia a war trophy was the condition precedent to marriage.

Civilization widened the areas of co-operation but it increased the number of possible objectives of war, and brought disparate communities into contact with one another. The growth of population prevented an abatement of warfare. It was a reserve force to ward off oppression, to avenge injuries and insults. The culture of the community nursed the passions of war and literature came forward to refine the cult of slaughter and aggrandizement. The martial spirit pervaded the religion, the morality, the outlook and the organization of the community. The State, partly a creation of war, tried to enlist all the military enthusiasm under its banner, inflamed it and organized its expression. Countless generations have been nourished on bardic lays and epics and have, for the most part, taken inter-group carnage as part of the 'natural order'. The frequency and familiarity of war as an instrument of policy led to its employment for the achievement of any objects whatever, even those which scarcely lent themselves to the employment of force, such as the propagation of specific types of religion and culture. Anger, fear, suspicion or caprice would let loose the hounds at any moment.

Here and there protests were indeed made against the hate and chauvinism which filled the atmosphere in every period of war. Some ethical teachers and philosophers penetrated to the concept of

War under
civilization

The call
to peace

mankind as a single community which might live at peace. Long ago a Sanskrit poet sang of the world as one family. In Europe the merging of the classical City State into the large Country State or Empire suggested the idea of the world as a single city. The Cynics and the Stoics worked out a conception of universal reason, law and citizenship. This idea influenced the ethical and legal writers of Rome. Marcus Aurelius and Seneca preached the brotherhood of man. The great jurists Papinian, Paul and Ulpian developed the conception of a law of nature, a principle of justice common to all men. Already Jesus Christ had proclaimed the fatherhood of God and the brotherhood of man and enunciated the maxim 'Love thine enemy'. Round the Sermon on the Mount a great literature sprang up and some interesting ideas on human solidarity were formulated. In the fourteenth century Dante declared that general peace was essential to man's perfect existence, that it required a world empire for its realization and that such an empire should perform the great function of co-ordination. Grotius, in the sixteenth century, approached the problem from a different angle and concluded that nations had common rights and duties under the sway of universal nature and reason. 'The world is our country,' wrote Thomas Paine; 'men are brothers.' Immanuel Kant advocated the abolition of standing armies and the establishment of international law on the basis of a federation of free States.

Cosmopolitan ethics, juristic principles and political philosophy were not altogether without influence on the course of events, but until the nineteenth century they failed to shake the belief in the necessity of war. The fact remained that the means of subsistence—the gains of agriculture, industry and commerce—were limited in some regions and available only with hard labour in others, and that population constantly tended to outrun those means. Nations,

The
persistence
of war

it seemed, must struggle for comforts, if not for bare necessities, and certainly for the provision of leisure for at least some of their inhabitants. It was only when these conditions began to change rapidly in the nineteenth century that the root causes of war were seriously undermined. Then the traditions clustering through the ages to the institution of war were put on the defensive and eagerly availed themselves of some conclusions of biology and sociology for their justification. The modern case for war has been built mainly on its selective and energizing role and still exercises considerable influence on large numbers of people in many parts of the world.

**Modern
defence
of war**

Darwin assigned a momentous role to struggle as an agency of natural selection and progress. He admitted, however, that though struggle for existence had been and still was, important, yet other agencies were important in regard to the highest part of man's nature. The moral qualities were advanced either directly or indirectly much more through the effects of habit, the reasoning powers, instruction, religion, etc., than through natural selection, the role of which, Darwin freely acknowledged, had greatly diminished. Only in a subordinate degree did continued progress depend on it, so far as highly civilized nations were concerned. For such nations did not supplant and exterminate each other as savage tribes did. The most efficient causes of progress seem to consist of a good education during youth, whilst the brain is impressible, and of a high standard of excellence, inculcated by the ablest and best men, embodied in the laws, customs and traditions of the nation, and enforced by public opinion.¹ But these important qualifications or rather developments of the biological doctrine of evolution were overlooked by those who were dominated by the older traditions of militarism and who

Darwinism

¹ Charles Darwin, *The Descent of Man*, 1901 ed., p. 220.

seized upon struggle, pure and simple, as the means of survival and progress. Haeckel boldly interpreted the theory of selection to imply that in human life, as in animal life, everywhere and at all times, only a small and chosen minority could exist and flourish, while the enormous majority starved and miserably perished more or less prematurely. In popular versions of the doctrine, war was extolled as a biological necessity of the first importance, as the greatest factor in the furtherance of culture and power, representing the highest expression of the strength and vitality of a civilized nation.¹

Akin to this idea, but much older, is the conception of war as invigorating and purifying the national life. Bacon, for instance, argued that exercise was essential to the health of the body natural and politic alike, and that a just and honourable war was a true exercise to a State. Adam Ferguson upheld the strenuous life exemplified *inter alia* by war which, he was convinced, no speculation could exorcise.² Joseph de Maistre quotes the saying that blood was the fertilizer of the plant called genius. He was convinced that arts, sciences, great enterprises, great conceptions and virile virtues, prospered specially in time of war. The same idea has been restated in several ways under the influence of modern psychology. Tarde, for instance, believed that militarism concentrated, purified and exhausted the scattered criminal passions of nations, and justified them through mutual destruction. He concluded that militarism enlarged the sphere of peace, as crime formerly enlarged the sphere of honesty!³

¹ F. Von Bernhardi, *Germany and the Next War*.
² Adam Ferguson, *Essay on Civil Society*, 1765; *Principles of Moral and Political Science*, 1792.

³ Graham Wallas, *Human Nature in Politics*, p. 290, quotes Lord Ampthill as saying: 'From an individual struggle, a struggle of families, of communities, and nations, the struggle for existence has now advanced to a struggle of empires.' K. Pearson, *National*

Gumplowicz and Le Bon held that war was a permanently valuable factor in social evolution and that it fulfilled an indispensable therapeutic and constructive function. Nietzsche's well-known saying that a good war sanctified any cause is outdone by Werner Sombart: 'War is a holy thing, the holiest thing on earth.'

None of these modern justifications of war is applicable to any stage of human society. At any rate, **Criticism** they have now become obsolete. The struggle of species against one another does secure survival of the fittest but *homo sapiens* was never confronted with the problem of survival. As for human groups, the issue of struggles depended on so many factors that victory was not a sure test of intrinsic superiority. Numbers would often tell, irrespective of quality. Coalitions may inflict defeat on groups inferior only in quantity of human and natural resources. A victorious group may include families or individuals inferior in every respect to members of the vanquished party. Victory is sometimes secured by deception, ruthless cruelty, treachery, and unscrupulousness, which are scarcely desirable traits of character. History records alternate victories and defeats as the lot of numerous communities and invalidates the theory that successful war presupposes or promotes superior qualities. The issue has often been decided by the earlier adoption and use by a tribe of State of new weapons, tactics or strategy

Life from the Standpoint of Science, p. 44, quoted in J. A. Hobson, *Imperialism: A Study*, p. 135, thought that it was to the real interest of a vigorous race to be 'kept up to a high pitch of external efficiency by contests, chiefly by way of war with inferior races, and with equal races by the struggle for trade routes and for the sources of raw material and of food supply'. 'This,' he added, 'is the natural history view of mankind, and I do not think you can in its main features subvert it.' Again, 'History shows me one way, and one way only, in which a high state of civilization has been produced, namely, the struggle of race with race, and the survival of the physically and mentally fitter race.' Quoted in J. A. Hobson, *op. cit.*, p. 141.

which can easily be borrowed, and have, in fact, been often adopted by others to turn the tables on the erstwhile victors. Victory has sometimes attended a sudden wave of religious or national zeal which is similarly transferable or which may quickly pass away, without producing a lasting effect on character. When history has made all allowance for the deeper causes of events, it is bound to concede that the genius of individual commanders like Alexander the Great, Chenghiz Khan, Tamerlane and Napoleon Bonaparte may be crowned with startling success to which enduring moral qualities may be irrelevant. Nowhere in human affairs does the element of chance count for more than in warfare.

War then is not a measure of fitness in any adequate degree. There are of course contingencies in which superior enlightenment, courage, cohesion, or moral fervour may lead to success but that can scarcely be held to justify the extermination of the vanquished, for these may be capable of developing similar or better qualities. Nor is their subjection to be justified because it strikes at the root of the principle of development and generally affects character for the worse. But if war possessed any positive selective force in former times, it has under modern conditions been replaced by negative value. 'The mechanism of war has killed the art of war.' It is now an affair more of the chemist and the engineer than that of the dashing hero and fearless captain.¹ Waged by millions, it begins with the slaughter of the most energetic and public-spirited young men on either side. The World War was followed by what a distinguished biologist called the menace of the dearth of youth. In the present phase of the military arts,

Negative
selection by
war

¹ 'When the opposite armies had dug themselves from Switzerland to the sea, no one was more perplexed than Kitchener. "I don't know what is to be done," he said to me more than once. "This isn't war." '—Viscount Grey, *Twenty-Five Years*, ii, p. 69.

submarines, aeroplanes and gases would rain death and mutilation on combatants and non-combatants alike, irrespective of fitness.¹ War now inflicts privations on whole populations in belligerent and even neutral countries and stunts the growth of the younger generation everywhere. Apart from numbers, success may still attend on more effective discoveries and inventions, superior cohesion, endurance, organization, etc., but these qualities are only a few of the many which modern life demands and any gain in one direction is likely to be more than offset by the inevitable loss on the other side of the moral equation.

As to the energizing quality of war, it may be admitted at once that in certain circumstances war stirs the waters and shakes a whole generation to its depths. It may bring long processes of slow development to a climax and accelerate the liquidation of the past. It may give an impetus to science, to literature, to reform in general. But there is always a heavy debit account. And there is the risk of war producing exactly opposite effects and resulting in temporary

War and
social
change

¹ The well known military writer, General Von Altrök, observes:

'In wars of the future the initial hostile attack will be directed against the great nerve and communication centres of the enemy's territory, against its large cities, factory centres, munition areas, water, gas and light supplies, in fact against every life artery in the country. Discharge of poisonous gases will become the rule, since great progress has been made in the production of poison gases. Such attacks will be carried out to great depths in rear of the actual fighting troops. Entire regions inhabited by peaceful populations will be continually threatened with extinction. The war will frequently have the appearance of a destruction *en masse* of the entire civil population rather than a combat of armed men.'

Cf. Marshal Foch:

'... The potentialities of aircraft attack on a large scale are almost incalculable, but it is clear that such attack, owing to its crushing moral effect on a nation, may impress public opinion to the point of disarming the Government and thus become decisive.' See also J. M. Kenworthy, *Will Civilization Crash?*

stagnation, reaction or depression. It is a gamble in human happiness. An infinitely surer and less costly alternative is well-planned reform through social co-operation.

It has often been supposed that war alone can keep man upright. Melchior de Voguë, for instance, declares that less than half a century of the certainty of peace would produce corruption and decadence more destructive than the worst wars. Others have claimed that war is the one efficient school of altruism, and a cure by iron, strengthening humanity. And so to Treitschke's confident hope that the living God shall regularly send war as a terrible medicine for the human race.¹ The assumptions underlying this widely prevalent view are that certain desirable qualities are evoked only by war and go to sleep again with peace until they are roused by another clash of arms. Neither social psychology nor history offers any warrant for such a hypothesis. It can indeed be argued that self-assertion to the point of combat against obstacles is of the essence of the vital process. But the progress of culture lifts this combat from the physical to the intellectual and moral plane. And in any case human life presents such abundant opportunities of combat that it is scarcely necessary to resort to armed force for stimulation to efficiency or altruism. Every parent and every teacher must struggle to initiate children into the social heritage. Every individual must conquer knowledge, liberty and harmony every day for himself. Disease, poverty, social maladjustments of all sorts await subjugation. No one can study the lives of scientists, explorers, reformers, statesmen and captains of industry and commerce without finding moments as glorious and as intense as any in the careers

¹ Cf. F. Von Bernhardi, *Germany and the Next War*: 'Aspirations for peace seem to poison the soul of the German people.' For a scathing attack on the idea of war as a moral regenerator, see Tolstoy, *The Kingdom of God is within You*.

of soldiers. There have been periods of intellectual, moral or religious awakening when whole populations have been stirred more deeply than by any war. In fact there have been general or presidential elections in various countries fraught with plentiful excitement and 'medicinal' qualities. There is not a single valuable trait of character which the strenuous intellectual or moral life cannot develop as efficiently as war.

On the other hand, war is liable more than anything else to enchain man to the lower planes of materialism and group-exclusiveness. Its ethical dualism lowers the sense of the values of life as such and imparts an instability to character. The practice of fraud, violence, and cruelty, added perhaps to plunder and rapine, lowers the dignity of man as man and poisons the springs of social life. Every long war is followed by a debasement of moral standards. Ignoble passions can feed on war as on economic pursuits. For instance, Professor Zimmern quotes an Italian who wrote to him during the Great War that there was a great deal of profiteering in Italy and that all sorts of common people were getting rich, even saying, 'Long live the War'.¹

Not only does war possess no peculiar vitalizing properties, not only does it tend to accentuate certain evils incidental to social life but it is fraught with special dangers under modern conditions. It diverts scientific and organizing talent from socially useful inventions and improvements; it diverts energies from productive industry. It diverts stupendous sums of money from social welfare to the mechanics of what has been designated as 'multitudinous murder'. In connexion with the American Civil War it has been estimated that to free the slaves would have been many times cheaper for the South, and to purchase them many times cheaper for the North, than the cost of the war. It

¹ A. E. Zimmern, *Nationality and Government*, p. 281. On British profiteering during war time, *ibid.*, p. 282.

has been calculated that the World War cost about £100,000,000,000 which would have sufficed to provide every family in North America, Australia, and many European countries with a five-acre plot of land, a house worth £500, and furniture worth £250, in addition to schools, universities and hospitals. At present armaments absorb about 20 per cent of the national budgets, that is, roughly about a thousand million pounds a year which, if properly laid out on reform, could transform society in the near future. In the hands of cynical statesmen, war has sometimes served the purpose of diverting attention altogether from internal reform. The Spanish writer Mariana almost based domestic peace on war, for which he thought a just cause could generally be found. Otherwise he would lighten the burden of military expenditure by engaging the soldiers in foreign adventures, plunder of the cities of heretics, and, if necessary, in piracy and brigandage.¹

Now the costs of war always outweigh its maximum gains and the aftermath shows that nations thrive not on one another's poverty and degradation but on one another's riches and self-respect.² So long as war remains an instrument of policy, there will persist a sense of insecurity which soldiers will deepen,³ and which will serve to bolster up the domination of a military caste. War buttresses the conception of the State as power rather than as organized public service and puts politics in an altogether false perspective. The State being primarily power, said

**Militarism
and
democracy**

¹ Writing in 1608 when the struggle between Parliament and Stuart absolutism had commenced in England, Bacon in *Commentarius Solutus* advised aggression as a means of distracting attention from the controversy ranging round autocracy.

² Cf. Norman Angell, *The Great Illusion*.

³ Cf. Lord Salisbury: 'If you believe the doctor, nothing is wholesome, if you believe the theologian, nothing is innocent, if you believe the soldier, nothing is safe.' *Life of Robert Marquis of Salisbury*, ii, p. 153.

Treitschke, the State which gathers authority most completely into the hands of one and there leaves it most independent, approaches most nearly to the ideal. The logical conclusion was drawn by Treitschke when he declared that the State was not an academy of arts and that if it neglected its power in favour of the ideal strivings of mankind, it renounced its nature and went to ruin. Between militarism and democracy there is an inherent incompatibility. The former is based on the idea of force as one of the dominating principles of human relations and on group-exclusiveness and aggrandizement as a normal feature of social life. Democracy rules out force and bases itself on the worth of man as man, on the widest possible opportunity of development and therefore on the principle of freedom for all. Militarism demands concentration of authority and favours absolutism. It has been one of the principal causes which explain why full-fledged democracy has scarcely ever been realized in history. Even democracy of the partial and limited character was denied by militarism a chance in the east, in ancient Rome, in medieval Europe and in modern Central and Eastern Europe. Militarism has arrested the constitutional development of Japan, Italy and China and has combined with other factors to rob Republicanism of much of its reality in South America. It has often perverted the course of revolutions which started with the avowed object of establishing popular Government. Democratic government will never be safe so long as militarism endures. Parliaments cannot always hope to keep their armies, specially victorious armies, under strict control. Since the Roman republic many a renowned captain has used his power to build up a dictatorship.¹ Nor is militarism

¹ In 1913, H. Delbrück wrote that the decisive question for the inner character of any State was 'to whom does the army belong?' He added that a disciplined army would remain in the hands of the officer-corps 'whether the parliament passes Mutiny Acts or not'. On the eve of the World War he uttered the tragic


favourable to the habits of thought which democracy requires. It gives a shock to parliamentary traditions so that the conclusion of a war is sometimes followed by resort to violence on the part of governments or of oppositions. It perverts education into a training in artificial habits of command and obedience rather than in those of internal discipline and equality of co-operation which democracy requires. Militarism demoralizes the churches, leading them to worship the God of battles instead of the God of human welfare. It has well been pointed out that war now requires a general inflammation of public opinion for its outbreak and general enthusiasm for its continuance. It has given a tremendous impetus to those arts of propaganda which consist chiefly of suppression of the whole truth or half the truth, and of false suggestion. Propaganda enlists the idealism of the people and diverts it into channels of destruction. The prevailing atmosphere affects not merely journalism but social philosophy, even psychology and anthropology.¹ Indeed a long war has a tendency to inhibit the rational faculties and to incline the mind to soothsaying and other forms of irrational behaviour. All this is antithetical to the temper which is calculated to sustain democracy.

Under modern conditions the selective and moral value of war is mainly negative. Its *raison d'être* **Elimination of war** has really disappeared with the new possibilities of plenty and abundance for all. It survives

prophecy that only another Sedan, inflicted on the Germans instead of by them, would make the army acquiesce in parliamentary control.

¹ For telling illustrations of newspaper legends during the last war, see Lowes Dickinson, *War, Its Nature, Cause and Cure*, pp. 32-33. Thus an English press correspondent who reported an act of German chivalry was rebuked by his 'boss': 'Don't want to hear about any good Germans.' J. M. Robertson, *The Future of Militarism*, 1916, and W. Trotter, *Instinct of the Herd in Peace and War*, pp. 156 ff., may be cited as specimens of the reaction of war even on highly trained minds.

MILITARISM



essentially as an anachronism and that for two chief reasons. The whole culture of man, his poetry, his art, his literature, history and philosophy, education, custom and law—his whole outlook on life—were so thoroughly assimilated to the war mentality that they are taking an unconscionably long time to disentangle themselves from it. The inertia of habit and tradition cannot be shaken off at once. Only slowly are men beginning to perceive the real implications of the changes which have occurred in the intellectual and economic spheres during the last hundred and fifty years. Secondly war mentality persists because the social and political consequences of former wars have not been liquidated. Apart from social stratification, wars established certain relationships among races, nations and groups which can be maintained in their present form only by preparedness for war. The present order is still freighted with war. The spirit of war holds guard over its surviving memorials and will not be exorcised until the age-long tangles in human affairs are straightened out into accord with the principles of universal human development. Militarism is not likely to disappear until certain features in the relations of races and nations, inherited from the economy of want and conflict, have been revised into conformity with the new possibilities. Disarmament is really part of the wider problem of world reorganization and will materialize only with the liquidation of political, economic and diplomatic relations which have rested mainly on the exertion of superior force by one group over another. War can no longer be advantageous to a nation as a whole but it can still bring some profits to a few industrialists and financiers in search of markets and investments abroad. These operations have to be brought into line with the general good so that the last tangible benefits of militarism may disappear.

CHAPTER XI

RACE AND NATION

PAIN economy set a high value on group solidarity and encouraged an exclusiveness which in spite of some contrary influences of a political and ethical character, sanctified group prejudices.

**Group
egoism**

An injury to a member of one's group was resented as an attack on the solidarity and the honour of the whole. Pride in one's group has usually led to an imaginative abasement of all others. All this is buttressed by other factors but it is mainly a device for the protection and aggrandizement of the various groups. Group-prejudice has had a function in social life and has therefore been well nigh universal. It has maintained the group as a 'self-conscious ethnic personality' and preserved its identity by discouraging intermarriage and cultural borrowing. Like militarism with which it is closely allied, it has intertwined itself with the whole culture and outlook of the group and stamped itself on its religion, its literature, its art, and the whole set of its institutions and standards. In the tangled and ever-changing relations of groups, it has assumed diverse forms. There have been layers and layers of sub-groups within groups so that group-feeling has been variously graded in its intensity and has here and there lost itself in humanitarian feeling. With the enlargement of human groups and their frequent contact, prejudice has crystallized round race and nation.

There is not a concept in sociology so difficult to define as race. Anthropology and history have shown that there is no pure race anywhere on earth. From the historic and prehistoric processes of development and amalgamation mankind found themselves split into a number of broad divisions mainly on geographical lines.

Race

Almost every section hedged itself with pride and prejudice and believed itself to represent a pure and superior race. This is very clearly brought out in the sociological data collected by Westermarck and others. For instance, the Esquimaux believe in a legend that European races sprang from a first bungling attempt on the part of the Creator. The Veddahs are filled with genuine contempt for the rest of mankind. With the Chippewas, a white man is an embodiment of folly. Among the Polynesians an Englishman is a byword for stupidity. The Chinese have always been the celestial race, while the Jews are no less the chosen people. The Hindus divided the world into the virtuous Aryas and the irreligious Mlechhas. Classical antiquity similarly regarded mankind as consisting of those born to rule and those meant by nature to be slaves. Similarly, Aryan, European, Nordic or Anglo-Saxon superiority has passed into a dogma, sometimes supported by 'science'. One of the subtle ways of satisfying group-pride is to judge one's own group by its best specimens and others by their worst.

Race vanity and its counterpart, race contempt, have been intensified by conflict and by cultural and economic differences. In this background the whole discussion on race characteristics has been vitiated by unwarranted assumptions and hasty generalizations. MacIver has forcefully pointed out that 'in nothing are we more liable to go astray than in the search for the race-spirit, if by that we mean a focus of original characters revealed as independent of environment. To find it involves a perilous initial process of abstraction, the almost or altogether impossible process of unravelling the web of life and character woven by the constant infinite reactions of circumstances and the minds of men.'¹

¹ R. M. MacIver, *Community*, p. 148.

Even Gumpłowicz maintained that race is an historical rather than a physical concept, 'a unity which has arisen during the course of history by and through social development; and it is

**Heredity
and environ-
ment**

It is in fact a cardinal error to oppose heredity and environment. Nothing can be inherited except potentialities, the realization of which is conditioned and powerfully affected by stimuli from the environment. Development is mainly a function of nurture, opportunity and institutions. It may be added that the Factorial hypotheses which emphasize heredity as against environment do not properly distinguish between unit characters and unit factors. As to innate mental qualities, neither the Binet nor any other tests are a safe guide. They fail to distinguish between what may be due to innate faculty and what may be due to environment, and the force of tradition and education. Nor can any intelligence tests yield valid results, unless those tested are drawn from similar conditions of life.¹ It has been rightly pointed out that these tests measure education rather than intelligence. No scientific correlation has yet been established between race on the one hand and cultural capacity or the power to develop high civilization, much

a unity which finds its origin in intellectual phenomena such as language, religion, customs, law, culture, etc.'

A good many assertions on race and innate quality are current. Thus Professor Osborn says, 'Race implies heredity and heredity implies all the moral, social, and intellectual characteristics and traits which are the springs of politics and government.'

Professor E. M. East is convinced that 'great gaps separate the races. There are huge series of hereditary units possessed exclusively by each. Thus the white race has developed intellectual qualities superior to the black race, though the black race can resist malaria much better than the white.' Again, 'the physical differences between races are extraordinary . . . the mental differences are just as great.'

The practical conclusion may be stated in the words of L. Stoddard, *The Rising Tide of Colour*: 'Democratic ideals among homogeneous populations of Nordic blood, as in England or America, is one thing, but it is quite another for the white man to share his blood with, or entrust his ideals to, brown, yellow, black or red men.'

¹ Cf. *Report of the Consultative Committee on Psychological Tests*, appointed by the Board of Education, England, 1924.

less the power to borrow and assimilate a civilization, on the other. If the history of the world be surveyed as a whole with due regard to environmental influences, cultural changes appear to be for the most part independent of the germinal constitution of men.

**Charac-
teristics** Nurtured in divergent environments, the races or rather peoples certainly display different characteristics. But there is no scientific warrant to regard them as innate, fixed or unalterable. Physical anthropology shows that apparently considerable physical differences between 'races' really consist only in certain quantitative variations. Mental differences are even less important, in fact very slight. The biological basis of social life and culture is practically identical in all humanity. Beyond it, peculiarities of behaviour are a matter of acquired characteristics in relation to the environment. We do not yet know enough about the inheritance of acquired characteristics to venture any dogmatic assertions. One thing, however, is certain. These characteristics, whether inherited or not, have a great plasticity about them. It has been proved that even physical features like the head form alter under environmental influences. As to non-physical characteristics, no discussion can be even remotely scientific which does not begin by negating the concept of 'human nature' as a fixed, permanent, unalterable entity. Characteristics can change and actually do change with the growth and diffusion of knowledge, new modes of organization, new inventions and new contacts. All that modifies institutions affects the mode of the expression of characteristics. Every characteristic may have a value in the originating environment and even in the totality of civilization. But the central fact about it is the liability to receive impressions from all quarters and to change accordingly. The history of France, Russia, Japan, Turkey and other countries conclusively proves that much. Another crucial fact which is often ignored in the discussion of 'races' is

that the members of every such group show the widest possible variety of capacity and temperament among themselves. Every community includes fickle and steady persons, reserved and emotional, romantic and prosaic, selfish and altruistic and so on. Nor should it be forgotten that the characteristics which appear prominently on the surface do not exhaust the whole of personality. Fresh stimuli call forth fresh responses and alter the whole tenor of self-expression.

The race problem becomes aggravated in proportion to the conjuncture of physiological and cultural differences with economic competition and political clash. It has assumed its most serious form as the problem of colour. Ancient India was confronted with it when the Aryan immigrants warred with the darker aborigines and ultimately settled down among them. The problem was solved partly by admixture, partly by cultural assimilation and partly by the institution of caste, called Varna, the Sanskrit synonym for colour. It created a disharmony in the Indian body politic which, in spite of thirty centuries, has not yet been completely resolved.

With this exception, colour is mainly a modern problem arising from the contact of white and coloured peoples since the geographical discoveries of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. Its ramifications are now world-wide and affect the happiness of millions and the peace of the whole world. It is necessary to understand its genesis and solve its difficulties before a world economy can be established on sure foundations.

At the start differences of colour accentuate the perennial difficulty of understanding the psychology of others. Limited by his own vision, experience and interests, everyone finds an initial difficulty in comprehending the working of other minds. Every divergence adds to the difficulty. Man has never found it easy to understand woman. The very gods,

says a Sanskrit poet, do not know the character of woman; what of men?¹ On her part woman has often given up the quest of understanding man as hopeless. Elderly persons cannot readily place themselves in the position of youngsters, in spite of the fact that they were themselves once young. As for youth, it has conducted a truceless duel with age. A gulf yawns between the educated and the uneducated. As we proceed in the scale, every divergence acquires disproportionate significance and threatens to block the ways of comprehension. Followers of different occupations often look askance at one another. Members of different classes tend to live in separate compartments. Prince Kropotkin records how a Russian dame was astounded to notice a peasant girl weep at the news of a soldier's death. It had never struck her that a peasant could love. The followers of one religion often invest those of another with perversions and vices which are more than reciprocated. Between nations living apart from one another, with divergent standards and cultures, walls of misunderstanding seem to arise almost spontaneously. Every nation credits others with innate failings or virtues in accordance with the exigencies of national pride or diplomacy. The French character, for instance, underwent a sudden metamorphosis in the eyes of Englishmen when the Anglo-French Entente became an accomplished fact. The Russian character followed suit, though it was destined to plumb unexpected depths after 1917. Tourists' impressions are often fulsome praise or sheer scandal-mongering devoured only too readily by credulous publics. India, for instance, has sometimes been painted as sunk in dark superstition, on the verge of barbarism. On the other hand, many Asiatics have dismissed Europe as gross and materialistic. An Indian politician in London was asked what he thought of western civilization. 'What?'

¹ Cf. Nietzsche: 'Men and women are alien—never yet has any one conceived how alien.'

he replied, 'They have no civilization here, they are all barbarians.' This is the point to which difference of colour brings highly civilized peoples.

Africa When the difference of colour is yet greater and is joined not only to other physiological differences in the cast of the face but also to wide divergences in the scale of civilization, the difficulty of understanding reaches its climax. It is quietly assumed that the African races are inherently incapable of higher life and civilization and doomed to a low status for ever. As a matter of fact, Africa lagged behind because the great Sahara desert cut her off from the orbits of progress. Secondly she was a prey to diseases which only modern science could hope to control. Economic backwardness naturally led to inter-tribal warfare of which advantage was taken by the Arabs and later by Europeans to conduct devastating slave raids. In spite of it all, Africa did develop a remarkable civilization in many regions of the interior. And with modern progress in the means of communication, conquest of disease and cessation of inter-tribal feuds and of slave raids, Africa only needs a fair chance to fall into line with the rest of the world. All this seems obvious, but the difference in physical appearances looms so large that even scholars and statesmen fail to understand the African nature and look to inherent incapacity for an explanation of what is merely the result of alterable environmental influences.

Repulsion of colour The intellectual difficulty of the colour problem is reinforced by what may be called the æsthetic difficulty. Every group sets up standards of personal beauty in accordance with physiological features with which it has been familiar for long. The first contact with unfamiliar features, specially when accompanied by strange costume and bearing, sometimes produces repulsion or terror. The phenomenon is too well known on the European side to need illustration but, in the interests of scientific study, it is necessary to point out

that a similar feeling has sometimes been experienced by coloured folk. The inhabitants of some parts of India have a fair complexion; yet in the sixteenth century the white faces of the first European visitors excited their repulsion. It is recorded that the Indians positively disliked it, saying that it was the colour of lepers.¹ Another European visitor noted that Europeans were called monkeys because of their white teeth.² Livingstone has vividly described the scene created by the appearance of his party in African villages. 'On entering villages previously unvisited by Europeans, if we met a child coming quietly and unsuspectingly towards us, the moment he raised his eyes and saw the men in "bags" he would take to his heels in an agony of terror, such as we might feel if we met a live Egyptian mummy at the door of the British Museum. Alarmed by the child's wild outcries, the mother rushes out of the hut, but darts back again at the first sight of the fearful apparition. Dogs turn tail and scour off in dismay, and hens, abandoning their chickens, fly screaming to the tops of the houses.'³ That this is mainly a question of habit and æsthetics is proved by the change which familiarity effects temporarily, if not permanently, in tastes. Stanley confessed that when he emerged from his African explorations after long habituation to black and bronze he found 'something of an unaccountable ghastliness' in the pale features of the first Europeans he met. After a prolonged residence in out of the way places in India in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, some Englishmen got habituated to the brown rather than to the white complexion. There is another interesting fact which has to be noticed. In the United States,

¹ De Laet, *Empire of the Great Mogul*, tr. J. S. Hoyland and S. N. Banerji, p. 80.

² *The Voyages and Travels of John Albert de Mandelslo . . . into the East Indies*, tr. John Davis, 1662. Edward Terry in *Purchas his Pilgrims*, ix, p. 29.


³ D. Livingstone, *The Zambesi and its Tributaries*.

feeling against one's coloured neighbours is often less strong than that against the more distant coloured folk.¹ The æsthetic standards are, however, so deeply rooted in the social traditions that familiarity often does no more than remove the terror from strange complexions, leaving a certain degree of aversion behind. In the case of the English, the Dutch or the Germans, the phenomenon is too well known to need any mention. In India one can find people who do not readily take to the white complexion. The repulsion which it excites is slight; there is nothing intolerant about it and it is easily shaken off. But some familiarity is needed before it can acquire an æsthetic appeal. It is recorded that a native woman in Australia oiled and smoked her child by a white man so as to impart to her a darker colour. It is also noticeable that among the Europeans, colour feeling is at its minimum with the Spaniards and the Portuguese who themselves possess a swarthy complexion, and who on account of their geographical situation, have long been familiar with darker complexions. For similar reasons the French evince much less of it than the Teutonic peoples. They are all repelled less by the brown, still by the yellow, than by the black complexion.

Æsthetic and intellectual difficulties are enough to create serious misunderstandings. But they are intensified a hundredfold by the complications which economic competition or exploitation has produced. From the sixteenth century onwards many communities, darker and weaker, were dispossessed of their lands and forced into the hard labour of the mines and plantations which rapidly decimated some of them. The slave trade blighted African life and culture. Yet there were pious and learned persons fully convinced that the slave trade was consistent with the principles of

**Economic
clash**

¹ H. A. L. Fisher, *The Commonweal*, p. 87.



humanity and revealed religion.¹ In 1863 during the American Civil War, the clergy of the Confederate States proclaimed that abolitionism was 'an interference with the designs of Divine Providence. It does not possess the signs of the Lord's blessing. . . . We declare in the sight of God that the relation of master and slave, much as we deplore abuses in this as in other human institutions, is not incompatible with our holy faith.' Forced labour has dislocated the domestic and tribal life of many African regions and measures like the poll-tax adopted to compel the delivery of certain raw materials or service in plantations have led to infinite hardship. All this represents at bottom a continuation of the old economy of want, conflict and subjection which has often been referred to above. But two important differences have supervened. There is an unprecedented disparity in the intellectual and technical resources of the parties concerned and the modern efficiency in the military arts renders direct revolt almost hopeless. Secondly the difficulties of colour have for the most part inhibited those processes of amalgamation which would otherwise heal the old sores and result in a fresh alignment of the social factors. Modern slavery associated the black colour with all that is miserable and undignified in life. Its abolition put the economic exploitation on a different footing and, along with the new technical appliances, mitigated its severity; but the fundamental problem still remained, far from solution. A clash of the standards of living has supervened and the white communities have been powerfully swayed by fears of being undercut by cheap coloured labour. In the Southern States of the American Union the whites insist on a segregation of the Negroes, lest they take the bread out of their mouths. It has been observed that the American attitude towards Chinese immigrants altered from friendliness to antagonism as they became economic rivals and again to

¹ W. C. Willoughby, *Race Problems in the New Africa*, p. 151.

friendliness when their immigration was restricted to safer numbers. Apprehensions of undercutting and a lowering of the general standard of life are partly responsible for the Canadian policy of excluding coloured immigrants. Partly for similar reasons, Australia has adopted a white policy and refused to admit Mongolians even to those extensive northern territories which are not suited to white settlement. In South Africa, British East Africa and other regions the same problem presents itself and produces extreme bitterness among the various races.

All these apprehensions about the standard of living and their consequences are but a segment of a vicious circle. The immemorial practice of appropriating the resources or labour of weaker peoples has in modern times partly assumed the form of restricting them to the production of raw materials for cheap sale and making them purchase some manufactured goods. Their economic progress is thus hampered so seriously that they can for the most part subsist only on a low plane of existence to which they accustom themselves so thoroughly that their opportunities of competition naturally result in undercutting those accustomed to higher standards.

The economic factors which aggravate the colour problem so much are inextricably intertwined with political forces. In large regions in Africa and Asia colour tends to become a symbol not merely of low economic standards but also of political subjection. The habits of overlordship on one side and the indignation of frustrated life on the other keep the antagonism alive. The sores are not healed because colour for the most part prevents intermixture, so that fundamental disharmonies rend the body politic. Hence the relations of the coloured and white races in some regions have become relations of latent warfare. They provoke furious hatred on one side and contempt on the other. According to a subtle psychological process of compensation the domi-

**A vicious
circle**

**Political
factors**

nant peoples hold the subjects in very low esteem to quiet any possible remorse for their harsh treatment of them. At the same time their own moral standards deteriorate by attempts to maintain belts of life on lower standards round them. 'It is that tragedy of recurrent accommodations, of habitual self-adjustments to lower conceptions of life and to feebler notions of excellence, which is nothing less than education in its descending and contractive forms.'¹

Concepts and words It is this combination of intellectual and æsthetic difficulties with economic and political clash which constitutes the modern colour problem of a world which has been brought together but which has yet to master the art of living together. It rouses passions which blur the vision and which distort our notions of psychology, economics, history, even of geography. Under their influence all sorts of calumnies are accepted as gospel truth and human relations governed by phrases. One is reminded of Ruskin's lament over the sway of words. 'Never were creatures of prey so mischievous, never diplomatists so cunning, never poisons so deadly, as these masked words. They are the unjust stewards of all men's minds.' For instance, it is often assumed without adequate warrant that many extensive regions in Asia and Africa are incapable of sustaining physical and intellectual vigour. Little account is taken of what science can do for them. Defenders of slavery in Europe and America pressed biology and anthropology in their service to prove that the Negro was not a man but one of the higher apes, as some features of his bone structure testified. Bryce recalls a lecture in which Thomas Huxley attempted seriously to demolish this thesis.²

Hypotheses As for ethnic psychology, its whole development has been seriously affected by the inroad of racial passions. Hypotheses of race characteristics are built upon the flimsiest evidence. As Professor Zimmern

¹ Murphy, *The Basis of Ascendancy*, p. 158.

² J. Bryce, *Essays and Addresses in Wartime*, p. 69.

has put it, certain theories of race superiority based on difference of colour are just 'a reaffirmation of the time-honoured arguments in favour of slavery'.¹ One such theory is that which credits many African peoples with innate, almost invincible indolence. As a matter of fact, the African is quite active. Big Industry has not attracted him because it is still new to him and because it only wants his labour under very unfavourable conditions, at a distance from his kith and kin, and because his own wants are still very few and simple. Once these conditions change, the African might in point of industry give as good an account of himself as any other people.² Historians rarely do justice to the blacks. For instance, a recent American report on 'the Negro in Public School Texts' observed that in no textbooks had the Negroes been presented in a creditable sense, as a race group with a history of their own in Africa. In the intellectual, emotional, economic and political background of the colour problem it is not surprising that Rudyard Kipling, the poet of Imperialism, speaks of the 'half-devil and half-child', whose burden the white man bears.

Apart from colour, the relationships of race present serious problems largely because political evolution has intertwined them with nationality. The concept of nationality defies exact definition but it is clear that in historical sequence it represents a consciousness of separate entity based on a common habitat, a certain indefinable community of culture, traditions, memories, aspirations and interests.³

Racial relationships and nationality

¹ *The Third British Empire*, p. 86.

² On native indolence in Africa, see W. C. Willoughby, *Race Problems in the New Africa*, pp. 188 ff.; S. Olivier, *White Capital and Coloured Labour*, 1929 ed., p. 103. Cf. Winston Churchill, *My African Journey*, pp. 60-65.

³ J. K. Bluntschli defines Nation as a 'union of masses of men of different occupations and social strata in a hereditary society of common spirit, feeling and race, bound together especially by language and customs in a common civilization which gives them

Such a consciousness is the resultant of historical circumstances but it generally rests on the hypothesis that the nation is a race or a branch or a sub-branch of a race. Nationality is essentially ethnic and cultural. It is an urge to freedom of expression. It has been stimulated to intensity by clash with other groups and has upheld the dogma of national independence.

As such it appeared in England about the fourteenth or fifteenth century, in France in the fifteenth, in Spain, Holland and Sweden in the sixteenth century, largely as the result of clash with foreigners. After the Reformation had diminished the theological fervour in many parts of Europe, nationality occupied a high place in the enthusiasm of peoples. It seemed to be an ideal worth dying for.¹ The partition of Poland towards the close of the eighteenth century gave it a new impetus and endowed it with a fresh sanctity.

a sense of unity and distinction from all foreigners, quite apart from the bond of the State', *Theory of the State*, English translation, p. 90. Boutroux discovers the essence and test of nationality in the will of a certain number of persons to live together in a country where they were born and where their personality received its impress, to cultivate together common memories and to pursue common aims.

According to Ramsay Muir, a nation is a body of people who feel themselves to be naturally linked together by certain affinities which are so strong and real for them that they can live happily together, are dissatisfied when disunited and cannot tolerate subjection to peoples who do not share their ties.

Cf. Renan on Nationality: 'It is a vast solidarity, established by the realization of the sacrifices which have been made and of those which may still be expected. It implies a past; in the present, however, it rests upon a tangible fact, consent—the clearly expressed desire to continue a common life.'

Cf. also Ernest Barker, *National Character*, p. 12: 'A nation is a spiritual principle, made by two things . . . the one in the present, the other in the past: the one the possession in common of a rich bequest of memories, the other a present sense of agreement, a desire to live together, a will to continue to make effective the heritage received as an undivided unity.'

¹ C. Hayes, *Essays on Nationalism*.

'Thenceforward,' says Acton, 'there was a nation demanding to be united in a State, a soul, as it were, wandering in search of a body in which to begin life over again.'¹ The French Revolution and Napoleon brought the people to the fore in several European countries who reacted to their impact by developing a consciousness of nationalism. The Revolution propagated the ideal of self-government and joined it to that of nationalism. Thenceforward nationalism became a dogma and dominated the human mind over a large part of the globe. Poets, historians, journalists and politicians roused nationalism in Central Europe and in the Balkans. Elsewhere in the Near East and far away in India, China, and Japan it began to cast a spell by promising relief from actual or threatened foreign domination. Meanwhile the Industrial Revolution had, by virtue of mercantilist traditions, been appropriated to national purposes. That revolution began in a national State and in the nineteenth century spread chiefly to national States, imbued with traditions of mercantilism. 'Even the enormous transit of ideas and news which the Industrial Revolution made possible, assumed, for linguistic reasons, a complexion predominantly national.'² The free trade movement was confined to a few regions and derived its force there chiefly from its temporary coincidence with national interests.

Nationalism thus represents the ancient group principle in a new form characterized by a coincidence of political and certain ideological boundaries and an insistence on sovereign independence. It favours intensive co-operation within the bounds of the national State but beyond those bounds it encourages separatism. The old tendency towards aggrandizement at the expense of other groups has taken a new turn and joined itself to cultural pride. Nationalism has shown the vital quality of elasticity and stood in some regions for

Nationalism
and
imperialism

¹ *History of Freedom and other Essays*, pp. 275-76.

² C. Hayes, *Essays on Nationalism*, pp. 50-51.

the attainment of political unification; elsewhere for winning independence; with some States for the cultural assimilation of dissident groups; and with others for economic aggrandizement. In the last two cases it develops into cultural or economic imperialism.

Self-sufficiency Mazzini and some others indeed worked out a theory of nationalism in terms of international concord and co-operation. But it was only inevitable that the exclusiveness of nationalism should foster the idea of moral self-sufficiency. In the heyday of German nationalism, Hegel expounded the idea of the State as containing all the worth which the human being possessed. It was the guardian of a whole moral world, but not a factor within an organized moral world, because organized moral life was to be found only within the State and not in the relations between the State and other communities. To Bosanquet, who was profoundly influenced by Hegel, the State appeared as a complete idea of the realization of all human capacity.

Cultural homogeneity It was the insistence on moral self-sufficiency which combined with the need of internal harmony in the face of possible invasions to stress cultural homogeneity. Militarism indeed had no small share in defining the various manifestations of nationalism and indicating a ruthless policy of cultural assimilation which in Central and Eastern Europe poisoned the relations of majorities and minorities in the various States and led to international complications of the gravest character. Lord Acton was among the first to perceive the dangers of this assimilation of political and cultural boundaries in theory. He deprecated the whole doctrine of nationality at the time of its almost unquestioned ascendancy and uttered a solemn warning against the dangers which lurked in it. 'By making the State and the nation commensurate with each other in theory,' he wrote in 1862, 'this principle reduces practically to a subject condition all other nationalities that may be within

the State's boundary. It cannot admit them to an equality with the ruling nation which constitutes the State, because the State would then cease to be national, which would be a contradiction of the principle of its existence. According, therefore, to the degree of humanity and civilization in that dominant body which claims all the rights of the community, the inferior races are exterminated, or reduced to servitude, or outlawed, or put in a condition of dependence.¹

On the economic side, the ideal of self-sufficiency combines with the exigencies of modern industry—its ever present needs of raw supplies and markets and sometimes cheap labour—to prompt the annexation or control of territories inhabited by weaker peoples. Economic nationalism has its counterpart in economic imperialism and has found exponents in unexpected quarters. Speaking of possible

Economic nationalism ¹ Again, 'Its course will be marked with material as well as moral ruin, in order that a new invention may prevail over the works of God and the interests of mankind. There is no principle of change, no phase of political speculation conceivable, more comprehensive, more subversive, or more arbitrary than this. It is a confutation of democracy, because it sets limits to the exercise of the popular will, and substitutes for it a higher principle.'—*History of Freedom and other Essays*. Acton indeed felt that the combination of different nations in one State is as necessary a condition of civilized life as the combination of men in society. '... It is in the cauldron of the State that the fusion takes place by which the vigour, the knowledge and the capacity of one portion of mankind may be communicated to another. If we take the establishment of liberty for the realization of moral duties to be the end of civil society, we must conclude that those States are substantially the most perfect which, like the British and Austrian Empires, include various distinct nationalities without oppressing them. . . . The co-existence of several nations under the same State is a test as well as the best security of its freedom. It is also one of the chief instruments of civilization; and, as such, it is in the natural and providential order, and indicates a state of greater advancement than the national unity which is the ideal of modern liberalism.'—*History of Freedom and other Essays*. See pp. 289-300.

terms of peace during the Great War, a socialist like August Müller insisted on Germany having extensive colonies so that she might import the necessary tropical products which she could not grow herself, from her own sphere of government. The same note is struck by the literature on British imperial preference, as on French colonialism. Big Industry and high finance manipulate the patriotic enthusiasms and equate nationalism with imperialism. At this point nationalism merges itself into the wider questions of race, specially of colour, and we come to the 'sliding scale of diplomatic language, hinterland, sphere of interest, sphere of influence, paramountcy, suzerainty, protectorate, veiled or open, . . . lease, rectification of frontier, concession, etc.'¹

**Psychology
of national-
ism**

In this play of economic aggrandizement, cultural pride and political prestige, nationalism has often favoured an attitude of separatism, arrogance and aggression. Fichte was responsible for a scheme of an international league to enforce peace, and nationhood was to him a manifestation of the primordial, the divine, the eternal—the absolute. Yet he felt that a nation could not dispense with arrogance. Even Mazzini attacked the cosmopolitans on the ground that it was impossible to love all without distinction of nationality. Some statesmen have bluntly stated the implications of the extreme nationalism. Thus, defending his Polish policy, Von Bülow declared that 'in the struggle between nationalities, one nation is the hammer and the other the anvil; one is the victor and the other the vanquished. It is a law of life and development that when two civilizations meet they fight for supremacy.'

**Ethical
dualism**

In the present relationships of races and nations, based largely on the spirit of group exclusiveness and aggrandizement, public morality is chiefly characterized by double or triple standards. Ethical

¹ J. A. Hobson, *Imperialism: A Study*, p. 10.

dualism indeed, results whenever the loyalty to one group is not reconciled with the loyalty due to wider groups. It is often developed to a disproportionate degree by excessive devotion to the family, the village, the vocational guild, the caste or class. Men draw distinctions in their conduct towards members of different castes or classes with an ease which would be surprising if it were not so widely prevalent. It has already been pointed out how militarism erects this dualism to the rank of a principle in group relations. Diplomacy with militarism as its sanction moves in an atmosphere of reason of State which political philosophy has always noted and sometimes approved.

Long ago the *Mahabharata* expounded a code of reason of State which sanctioned ruthless slaughter, treachery, falsehood, and deception to meet emergencies.¹ Similar precepts were enjoined by Kautalya in his *Arthasastra*² and other Hindu writers who dealt with interstate relations.³ Similar political conditions produced similar practices and doctrines elsewhere which are reflected in the *Gulistan* of Shaikh Sadi and other Persian writers. Nor have conditions been different in Europe. Interstate morality has usually been at a low ebb and has also reacted unfavourably on the tone of internal politics. The father of political science was constrained to admit that it was not perhaps the same thing in every case to be a good man and to be a good citizen.⁴ Reason of State was reduced almost to a system in the sixteenth century by Machiavelli who held that when

¹ *Mahabharata*, Sabha parva, xxxii; Vana parva, xxv, xxxiii; Adi parva, cxlii (Kanika's discourse); Santi parva; Rajadharmanusana, ciii, cv, cxxxi, cxxxviii, cxl.

² *Arthasastra*, ed. Shamasastri, Book VII.

³ Cf. Somadeva Suri, *Nitivakyamrita*, ss. 345-72; Bharavi, *Kiratarjuniya*, canto i; Dandin, *Dasakumara-charita*. Also Visakhadatta, *Mudrarakshasa*.

⁴ Aristotle, *Ethica Nicomachia*, V. ii, 2.

the safety of the State was at stake there must be no consideration of what is just or unjust, merciful or cruel, glorious or shameful.¹ A very common line of thought is reflected by Horace Walpole who declared that no great country was ever saved by good men, because these would not go the length that might be necessary.²

It is this feature of human relations which characterizes the attitude of races and nations towards one another and poisons the springs of moral action. Professor Hobhouse notes that 'in all relations with weaker people we move in an atmosphere vitiated by the insincere use of high sounding words. If men say equality, they mean oppression by forms of justice. If they say tutelage, they appear to mean the kind of tutelage extended to the fattened goose'.³ Yet the real sentiments sometimes came to the surface. 'The historian,' said Treitschke, 'who judged European policy in Africa or the east by European standards would be a fool. There coercion by terror is necessary for self-preservation'.⁴ A recent writer quotes a white settler as telling him that the white man was determined to do all he could to remain and rule in Africa. 'No ethical considerations such as the rights of man, will be allowed to stand in the way'.⁵ All this is in harmony with Rudyard Kipling's epigram that there are no ten commandments beyond Suez.

¹ Diderot proposed to head certain chapters of Machiavelli's *The Prince* with 'the circumstances under which it is right for a prince to be a scoundrel'. See J. Morley, *Romanes Lecture on Machiavelli*.

² Cf. Dryden,

'Art thou a statesman,
And canst not be a hypocrite? Impossible.'

Also Alexander Pope, 'Statesman, yet friend to truth.'

³ L. T. Hobhouse, *Liberalism*, 43-44.

⁴ *Politics*, English translation, p. 100.

⁵ Leonard Barnes, *Caliban in Africa*.

**Nationalistic
attitude**

Apart from colour, the same dualism marks the attitude of many towards other nations and is well reflected in literature. Interpreting the law of nature in his 'Institutes of Law', a jurist holds aggression to be a natural right and would measure its extent by the power which God has bestowed on the aggressor or permitted him to develop. Treitschke who regards power as the be-all and end-all of a State concludes that every sovereign State is entitled to declare war at its pleasure and to repudiate treaties. Bernhardt was only summarizing a long chapter in international relationships when he denied to weak nations the same right to live as the powerful and vigorous nations had. So nationality becomes, in the words of Tagore, 'one of the most powerful anæsthetics' that man has invented. Education often inculcates the type of patriotism which sanctifies the attitude of 'my nation, right or wrong'.¹

¹ Cf. H. G. Wells:—'We have all been so taught and trained to patriotic attitudes, they have been so drummed into us from earliest childhood, they have so impressed themselves upon us at home, at school, in book, in drama, in the common idioms of thought, they have been so built into the substance of our minds, that it is only by a considerable intellectual effort that any of us can liberate themselves from these forms of thought, to which we have been moulded.'—*Commonsense of World Peace*, pp. 28-29.

How 'patriotism' and 'imperialism' may colour the mental attitude towards pure adventure is illustrated by a speech reported to have been delivered in the autumn of 1932 in England by Lord Clydesdale, chief pilot of a British expedition to fly over Mount Everest, the highest peak of the Himalayas. 'The success of this flight,' said he, 'will have a great psychological effect in India. It will do much to dispel the fallacy that this country is undergoing a phase of degeneration but rather instil the truth that Britain is ready to pass through a process of regeneration. It will show India that we are still a virile and active race and can overcome difficulties with energy and vigour, both for ourselves and for India. . . . We are the first and foremost to foster and promote British prestige in the world and especially in India. . . .' Later, a noble dame who had financed the expedition, said in the same strain: 'India will now be forced to realize that the British lion is still full of pluck and courage. . . .'

**Towards
internationalism**

These features in the relations of races and nations are, however, becoming anachronistic. It has already been pointed out that the new economy of plenty has removed the root causes of the conflict which made human groups so exclusive in spirit and aim. The new means of transport and communication, the new industry and the new commerce have made the world a single economic unit and produced a new homogeneity in the economic interests of all nations. In the seventeenth century an English writer vigorously propounded the doctrine that commercially a country could progress only at the expense of another.¹ That is no longer true and with general economic improvement will become the exact antithesis of the truth. Slavery has nearly gone and forced labour is being renounced. Travel may at first multiply misunderstandings but it is calculated in the long run to produce a better appreciation of peoples by one another and at least to remove the cruder notions.²

**Solution of
the colour
problem**

Already the relations of the races reflect a marked change in mental attitude. The situation to-day is vastly different from what it was in 1600 or 1800. Nowhere will public opinion now tolerate the atrocities which failed to excite any horror until a century and a half ago. It is now under-


¹ T. Mun, *England's Treasure by Foreign Trade*, 1664.

² Here is a sample of fantastic notions of distant peoples born of sheer ignorance. It is said that when King Chulalongkorn of Siam landed in England in 1887, the children in the crowd wept bitterly from disappointment because they had been led by their mothers to expect to see a large blackamoor dressed in a cocked hat and feather apron, who would probably execute a war dance on the quay. It is said that when the king returned from his European tour to Siam, his people offered up thanksgiving to Heaven for his safe return from perilous adventuring amongst the cut-throat, the grabbing, the wicked and barbarous nations of the west. (W. A. Graham, *Journal of the Royal Institute of International Affairs*, September 1928, p. 297.)

stood, more than ever before, that pigmentation represents only an adaptation to the climate. In Latin America the intermixture of the Spaniards, Portuguese, Red Indians and Negroes has gone very far.¹ There are thinkers in Latin America who glory in this fusion and argue that 'the Divine mission of Latin America is to create the synthetic human being, to give adequate expression to the total ambition of the world'. Another remarkable feature of the times is the rapidity with which the coloured races are making up the leeway in technical progress and overcoming the political obstacles to their self-realization. The rise of Japan was followed by stirrings in China, India, Persia and latterly, in Egypt, Morocco, and Turkey. The race consciousness rising in Africa is a symptom of deep potential change. For instance Ethiopianism, partly in a religious garb, has made marked progress among the Bantus. The Negroes and the Hottentots, not to speak of the Semitic and Hamitic races, have made remarkable progress, have demonstrated their capacity for a fuller life, and are preparing the ground for an all-round improvement in their position. The great need of all these peoples at present is a higher standard of living and enlightenment which, as we have seen, coincides with the great demand of the world. It is desirable to abandon the imperialistic hold and allow them freely to develop their resources and for the rest, to assist their economic and cultural progress. The prevalent imperialism has led to a mistaken belief that political domination helps modernization and progress. In fact, it hinders the operation of the forces which purely friendly contact may release. To associate progress with subjection is to rouse racial or national pride against it.²

¹ The Argentinian, Ricardo Rojas, has coined the term *Eurindia* to denote the fusion of Indian and European elements in Latin America.

² Cf. Leonard Woolf, *Imperialism and Civilization*.

**Develop-
ment of
resources**

There is a widespread fear that such a policy would mean an enormous waste of natural resources. 'If we look to the native social systems of the tropical east, the primitive savagery of Central Africa, to the West Indian Islands in the past in process of being assisted into the position of modern States by Great Britain, or the black republic of Hayti in the present, or to modern Liberia in the future, the lesson seems everywhere the same; it is that there will be no development of the resources of the tropics under native government.'¹ But this is to take a very short view of the matter. The African, as he grows in freedom, enlightenment and standards of life, will put forth an industrial effort much more productive than the utmost exaction under tutelage can show. The quality of his labour will improve and his own capacity for organization tell with greater effect. As to the immediate future, 'a slight and temporary check to the accumulation of material wealth need not necessarily be an evil, even from a purely economic point of view, if being made quietly and without disturbance, it provided better opportunities for the great mass of the people, increased their efficiency, and developed in them such habits of self-respect as to result in the growth of a much more efficient race of producers in the next generation. For then it might do more in the long run to promote the growth of even material wealth than great additions to our stock of factories and steam-engines.'²

**Immediate
policy**

It is not implied here that the tangles of centuries can be resolved in a moment. It is not given to any generation of men to write on a clean slate. The logic of history rules out the sudden adoption of a policy of absolute *laissez faire* in Africa.

¹ B. Kidd, *The Control of the Tropics*, p. 53, quoted in J. A. Hobson, *Imperialism: A Study*, pp. 199-200.

² A. Marshall, *Principles of Political Economy*, p. 230.

Isolation and self-sufficiency are no longer possible for any region in the world. In the case of Africa, it is necessary to guard against the possibility of large tracts being overrun by adventurers, slave-raiders, concession-hunters, etc. The need of the present day is that the policy of domination be replaced by one of friendly co-operation, with a clear vision of withdrawal of all autocratic control from above.

Intellectual understanding, imagination and moral effort are needed to scrap the colour and race prejudices and to resolve the complexes which they have engendered. A correct perspective is possible only when it is recognized that the differences between races range within a narrow compass, that cultural and economic standards are independent of them¹ and that science gives no warrant for assumptions of innate superiority and inferiority. It must be realized that pigmentation is only a protection against sunlight and varies with its intensity, that it has nothing to do with other traits, and that colour feeling itself has nothing innate about it. Children show nothing of it and the large mixed populations in the United States and elsewhere have a tale to tell. Above all, it is necessary to understand that in the present phase of evolution the welfare of the whole world is bound up with universal enlightenment, economic improvement and freedom of development.

A similar effort is needed to rid the world of the handicaps which can be traced to nationalistic fervour. Not merely must the new facts of interdependence be brought home to the public but adequate freedom of development must be guaranteed to all. Constrictions and inequalities are largely responsible for rankling grievances. 'A healthy nation', writes Bernard Shaw, 'is as unconscious of its nationality as a healthy man of his bones. But if you

Psychological effort

Cultural concept of nationality

¹ Cf. F. Boas, *Anthropology and Modern Life*.

break a nation's nationality it will think of nothing else but getting it set again. . . .¹ When freedom of development is secured to all peoples including all minorities within States, nationality will shed its political implications and assume a purely cultural role, as Novicow suggested. Renan also stressed the element of cultural heritage in nationalism. Lately, Professor Zimmern has sought to depoliticize the concept of nationality and has contrasted it with Statehood. 'Nationality, like religion,' he writes, 'is subjective. Statehood is objective. Nationality is psychological; Statehood is political. Nationality is a condition of mind; Statehood is a condition in law. Nationality is a spiritual possession; Statehood is enforceable obligation. Nationality is a way of feeling, thinking and living; Statehood is a condition inseparable from all civilized ways of living.'² Again, nationality 'is primarily and essentially a spiritual question, and in particular, an educational question. It is a question for the parent, the teacher, the educational administrator, the missionary, the social worker, for all who are concerned with the life and ideals of the young and with the spiritual welfare of the community'.³

But nationality can assume a genuinely spiritual role only when political subjection and militarism have disappeared. Otherwise, nationality will inevitably direct itself to the attainment of political freedom or to aggrandizement at the expense of others. A revision of present day political arrangements is the *sine qua non* of the emergence of a nationalism

¹ Preface to *John Bull's Other Island*.

² *Nationality and Government*, p. 51.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 65.

Jan Kollár, the Slovak patriot-poet, said in 1824: 'It is a mistake to call the country in which we dwell by the holy name of fatherland; the true undying homeland, against which might and deceit cannot prevail, is custom, speech and concord.' See Carlton Hayes, *Essays on Nationalism*, p. 54.

free from the taints of intolerance and aggression. The scale of organization has been widened in the course of history until it is now faced with possibilities of world dimensions. The spirit of exclusiveness and aggrandizement, which has long characterized human relationships and which the educational machinery has been used to inculcate, is out of tune with the present trends of development. It must give way to that of political equality and co-operation among all the peoples of the world.

CHAPTER XII

INTERNATIONAL CO-OPERATION AND REGULATION

**Centrifugal
and
centripetal
forces** THE history of human relations has been an intricate interplay between centrifugal and centripetal forces. It has already been pointed out how the economic exigencies of life, the difficulties of transport, the imperative demands of co-operation and conflicts solidified primitive groups into small communities and States. Sympathy, devotion and loyalty clustered round them. But the small organizations could not be permanently adequate to the changing economic requirements, the widening cultural interests and expanding sympathies. Fresh contacts developed and extended the range of co-operation and the scale of organization. The larger communities in their turn became a part of the social tradition and evoked the loyalty of the members. The process of expansion, however, was hampered by the difficulties of communication and by various cultural and political traditions. Setbacks were frequent and political history tended to become a round of expansion and contraction of frontiers. But one solid and permanent result was achieved—an enormous range of inter-State contacts, commercial, cultural and diplomatic.

**International
co-operation** In history the bounds of co-operation have never coincided with political frontiers. Religion, ideas and trade have transcended State limits and prompted a great deal of co-operation as well as rivalry. Peoples have freely borrowed gods and scriptures as well as inventions and methods of organization from one another and indeed have often co-operated either formally or informally in fostering economic activities and propagating common ways of life. This co-operation, however, has been regional rather than world-wide; it has

been fitful and intermittent, because communications were imperfect, the common elements in cultures were comparatively small, and the scramble for the inadequate and inelastic means of sustenance was keen. Hence the traditions of militarism and group-egoism have not been outgrown. If there was an imperative necessity for extension of intimate political co-operation in order to keep pace with the process of cultural and economic integration, neighbouring States would combine into a federation or be forced into an empire. In the wake of great dominions like those of the Mauryas and the Guptas in India, of Alexander the Great, and of the Romans, political theory began to dream of World-Empire. For instance Lucan foresaw a day of universal peace and love. Cicero believed in a world society. Seneca felt that his country was the world. Epictetus and Marcus Aurelius declared themselves to be citizens of the world. But in actual practice the countries were in a state of nature, as Hobbes said, and beyond their limits co-operation was spasmodic and unorganized.

A new era opened with the progress of modern science and its application to industry and transport.

A new era The nineteenth century revolutionized the relations of peoples. It rapidly made of the world a single economic whole, and seemed to relegate national self-sufficiency to the limbo of oblivion.¹ It increased the common elements in the cultures of various countries and broadened the range of sympathies. There came about a

¹ It has, for instance, been calculated that 'in pre-war times, Switzerland imported 78 per cent of her grain supplies, Great Britain 75 per cent, Holland 66 per cent, Norway 65 per cent, Denmark 28 per cent, Austria 22 per cent, Italy 18 per cent, Germany 16 per cent, Sweden 14 per cent, France 12 per cent, Russia and the U.S.A., the two greatest wheat-producing countries, exported surpluses of 14 per cent, and 19 per cent respectively, and further important supplies came from Canada, the Argentine Republic, Australia and the Punjab'.

vast extension and organization of international co-operation in the wake of the new facilities of transport, economic repercussions and cultural intercourse. During the present century, the process has, in spite of forebodings and setbacks, developed by leaps and bounds. The strength of the new currents can be estimated only when it is borne in mind that their flow has been hampered by militarism, nationalism and imperialism.

Internationalism
and Big
Industry

The economics of mass production and mass distribution imply that the great industrial and commercial firms should keep the world rather than their own country alone before their eyes. They soon discover that their prosperity depends upon international co-operation in many directions. This co-operation may or may not be designed to serve the welfare of humanity at large but the fact remains that it has to be international. Accordingly, producers and suppliers in various countries, whether individually or through associations, conclude agreements to restrict competition, regulate production and distribution, divide markets, or fix prices, in regard to certain commodities. 'In other cases the national groups surrender some of their independence and sovereignty and form international trusts and cartels, which may be very elaborate international organisms; in others again, the groups merge their own individuality completely in one international company.'¹ It was estimated sometime ago that the International Match Corporation ran 150 factories with 50,000 workers in 28 different countries, that the American Meat

¹ Leonard Woolf, *International Government*, p. 177. In trade and industry, there are two main tendencies, 'first, the formation of regular international associations of commercial groups, with regular organs of international government, to protect the international interests of the national groups; secondly, the application to industry and trade of various forms of international regulation and agreement, the object of which always is to regulate international competition and to substitute for it some form of co-operation.' *Ibid.*, p. 328.

Trust had 500 subsidiary companies in South America, Europe and Australia, and that the European Steel Cartel allocated an output of about 25,000,000 tons between the producers of four countries. The international cartels have succeeded in offsetting the waste and dislocation which policies of protection and dumping would necessarily imply.¹

The need of agricultural organization is now being felt in an increasing measure. At the World Economic Conference, for instance, M. Michelis argued that agriculture should organize itself so as to be able to adjust itself, like manufactures, to changing conditions. Various plans are being suggested to bring agricultural co-operatives together on international lines. The International Committee for Inter-co-operative Relations, instituted in 1930 with its headquarters at Geneva, is designed to foster economic and moral relations between agricultural and consumers' co-operation,² and co-ordinate co-operative activities. The international organization of short-term agricultural credit has been one of the most interesting developments since 1930-31. Simultaneously, all sorts of measures have been advocated and adopted by national associations of producers and Governments³ during the last few years and their failure has demonstrated the need for action on a wider scale. A

¹ At the World Economic Conference of 1927, the Committee on Industry stressed the need for international industrial agreements in many directions. The Committee on Commerce agreed that customs barriers were no longer to be regarded as a purely domestic matter.

² The Economic Committee of the League of Nations on the Agricultural Crisis realized the need for international co-operation and *inter alia* suggested an agreement between the overseas countries and European countries, permitting the former to supply Europe and at the same time enabling the latter to market the surplus of their own production.

³ Cf. *The Agricultural Situation in 1930-31*, published by the International Institute of Agriculture, Rome, 1932, pp. 99 ff. and 219 ff.

good deal of continental co-operation has already been attempted and in the course of it the truth has been brought home that such co-operation must be world-wide in order to yield full results and stimulate consumption.¹

¹ Cf. *The Agricultural Situation in 1930-31*, published by the International Institute of Agriculture, Rome, 1932:—

The First Inter-American Conference on Agriculture, Forestry and Animal Industry, convened by the Government of the United States, pursuant to the resolutions approved by the Sixth International Conference of American States held at Havana, Cuba, in 1928 met at Washington from 8 to 20 September 1930. It was attended by fifty-four delegates from the States members of the Union, namely, Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, the United States, Uruguay, Venezuela. . . . The following subjects were dealt with:—

- (1) Surveys and inventories of soils, forestry, pasture lands, plants and animal diseases and pests, census, and other statistical surveys;
- (2) Problems relating to land;
- (3) Problems relating to forestry;
- (4) Problems relating to animal industry;
- (5) Problems relating to plant industry;
- (6) Agricultural education;
- (7) Agricultural economics, including competition, co-operative agricultural credit systems, market standardization, present and future food supplies, farm management, and production problems. It passed seventy resolutions, *inter alia*: 'That the various countries strive to strengthen existing organizations which have as their object *co-operative marketing*. . . . It has been proved in actual practice that over-production of articles important as exports cannot be solved by the individual action of a single country, even if it be the principal producer, but requires concerted international action.' (Pp. 82-83.)

A conference summoned by the President of the Commission of Enquiry for European Union, and attended by twenty-two countries, at Paris in February 1931, discussed the whole question of surpluses of wheat, maize, barley, etc.

**International
co-operation
in the labour
movement**

A parallel movement has been in progress in the world of labour. Before the nineteenth century was half over, the leaders of the working class movement had clearly grasped the need for international organization. 'Brothers and Friends! Do not let our union be stopped by the seas or

Another conference was held at about the same time to discuss the disposal of the cereal surplus of 1931 as well as the question of agricultural credit.

A report signed by the representatives of France, Germany, Austria, Bulgaria, Estonia, Finland, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Rumania, Switzerland, Czecho-Slovakia, and Lugoslavia, and issued on 28 February 1932, stated:

'The Committee recognized in the first place that the disposal of surplus European cereals is not merely a European but a world problem and that a wholly satisfactory solution could be reached only by an understanding between all the parts of the world concerned. . . . The Committee therefore considers that it is in the interest of producers in every continent to act together with a view to checking the spread of the crisis.' (Pp. 79-81.)

The International Wheat Conference, March 1932, was attended by the official delegates of all the exporting and importing countries of Europe, Asia, Central and South America, Canada, Australia and Africa, while the points of view of the United States, which was not officially represented, were presented by experts invited by the International Institute of Agriculture. The Conference was organized by the International Institute of Agriculture and was described as preparatory to the second World Wheat Conference of 1932. The Conference approved the following Final Act:

'The International Preparatory Conference of the Second Wheat Conference recommends examination of the possibility, in countries where wheat is already consumed, of considering the means of developing such consumption. It also recommends a strong publicity campaign in order to popularize the consumption of wheat in countries where it is not at present largely used. It is of opinion that in order to give full effect to this publicity, it would be desirable to sell off at low prices in such countries part of the stocks which overburden the world market. . . .' (Pp. 84-85.)

The Commission of Enquiry for European Union, at its Third Session at Geneva from 15 to 21 May 1931, resolved *inter*

rivers that mark the boundaries of States' so wrote the workers of Nantes to those of London in June 1834. William Lovett, Secretary of the London Working Men's Association, brought a series of International addresses to a climax in an *Address to the Working classes of Europe* in 1838, calling on 'fellow producers of wealth', to unite in 'holy zeal'. And so to 1848, when *The Communist Manifesto* ended with a deep exhortation: 'Workers of all Lands, Unite'.¹ The latter half of the century witnessed the growth of numerous international labour associations. From 1864 to 1876, the First International organized a

alia:—'It should be frankly recognized that the methods applied in the national field for solving the present difficulties, have not only proved to be for the most part ineffective, but have in fact frequently tended to aggravate the general situation. . . . It seems that international action, inspired by considerations for the interest of all and based on the principle of a wise collaboration between the different countries, with the definite intention of eliminating the obstacles to the free circulation of labour, capital and commodities, is alone capable of leading to a gradual solution of the present difficulties and ultimately to the return of prosperity to agriculture and to European economic life in general.'

The International Wheat Conference which met in London in May 1931, was attended by representatives of the United States, Argentina, Australia, Canada, Hungary, India, Poland, Rumania, Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, and the U.S.S.R. 'It considered that where possible a reduction in the areas devoted to wheat should be undertaken in whatever way each country thought most effective and practical, that a careful exploration of all avenues for the greater utilization of wheat, both for food and otherwise, was especially desirable, and that current information about the supply, demand and movement of wheat should be brought together in such a way as to assist the wheat exporting countries towards the orderly marketing of their surpluses.' As a conclusion, the Conference expressed its confidence that such meetings as this and exchanges of views among the representatives of the world wheat-exporting countries would advance the cause of international co-operation in the general field of economy and of agricultural economy in particular. (Pp. 88-90.)

¹ L. L. Lorwin, *Labour and Internationalism*, pp. 16, 18, 27.

large number of conferences and congresses to chalk out lines of international action for bringing about the social millennium. In spite of acute dissensions and jealousies it succeeded in establishing a strong tradition of international deliberation on labour programmes and plans of campaign. From 1889 to 1914, the Second International familiarized the world with the idea of the international solidarity of labour. The period was remarkable for the establishment of the International Labour Secretariat, the International Trade Secretariats, the International Secretariat of Christian Labour Unions and, not the least, the International Association for Labour Legislation.

Early in the nineteenth century, Robert Owen, Blanqui and others stressed the need for international legislation on labour problems. The movement found concrete expression in the Berlin Conference in 1890, which comprised representatives from fourteen European countries and which passed resolutions on Sunday labour, child labour, labour in the mines, etc. The same year saw the foundation of the International Association for Labour Legislation which put before itself the objectives of organizing an International Labour Office, facilitating the study of labour legislation in all countries and providing information on the subject, promoting international agreements on questions relating to conditions of labour, and organizing international congresses on labour legislation. The Zurich and Brussels Conferences followed in 1897. A number of meetings were held and a series of measures recommended between 1900 and 1913. Two important conventions were signed at the Conferences at Berne in 1905 and 1906. The successor of the Association is the International Labour Organization,¹ which, since 1920, has acted as an inter-

¹ The objects of the International Labour Organization are set forth in the preamble to part xiii of the Treaty of Versailles of 1919, its constitution being defined in Articles 387-427. Article 396 declares that 'the functions of the International Labour Office

national clearing-house of information on the conditions of industrial life and labour, has arranged annual conferences of the representatives of labour, employers, and Governments of practically all the countries of the world, and has drafted numerous conventions on hours and conditions of work for the acceptance of Governments.

Economic co-operation has been accompanied by a large measure of intellectual co-operation among the various peoples. The cross-fertilization of cultures has proceeded apace, though there has been also a great deal of cultural clash and suppression. The common element in various cultures has increased. Contacts have been established among those engaged in the furtherance of the sciences in various countries. Every science, in fact every branch of learning, has now got an international association.

It has been estimated that between the year 1840 and the outbreak of the World War, more than 500 voluntary international associations were created and that 400 of them had a permanent existence. They pertained to industry, commerce, labour, temperance, morals, suppression of slavery, feminism, science, art, literature, etc. As Mr. Woolf observes, the catholicism of internationalism is well shown by the 'International Association for the Suppression of Useless Noises', and the 'International Association for the Rational Destruction of Rats'. Some of the international associations were federations of national associations or federations of federations, and some counted States and municipalities among their members.¹ One of the most

shall include the collection and distribution of information on all subjects relating to the international adjustment of conditions of industrial life and labour, and particularly the examination of subjects which it is proposed to bring before the Conference with a view to the conclusion of international conventions and the conduct of such special investigations as may be ordered by the Conference'.

¹ Leonard Woolf, *op. cit.*, pp. 166-67.

interesting organizations is the International Co-operative Alliance, comprising 85,000 societies in 36 States. The World Association for Adult Education is another interesting instance of international co-operation.

International economic and intellectual interdependence and co-operation naturally brought about an extension of governmental co-operation through conferences, conventions, treaties, and administrative and arbitral machinery. In his analysis of international government, Mr. Leonard Woolf has shown to what extent international conferences and treaties before the World War dealt with international trade, industry, finance and communications, health, morals, crime, science, art, literature, emigration, immigration and political relationships.¹ There were forty-five public international unions before the war. Mr. Woolf classifies the organs of pre-war governmental co-operation as follows:—

(1) eleven permanent deliberative or legislative organs working in conjunction with administrative organs, such as the Telegraphic Union, the Radio-telegraphic Union, the International Institute of Agriculture;

(2) five periodic conferences in conjunction with permanent international bureaus or offices, such as those on railway freight transportation, industrial property, literary and artistic property;

(3) ten conferences and conventions with the object of unifying national laws or administrations, such as the automobile conference, and those concerning submarine cables, commercial statistics and white slave traffic; and

(4) four special international organs of a permanent character, such as the Sugar Commission, the Opium Commission, and the Hague Tribunal Bureau.

The constitutional machinery of all these organs showed great diversity while their functions ranged from

¹ *International Government*, p. 156.

consultation and agreement to virtual legislation and administration.¹ One of the most remarkable was the International Postal Convention of 1874 which created two permanent organs of international government—the Postal Congress whose decisions are binding upon the different States and the Postal Bureau which administers the international service.²

International conferences During the last hundred years the number of international conferences has shown a progressive increase. 'Since 1843, from decade to decade the number of international conferences regularly doubled (9, 20, 77, 309, 510, 1070) until in the first four years of the decade beginning with 1910 it reached a total of 495.'³

Diplomacy and alliances The Concert of Europe was a practical recognition of the fact that peace and war had become international concerns. It won some notable triumphs and if it failed ultimately it was mainly because the temptation to aggrandizement and domination in the Balkans, in Africa and in Asia was overwhelming. It is noteworthy that militarism itself was partly internationalized. Offensive and defensive alliances are as old as human history but it was for a while in the nineteenth century, more than ever before, that alliances and *ententes*, rather than individual States, stood facing one another. When the war broke out in 1914, the operations were conducted on a basis of co-operation which showed some features of international government. The Allies established, though somewhat late, not only a single supreme command but also joint control over shipping, raw materials and food-stuffs. The Central Powers carried co-ordination further until men like Friedrich Naumann dreamt of a unified Mitteleuropa (1915).

¹ *International Government*, pp. 159-61.

² *Ibid.*, p. 156.

³ M. A. Lafontaine, quoted in *The League of Nations Starts*, ch. xiii.

To Naumann the heart of the constitutional problem of Central Europe consisted 'in the marking off of National Government from Economic Government and Military Government'. He would convert Central Europe into a new Economic State, with its own customs frontiers, promoting 'a wide and active interchange of commodities. For this a central Economic Government will be required, which will be directly responsible for part of the economic arrangements concerned and will advise the national Governments as to the remainder. Customs, the control of syndicates or trusts, organizations for promoting exports, patents, trade marks, etc., will be under central control. Commercial law, tariff policy, social policy and similar matters will only be indirectly within its purview. But the supernational Economic State, once established, will steadily increase its powers and will gradually evolve an administrative and representative system of its own'.¹ The war also demonstrated that the equipment of armies was dependent on access to overseas resources and that no prudence or skill could restore national self-sufficiency.

Up to the World War international co-operation had taken gigantic strides but it was still largely haphazard rather than systematically organized, regional rather than world-wide. Except in a few cases, it lacked organs of regular deliberation and control and could not produce a real international mentality in Governments and nations. In all these respects, a distinct progress is marked by post-war developments. The war brought home the facts of interdependence, the destructiveness of modern armaments, and the imperative need of international peace and co-operation. The conclusion of the peace in 1919 was accompanied by the establishment of institutions for

Post-war
international
co-operation

¹ Quoted in *Nationality and Government*, by A. E. Zimmern, pp. 325-26.

regular and systematic international consultation¹ and regulation. They have not achieved their object but it is clear that the world cannot dispense with them.

Already Geneva can boast of a considerable record of achievement through the International Labour Office, and the technical organizations and advisory committees of the League of Nations such as the Economic and the Financial Committees, Health Organization and Organization for Communications and Transit. The various organizations have conducted world-wide inquiries and drawn up conventions which many of the member-nations have ratified. The International Bureau of Assistance has relieved and repatriated thousands of foreigners in distress. The Central International Office for the Control of Trade in Spirituous Liquors in Africa, the Committees and Conferences on Traffic in Opium and other dangerous drugs, the Temporary Slavery Committee, the Advisory Commission for the Protection and Welfare of Children and Young People have not merely relieved suffering and promoted welfare but also brought nations from far and near to co-operate in human enterprises. The International Institute of Intellectual Co-operation, the International Federation of Library Associations, the International Museum Office, the International Committee of Popular Arts, the International Conference on Copyright, the international annual conferences of directors of national university offices, and international students' associations, the conference of associations engaged in international school correspondence, and the International Institute of Educational Cinematography have drawn together representatives of various cultures to understand one another better and to co-operate in

¹ Between 1919 and 1933 no less than twenty-eight international economic and financial conferences were held. Among the notable ones were those held at Brussels in 1920, at Geneva in 1922 and 1927, and in London in 1933. The last one drew together representatives of 66 countries.

promoting the common welfare.¹ The world conferences on economic questions have not merely focussed attention on important problems but have made valuable suggestions. The League of Nations has sought to protect minorities in Europe and backward peoples in the mandated territories, and attempted, though not successfully, to bring about a sense of security and reduction of armaments.

There is a great deal which has been left undone. The League has been hampered by the rule of unanimity. But whatever its imperfections and failures, it has established the principle of international consultation, a conference system, working through pacific methods on a world scale. That is becoming a part of the normal life of humanity. The League has done something to transform the old diplomacy which, as the recent revelations of its pre-war record show,² almost played with the fortunes of peoples behind their back. It has proclaimed the principle, imperfectly recognized by the old Concert of Europe, that every war is an international concern. It has shorn war of much of its traditional glory and has provided the much-needed alternative. It has brought limitation of armaments within the range of practical politics, and has held aggression to world-wide obloquy and fostered the settlement of disputes in an atmosphere of dispassionate investigation and impartial adjudication. It has brought together statesmen from fifty countries every year round a table to clear misunderstandings and plan co-operation. Its secretariat has developed an international mind and organized co-operation all round. The League promises to survive secessions, blows to its prestige and rebuffs to its resolutions because

¹ See *Ten Years of World Co-operation*, issued by the Secretariat of the League of Nations, 1930. Also C. Howard-Ellis, *The Origin, Structure and Working of the League of Nations*, 1928.

² See G. P. Gooch, *Recent Revelations of European Diplomacy*. For illuminating texts, see Seymour Cocks, *The Secret Treaties*.

it is rooted in the necessities of the times. If it were wound up, something like it would have to be set up at an early date: 'The League is dead, long live the League!'

This is the point to which the logic of events has brought the world today. The old obstacles to world-wide co-operation have not yet been completely surmounted. Grave inequalities in status persist and prejudices of race, colour, culture and creed restrict the range of sympathies and collaboration. In this interplay of centripetal and centrifugal forces there is observable a tendency to set up half-way houses between nationalism and world-wide co-operation. Regional projects for the elimination of war and the establishment of peace go several centuries back;¹ but the present juncture

¹ For instance, it was suggested by George Podiebrad in 1462 that the Christian States should federate into a single parliament and institute a common militia for defence. More than a hundred years later, the Grand D \acute{e} sign ascribed by the Duc de Sully to King Henry IV of France, proposed to divide Europe (without Russia and the Ottoman Empire) into six regions, each with a council to regulate the relations of the States therein, and to provide appeals from these councils to a general European assembly, meeting every year in the principal cities in turn. It was contemplated that Christian Europe was to wage a war for the destruction of the Turkish Empire. One of the motives underlying the Design was the humiliation of the House of Hapsburg.

Emeric Cruce took a wider sweep and suggested in 1613 a universal League, comprising European nations, the Turks, the Persians and the Tartars, with a Court of Arbitration at Venice. After the Thirty Years' War, William Penn suggested the establishment of a 'European Diet, Parliament or Estates', for the 'Present and Future Peace of Europe'. Writing after the Congress of Utrecht (1713), the Abb \acute{e} de Saint Pierre proposed a League of Peace, a perpetual alliance of European sovereigns to guarantee the integrity of their territories, with a permanent congress of ambassadors to arbitrate in all disputes between States. Refusal to accept its award was to be followed by a concerted offensive against the recalcitrant State.

After the Congress of Vienna (1815), the Holy Alliance between Russia, Prussia and Austria aimed at European peace on the basis of the *status quo*.

invests them with unusual significance. There are projects of what may, for want of a better term, be called continentalism or super-nationalism, such as Pan-Americanism, the United States of Europe and Pan-Asiatic Federation. There has been talk of Pan-Slavism, Pan-Turanianism, and Pan-Islamism, and a union of English-speaking nations. But the continental and other projects are not calculated to serve as a stage on the road to comprehensive internationalism. They may even arrest the process, raising inter-continental tariff walls and provoking animosities. For instance, if ever the United States of Europe materializes, it will be a standing challenge to the American union, to Asiatic countries and to the rest of the world. But continentalism is probably too artificial to have a chance in the world of the future. Continentalism has correctly diagnosed the political and economic inadequacy of the nation State but it has failed to perceive that the new economic unit is not the continent, but the world. Nor can the continent serve as a lasting cultural unit, for culture, so far as it is transcending national bounds, is becoming cosmopolitan rather than continental. There are European countries which have deeper cultural affinities with the United States, Canada or Australia than with other European regions. The legacies of the past make the political federation of a continent which is implicit in any effective economic union, even more difficult than the establishment of international government. In fact, the cure for intra continental animosities may be found more readily in comprehensive internationalism than in continentalism.¹

¹ Unfolding his plan of the United States of Europe, the late M. Briand (para. c. of Part 3 of his Memorandum) desired 'the rational organization of European production and trade, by means of increasing freedom and systematic simplification in the circulation of goods, of capital and of labour. . . .'

The South American delegates at Geneva announced that they would be obliged to form an economic block in self-defence.

Count Coudenhove-Kalergi, the well known exponent of Pan-Europa, goes further than M. Briand and clearly states that 'we

If man is to plan the future, he must steer clear of internationalism or continentalism and attempt straightaway to bring about world co-operation with all its practical implications. Not merely should the old relationships of overlordship and subjection, imperialism and exploitation be revised but a concerted effort should also be made to diffuse enlightenment, raise the standard of life in all lands and abolish militarism. These are the conditions precedent to international organization of an effective and permanent character. Continentalism represents an endeavour to get round them and stop at smaller units. But genuine internationalism must face the situation squarely and endeavour to establish and maintain conditions favourable to world co-operation. In order to achieve this end as well as to realize the maximum international co-operation under any given conditions in

cannot limit it either to economic or to political or to cultural union. We want Europe to be a political, economic and cultural community'. The aim is 'a federation of States and a customs union for the salvation of Europe, of western culture and of the white race'. Count Coudenhove-Kalergi feels that the idea of continental unity is a postulate of the twentieth century, like nationalism in the nineteenth century and that the struggle for Pan-Europa is a struggle against barbarism.

So General Denvignes, in the official organ of the Pan-European Union, deprecates the idea of disarmament 'because when in future all fighting between white people will be regarded as shameful civil war, the era of inter-continental wars, of the struggle between East and West, will perhaps begin——.' Then in capital letters 'EUROPEANS! PREPARE FOR RESISTANCE: EUROPEANS, UNITE.'

This, of course, is very far from disarmament. The same note is struck by an Australian writer, F. A. W. Gisborne: 'The advocates of general and complete disarmament for the prevention of war apparently overlook the fact that such a course of action, even were it feasible, would place the civilized nations of Europe at the mercy of the warlike and more or less barbarous races of Asia and Africa. Thus the higher civilization would be thrust beneath the heel of the lower, and the days of Attila, Timur and Chenghiz Khan would return.' *Democracy on Trial and Other Essays*, 1928.

future, it is necessary to strengthen and supplement the existing organs of international consultation, co-operation and regulation. If humanity is to maximize its economic welfare and to abandon force as the basis of group relations, it is necessary to assist the development of these organs into international government. It must be clearly understood that the world has reached a stage when the only alternative to international regulation is drift and chaos. Stable money, for instance, is one of the great needs of the world but we cannot attain it without international co-operation. High authorities like Mr. J. M. Keynes and Sir Josiah Stamp have pointed out that it is desirable to establish international control over gold supplies and credit. Co-operation between central banks organized, say, by the Bank for International Settlements could steady the exchanges and work a planned gold standard. So too a currency based on index numbers would depend for its working on international control. It would ease the burden of debt all over the world and facilitate an increase in the purchasing power of mankind and ensure a freer flow of goods. International co-operation in banking and credit could check the fall of prices more effectively than purely national measures. Access to raw materials and tariffs in general call for international consultation and agreement. The economic integration of the world must have a parallel in politics so that the currents of trade and finance may not be hampered by irrelevant political obstacles. It is also desirable to forestall the growth of invisible international government in high finance, commerce, industry and agriculture. From this point of view indeed international regulation will present a purification, rationalization and extension of the existing international regulation. It is only through international regulation that we can now hope to integrate economic with political organization. Human interests are fast becoming common or complementary, at any rate they admit of harmony. Health, communications, etc. can

now be adequately supervised only on the world scale. Immigration and international investment are also eminently suited for international regulation.

International government implies the abandonment of the dogma of complete national sovereignty. It seeks to replace the idea of independence by what has been called interdependence. But it does not of course signify the disappearance of national governments, or their subordination in all matters to the international government. The latter should chiefly perform the functions of normative legislation and adjudication. The Covenant of the League of Nations already envisages not only common deliberation on international conditions of a grave character but also peaceful revision of obsolete treaties¹ which, if carried out by international consent, would constitute a species of international legislation. The recommendations of the various organizations of the League and the International Labour Office would, when accepted more promptly and widely, amount to international legislation of another type.

For certain purposes, the International Government may have its own executive and supervisory agencies but for the most part it would leave the administration, even of its own measures, to national governments. In all cases, it will be necessary and desirable to surround the international legislature, agencies and offices with advisory and consultative organs. Geneva has already set an example to this effect and national governments are moving in the same direction.² Thus it will be useful to have the maximum amount of investigation and deliberation on economic matters among

¹ 'The Assembly may from time to time advise the reconsideration by members of the League of treaties which have become inapplicable and the consideration of international conditions whose continuance might endanger the peace of the world.' Article xix of the Covenant of the League of Nations.

² *Infra*, ch. xvi.

experts, employers and labour leaders from various countries before passing any definite resolutions.

International law which must form the basis of international co-operation and organization has been the subject of a great deal of misconception in juristic controversy. It has often been denied the title of law or has been dismissed as 'the vanishing point of jurisprudence'.¹ It is therefore necessary to emphasize that at bottom the sources of international law are identical with those of municipal law. Krabbe has said that the only source of law is 'the feeling or sense of right which resides in man and has a place in his conscious life, like all the other tendencies that give rise to judgments of value. Upon this all law is based, whether it be positive law, customary law or the unwritten law in general'.² If we add to this feeling of right a sense of convenience and a balance of interests, we get all the main sources of law. To quote Roscoe Pound, law is the outcome of our community life. 'The problem of the legal order is one of reconciling or harmonizing or compromising, conflicting or overlapping human claims or desires or demands.' Legal development has a twofold character, the growth of a system of rules applicable to social facts and growth of governmental organs for the precise definition of the rules and their enforcement. Such a legal development is presupposed by the very existence of a community or of communities alongside of one another.³ In this context there is some force in Krabbe's contention that the State itself, qualified as its independence is at best, depends for its existence on international law. International law would still be law in the truest sense of the term if it only set up standards for the adjustments of the

¹ T. E. Holland, *Elements of Jurisprudence*, 12th edition, p. 392.

² *The Modern Idea of the State*, Eng. tr., p. 47.

³ J. D. I. Hughes, *Introduction to the Study of International Relations*, p. 120.

relations of States with one another, that is to say, if it only delimited rights and duties.¹ As for the sanctions, force is not the only one, or the most important, for law as such. Sir Henry Maine and others have shown that there have been systems of law which were enforced independently of the State or its courts of law. As a matter of fact, even the ordinary statute law is obeyed chiefly because of social sanctions operating through public opinion and, where these are absent or weak, is honoured more in the breach than in the observance.

Inter-State contacts and relationships necessarily give rise to some sort of law for the regulation of such common affairs and the adjudication of such disputes as are not to be decided by the sword. In ancient times India, Greece, Rome and other regions developed their characteristic systems of international law. During the Middle Ages European organization was based on hierarchical ideals, and disputes were sometimes referred to higher authorities for settlement according to such common principles as had obtained recognition. After the Reformation and the rise of the nation State, the need of regulative principles in international dealings was felt more acutely than ever before and a long line of jurists beginning with Grotius who published his *Law of War and Peace* in 1625, have built up a system of international law with the help of Roman law, treaties, awards, judgements, and the canons of reason and justice. The vast extension of international relations, agreements and organizations, has broadened the foundations of international law and refined the usages and rules embodied therein. Writing in 1888, Sir Henry Maine acknowledged that the founders of international law, though they did not create a sanction, had created a law-abiding sentiment. 'They diffused among sovereigns and the literate classes in

¹ J. D. I. Hughes, *Introduction to the Study of International Relations*, p. 123.

communities a strong repugnance to the neglect or breach of certain rules regulating the relations and actions of States.'

Under the auspices of the League of Nations, there has been considerable progress in the codification of international law, both public and private, and there is now available a compact body of law applicable to disputes between States and certain categories of cases between citizens of different States.¹ Its prime source of strength is that it is grounded in the necessities of the present day Great Society. Its vogue will increase as public opinion grasps its value and importance. For its specific enforcement two methods are open. There is the self-limitation of States. The Weimar Constitution of the German Republic made a significant departure when it enacted that the rules of international law, universally recognized, formed part of German federal law and as such had obligatory force.² Similarly the Estonian constitution adopted the generally accepted precepts of international law as an inseparable part of her judicial order. So too, the Austrian Constitution. Such guarantees are likely to be incorporated in the organic law of various countries in proportion as the intimate bearing of international law on public welfare is clearly understood. It is also significant that in Great Britain, the United States and many other countries the courts apply international law to cases not covered by municipal law or by definite treaties or agreements. Apart from them there has been growing up a system of international judicature which is capable of vast extension.

¹ Kant clearly perceived that a world civil law is a necessary complement to general social rights and to lasting peace.

² Article 4 of the Constitution. The German Constitution, in its actual working, developed on unexpected lines and has now been virtually suspended. But this does not invalidate the argument that provisions to this effect are capable of incorporation in national constitutions for the observance of the courts.

International justice In 1899 and 1907 the Hague Conferences sought to establish a procedure for commissions of inquiry, good offices, conciliation, mediation and arbitration tribunals for the peaceful settlement of disputes. The Hague Tribunal which was then established developed into the Permanent Court of International Justice after the war in 1920. It gives awards and opinions on matters which one or both the parties or the Council of the League of Nations may refer to it. By 1930, forty-two States had ratified the Protocol of the Statute of the Court and twenty-nine had bound themselves, though with reservations in some cases, by the Optional Clause which provides that the Court's jurisdiction shall be compulsory for disputes of a legal nature, concerning the interpretation of a treaty, or a question of international law, or the existence of material facts, or the extent and nature of the reparation to be made for the breach of an international obligation. The scope of its practical jurisdiction has been limited by the forces of nationalism and imperialism but it does provide an alternative to the arbitrament of the sword. It has already proved its utility by settling some disputes which might otherwise have led to war.

The Permanent Court of International Justice In proportion as public opinion awakens to the present characteristics of the world situation, as nationality confines itself to its proper cultural role and imperialism and militarism make way for an economic order in terms of world welfare, the foundations of the International Court will be strengthened and its superstructure completed. When it is understood that supreme and vital national interests are summed up in the international interest, the authority of the Court will be accepted like that of the national organs of judicature. It will then occupy a position analogous in principle to that of the Federal Court in the United States. It is eminently desirable to invest it with appellate jurisdiction in cases arising out of international agreements

Prospects of international judicature

and conventions. It follows that branches of the Court should be established in various countries.

International law, judicature and organization are calculated to make the world, in some important aspects, a single community. It does not at all follow that States or nations or their components should cease to be communities. But community is a matter of degree and modern developments imply, for certain purposes, an area of common life commensurate with humanity. Such a possibility has been simply ignored

The World Community by many schools of political theory and expressly denied by others. Hegel concluded that the State was an absolute, fixed end in itself. Bernard Bosanquet regards the nation State as the widest organization possessing the common experience necessary to found a common life.¹ The State is denied a determinate function in a larger community and itself elevated to the guardianship of a whole moral world. 'Moral relations presuppose an organized life; but such a life is only within the State, not in relations between the State and other communities.'² From acute differences in the scale of living, 'it seems to follow that the object of our ethical idea of humanity is not really mankind as a single community. Putting aside the impossibilities arising from succession in time, we see that no such identical experience can be presupposed in all mankind as is necessary to effective membership of a common society and exercise of a general will.'³

Its denial Such a conclusion is the philosophic expression of a widely prevalent negation of the possibility and approach of a universal society. It is, however, invalidated by two factors of prime importance. It ignores the implications of modern transport, industry, commerce, finance, and cultural contacts and the resulting community of certain interests. Secondly it is informed by an unreal

¹ *The Philosophical Theory of the State* (ed. 1919), p. 298.

² *Ibid.*, p. 302.

³ *Ibid.*, pp. 306-307.

and centralistic theory of sovereignty and administration and ignores the possibilities of the federal principle in organization. In response to the international ramifications of economic and cultural influences, the States may well entrust certain affairs to common legislation, adjudication and even administration.

World opinion It has already been pointed out that such a world community can rest only on the support of world opinion. One of the most significant features of the present age is the beginnings, howsoever faint and feeble, of world opinion. In the last war the belligerents used all possible means to carry neutral opinion with them and thus recognized the force of world opinion. In the post-war world discontented nationalities and minorities have made it part of their programme to influence opinion in countries far and near. Governments have followed suit and have been known to spend large sums of money on foreign propaganda. World opinion is still weak, intermittent and liable to go astray but its emergence is the promise of a new order. It may be expected to develop with international organization, intellectual co-operation and general enlightenment. It should then be able to attach itself to a genuine and instructed loyalty to humanity.

Democracy and internationalism International co-operation, founded on principles of universal peace and universal well-being, is calculated to promote the moral and economic conditions favourable to democracy. It will go far to eliminate from human relations the principle of force which is antithetical to that of democracy. It will serve as a guarantee for the leisure and freedom which are indispensable to all higher life. It will bring to the fore the idea of the dignity of man as man, irrespective of colour, race or nation. The fortunes of democracy in the spiritual no less than in the political sense are bound up with those of pacifism and international co-operation.

CHAPTER XIII

GOODS AND SERVICES

SCIENCE summons humanity to reorganize its life and institutions on a plane which implies a fresh orientation towards goods and services. It involves the whole question of the rights of property and has during the last hundred years roused the keenest controversies in politics and economics. It has been pointed out that difficulties in procuring the means of sustenance lead to accumulation and exclusive use of commodities and annexation of areas of supply by groups of some species and that this institution of property receives a vast elaboration in human society on account of the multiplication of supplies through pasture, agriculture and industry, and on account of commerce, the stimulation of human needs and the growth of population; that in human history property has never followed a uniform tenure; that it has been held by individuals, families, tribes, churches and other associations; and that it has always been subject to a large measure of social control.¹

Property rights There can be no absolute code of property rights. Every age has its own system in response to its own requirements. In classical times Sparta banned citizens from industry and commerce, rigidly limited their possessions and forbade them to sell or divide the hereditary lots of land. Solon, the Athenian arbiter in the sixth century B.C., cancelled numerous outstanding debts at one stroke. He was not the only law-giver of Greece who sought political equilibrium in restriction of property rights. In Rome the public lands were

¹ *Supra*, ch. iii.

distributed among citizens according to various considerations. Village communities in India held extensive pasture lands in common and controlled the use of private farms as well. The Mogul Government in medieval India openly appropriated all but a fraction of the effects of its deceased officers and noblemen. Systems of taxation which have varied from time to time and place to place have tampered with private property in all sorts of ways. Not to speak of Russia, resort to inflation wiped off savings in Germany and elsewhere after the war. The Australian War Debt has been compulsorily converted to a lower rate of interest. Systems of property, in the broader sense of the term change from age to age. Loyalties and interests which grow up round any one of them gradually shift their incidence with a change therein.

On the whole property has so far been regulated by customs, laws and traditions, resulting partly from a regard for the communal good and partly from the pull which individuals, families, classes and associations have been able to exercise. It has represented the balance between the exigencies of production and distribution, social stratification, forces of communalism, and individual ability and ambition. As an institution, property has commanded great prestige because of its functions. As already pointed out, it has been a sort of extension of personality to its possessors. Acquisition is 'an incident of love of power, of desire to impress fellows, to obtain prestige, to secure influence, to manifest ability, to "succeed", in short, under conditions of the given regime'.¹ The self tends to identify itself with things. People pride themselves on 'their' ideas, 'their' deeds, 'their' relations or friends, 'their' houses, towns and countries. It is obvious that property has been a powerful aid to self-realization. It has helped to consolidate the family, and make of it a great instrument for the

**Utility of
property**

¹ J. Dewey, *Human Nature and Conduct*, p. 145.

training of the young. Through it, corporations have extended the range of their operations, improved their methods, and guaranteed a certain measure of independence to their members. The possession of large resources has enabled the State to function as the guardian of security and order and actively to promote welfare on a comprehensive scale. It will be observed that property, whenever held by groups, has always been attached to some services of a corporate character and also partaken of the nature of a trust for posterity. Apart from all considerations of selfishness, property was bound to become an object of keen pursuit. To a large extent, it has been a reward for productivity and talent, a measure of values and esteem and, altogether, one of the central factors in social life.

Until the nineteenth century, however, there was not enough to go round, at any rate, not without hard labour. Hence the struggle and conflict which have been fraught with tremendous consequences to human society. The scramble for wealth and the traditions which grew out of it led to disproportionate accumulation with groups, classes, associations and families. There have grown up corresponding systems of inheritance to perpetuate the possessions in the same social circles. The result is economic inequalities of a grave character which widen the social breaches and give the few power to control the conditions of life of the many. There results an 'ethical dualism' which is reinforced by temptations of egotistical and sensual gratification on the one hand and by servility and sycophancy on the other. Reputability and respectability adjust themselves to economic circumstances and tend to ally themselves with the principle of conspicuous waste, contrary to the true social interest. The system is materialistic in that it often divorces reward from responsibility, and enjoyment of wealth from social function.¹

Flaws in the
system

¹ R. H. Tawney, *The Acquisitive Society*.

Poverty Large sections of humanity have been afflicted by a sense of insecurity. Poverty has dwarfed their stature and reduced their lives to fragments. It bars the gate of knowledge against them and leaves them a prey to superstition and exploitation. In numberless cases it leads to disease, suffering and premature death. 'Poverty is not a crime' said an old woman to Proudhon, 'but it is something worse.' Poverty and insecurity vitiate the harmony of the family and prompt parents to break the children to servility.¹ They have been responsible for the horrors of juvenile and female labour. They have undermined the moral standards of the whole of society and produced a terrible amount of crime.²

Lack of opportunity Individual genius has now and then grasped favourable opportunities and risen to fame and plenty but for the most part personality has been smothered under the double weight of indigence and ignorance. There is something irrelevant in sermons on self-help to rise from log cabins to White Houses, because the odds are too heavy for the vast majority. Under the system so far in vogue opportunity simply does not come to many a peasant or labourer and the larger proportion of native talent goes unused to the grave.

Dignity of labour Under such arrangements it was only inevitable that labour itself should lose its dignity and invite contempt. The Hindu lawgivers would not allow the high castes to labour at 'lowly' occupations except in emergencies and would not permit the lower castes any higher vocations. In Greece Xenophon

¹ Jane Addams (*Democracy and Social Ethics*, p. 45), quotes a woman who said to her, 'If you did not keep control over them (the children) from the time they were little, you would never get their wages when they are grown up.'

² Indian Administration Reports show that crime generally increases after bad harvests which leave a large proportion of the land workers in dire straits. Some German statisticians have also worked out a correlation between fluctuations in the prices of food-stuffs and the number of thefts and robberies.

remarked that it was quite right that cities should rate the menial occupations low, for they murdered the bodies of those who worked at them by compelling them to stay indoors and sometimes even to stay all day by a fire. The Greek contempt for mechanical work sometimes extended to fine arts. Plutarch says that no well disposed young man, however he may admire the plastic works of a Phidias or a Polyclethus, the poetical and musical creations of an Archilochus or an Anacreon, would ever wish to be one of these men. 'Just in the same way we enjoy the magnificence of purple garments and the fragrance of unguents, while we deem the dyers and the makers of unguents to be illiberal and banausic.' Aristotle himself said that civic virtue was possible for him alone 'who is not only free born, but also free from all modes of work which serve the needs of daily life'. He would forbid 'the market square of the free' to mechanics, farmers and such other people. Similarly in Rome Seneca was convinced that handicrafts could have been invented not by philosophers but by the meanest bondmen.¹

The craze for money has often produced illth by converting mastery of things into mastery of men. The cash nexus has thrust itself into numerous relations of associated life. There is a cynical saying that employers are not in business for their health. St. Thomas Aquinas declared that trade was justly scorned since in itself it served the lust for wealth.² Members of professions and public services are tempted to think primarily of fees and emoluments rather than of serving the social interest. Acquisition becomes the dominant motive of the majority of men. Only a minority pursues

The cash
nexus

¹ That there is nothing natural about such an attitude is proved by the change that is now coming over Russia. To be a worker is to possess in Russia a social status. There is an inverted class consciousness. Cf. Julian Huxley, *A Scientist among the Soviets*, pp. 5 ff.

² Cf. J. Ruskin, *Unto this Last*, ch. i.

a life of genuine culture. There is the class stamp in place of the human stamp on so many creations of art and literature. The prevailing atmosphere is injurious to all concerned. 'Our inequality', said Matthew Arnold, 'materializes our upper class, vulgarizes our middle class, brutalizes our lower class.' Bellamy compared the social coach to a coach in which the rich are riding drawn by the masses.¹

The low esteem in which manual exertion is held leads to high standards of being waited on, specially in countries where social groups are separated by wide distances. Dr. E. A. Ross has given some interesting illustrations of the habits of being constantly served by others. In the United States a representative from the aristocratic south was amazed that a northern colleague in the Congress blacked his own boots. In Peru pages carry the prayer books and umbrellas of ladies going to church. On return from India, a little English girl wept at her first tea in England because she was expected to stir her cup herself.²

In the midst of the degradation of manual labour, the habit of personal attendance, and the social and economic stratification, it becomes almost a necessity of life for many to look down on others. Even the 'lower' classes look down on others lower still and those at the bottom wrangle for superiority to one another.

Religious and moral teachers have sought to rectify the relations of affluence and poverty through charity. It is true that charity relieves a great deal of suffering but the eagerness with which poverty

¹ Tolstoy declared that property divides men into 'two castes, an oppressed labouring caste that famishes and suffers and an idle oppressing caste that enjoys and lives in superfluity'. Again, 'money is a new form of slavery distinguished from the old solely by its impersonality, by the lack of any human relation between the master and the slave'.

² E. A. Ross, *Principles of Sociology*, pp. 335-36.


looks for it is demoralizing to the character. As a social institution charity usurps the place of justice and promotes habits of condescension and dependence. If it is not enlightened and discriminating enough, charity may positively encourage sloth and indolence among a few without touching the wants of the many.

The social and ethical maladjustments entailed by the graver inequalities of wealth and rank have prompted many theories and a few limited experiments of radical reform. The Buddhist, Christian and other monastic orders have practised communism in property and numerous religious and propagandist societies have interdicted private possession to their members. In the first century A.D. the Chinese Wang Mang declared that the land should belong to the State, as the slave to himself. Plato advocated communism of property among the guardians. Aristotle pointed out that what was everybody's concern was nobody's concern but he admitted that while property should be private, the use of it should be common, and he suggested that it should be the special business of the legislator to create this benevolent disposition in men. Thinkers in medieval Europe worked out theories of property as something artificial or as something in the nature of a trust. The friar Augustinus Triumphus in the fifteenth century declared that private property ceased to be such by natural law in case of necessity, by divine law for the sake of charity and by civil law for the benefit of the State. In the sixteenth century Suarez held liberty and community of goods to be natural and derived the validity of institutions inconsistent therewith only from *jus gentium*.

Theories on
reform of
property

Under Platonic inspiration modern utopian literature has frequently advocated communism. Thus Sir Thomas More was persuaded that 'till property is taken away there can be no equitable or just distribution of things, nor can the world be happily governed'.

Utopian
communism



Schools of
modern
socialism

It was, however, after the Industrial Revolution that the age-long urge to a reorganization of the property system was embodied in definite schools of economic philosophy and in programmes of action. Riches, so to say, were being heaped upon the world. The problem was to absorb and integrate them into the life of the world.¹ From Godwin in the eighteenth century to the present day, socialists and communists have argued that wealth is a social product, that it can be immensely increased by elimination of wasteful competition and overlapping and that the means of production, transport and exchange should be socialized. There are socialists like Bernard Shaw who insist on absolute equality of income for all. There are communists who would abolish private property altogether and vest economic control in unions of producers. Their distrust of the State is shared by syndicalists and some guild socialists who would similarly leave economic life to the management of the workers themselves. Philosophic anarchism goes further, and demands the abolition of private property, along with law and agencies of control.

Modern
programmes

These modern schools of socio-economic theory have been profoundly influenced by the material abundance and organization attendant on the Industrial Revolution. In their turn they have affected the course of working class movements which arose in reaction to the conditions of work and wages in factories situated in towns pulsating with ideas and presenting contrasts of extreme wealth and extreme poverty. The labour movements have, in conjunction with other forces, increased the workers' share in the wealth, leisure, security and enlightenment which technical appliances have rendered possible. Their programmes insist on a yet larger share in the control of production, or on the socialization of the

¹ Cf. J. S. Mackenzie, *Introduction to Social Philosophy*, p. 113.

mines, the land, the railroad, the steamship, the workshops and of the municipal services. After the war Russia has presented a new experiment in economic, as in social and political life, which has called forth an unusual amount of controversy. It constitutes a standing challenge to the old order and a source of suggestion and warning to those who seek to reorganize economic life.

The clash of ideas, interests and movements in regard to property goes to the roots of social organization. The dust of controversy often clouds the basic issues and diverts the gaze from the complexities of the present order. It is desirable to start with an elementary proposition that all wealth is the fruit of the mental or physical labour of individuals but that individuals do not and cannot work apart from one another. They co-operate in the production of wealth and the area of visible and invisible co-operation widens with the development of transport and economic interdependence until today, for many purposes, it embraces practically the whole world. For instance, the cotton-grower in Egypt or the United States is working in co-operation on the one hand with the manufacturers of his tools, and therefore with a further line of miners, mechanics, etc. in the background, possibly in distant lands, and on the other with manufacturers of textiles in distant countries together with workers in transport, etc., far and near.

There is undoubtedly an individual factor in production and it should be distinguished and recognized to form the basis, along with other factors, of remuneration. But all production is also social at bottom and involves a social interest all the way to consumption. At first sight inventions in technique and organization appear to be strokes of individual genius but they depend largely on the contemporary stage of culture. It is significant that several inventions of the same thing have often appeared simultaneously and similar

Wealth as a
social
product

The indi-
vidual factor
in produc-
tion

ideas have occurred to thinkers independently at the same time.¹ The personal equation is certainly present here as it is in all production, but the social element is also of the greatest significance.² On principles of economic justice alone it is difficult to deny the validity either of individual property or of socialization or of social control.

There are two tests which a modern economic system should satisfy. Firstly it must be calculated to increase the wealth of the world by strengthening the incentives to and improving the methods of production. The economic problem is not merely one of distribution. If the total wealth of a country were divided equally among all its citizens it would make little permanent difference in their resources. Wealth is a process of ceaseless creation and consumption. The world requires the development of agricultural resources, rationalization of industry and facilities of transport so as to supply a growing number of wants, and to increase the margin of leisure, of the human race. Secondly a modern economic system should be so devised as to banish poverty from every country in the world and guarantee security to all. Subject to these supreme considerations, flexibility should be the salient feature of the system. Not merely should it adjust itself to the varying exigencies of production in various countries but it should be capable of rapid adaptation to the changing environment. It should not choke the springs of improvement in technique and organization. It must be able to resist the temptations of rigid uniformity and standardization, and furnish as large a scope for initiative and spontaneity as may consort with the social interest.

¹ W. F. Ogburn, *Social Change*, pp. 84-117. See the Tables in particular.

² Cf. E. Bellamy: 'Nine hundred and ninety-nine parts of the thousand of every man's produce are the result of his social inheritance and environment.'

foretelling its doom they forgot that capitalism is a pervasive economic method and that it is capable not only of humanization but also of regulation in the world interest.

The problem which confronts every age is in what manner and in what proportions the expedients of individualism, socialization and social control are to be combined. One of the most important adjustments which the modern world requires is the extension and systematization of the international consultation and co-ordination which have been in evidence for long and which have made marked progress since the War. Russia has recently revealed the possibilities of planned economy on a regional scale. The potentialities of national plans, co-ordinated with one another in the world interest, are staggering. If a ten-year programme could be agreed to internationally and executed nationally under the supervision of Governments and with the co-operation of those engaged in agriculture, industry and banking, it would make a perceptible change in economic conditions and show the way out of recurring depression and unemployment. That there is nothing utopian about such a proposal is proved by the history of the Great War. It was marked by feats of inter-allied shipping control, munition manufacture, rationing, military training and transport.¹ International trusts and cartels are already in the habit of planning on a world scale but they are swayed inevitably by narrow interests. The time has come when the function should be taken over by recognized international bodies and performed in the interests of humanity, so as to provide a high standard of life to all. It could best be entrusted to an organization consisting of representatives of Governments, employers' associations, labour unions, peasants' unions and experts. Apart from such planning, it is now generally agreed that hours of work,

¹ See Leo Chiozza Money, *The Triumph of Nationalization*; A. Salter, *Inter-Allied Shipping Control*.

scales of wages, insurances, etc. in the various branches of agriculture and industry are best settled internationally. The principles governing tariffs, cartels and immigration should be laid down internationally. Transport lends itself to international regulation. Specially, there is much to be said in favour of vesting the ownership and management of the air services in an international body like the League of Nations. Similarly, statutory provision should be made for receiving contributions from States, as well as endowments from various sources, for the management of international services of intellectual co-operation, research, health, etc., and for defraying the costs of international organization in general. During the Middle Ages, the Church as an international association, owned large properties, derived its income from various sources and discharged many functions. There is nothing chimerical in the international ownership of a quota of the wealth of the world today.

International conventions and recommendations must be carried out mainly by national governments.

**National
regulation**

Subject to international agreements, national governments should be free to plan the economic activities of their nationals, undertake as much national control over wealth as may be necessary to keep production up to the mark, to eliminate waste of material and energy, to establish wholesome conditions of work and to guarantee the international minimum to all their citizens. Every State should have a free hand in the settlement of matters of principle and detail not covered by the international agreements. There can be no general rules of nationalization of the land or production or transport. The totality of the environment must be considered in determining whether any resources or services be taken over from private enterprise and entrusted completely to national, regional or municipal ownership or control. What the new economy demands is that production should be planned co-operatively, that the public interest be guaranteed against

waste and selfishness, that everyone be placed above want, and that social control be adequate to secure these ends.

It does not follow that the life of a nation or of the world as a whole be organized on the principle of absolute equality of income. Above the necessary comforts, the requirements of men show infinite variation. Aesthetic and literary tastes, the bent for travel and adventure, the general style of living and the scale of responsibilities must vary from person to person and entail differential expenditure. Everyone should be left free to earn enough to pay his way to self-expression. No scheme of socialization or social control should be so rigid and uncompromising as to hamper the free development of personality. 'There is very little difference between one man and another,' as a carpenter remarked to William James, 'but what little there is, is very important.' That difference is of the essence of personality and should not be stifled in economic or other arrangements. Besides, payment by the State on the basis of the formula 'to every one according to his need' is scarcely a practical proposition. No Government nor any other agency can hope to tabulate and provide for all the needs of all citizens, specially because the needs are likely to vary with the same person from time to time. It is best to leave every one free to evolve, define and provide for his own needs above the guaranteed minimum. The barren concept of equality has to give way to the principle of maximization of opportunity for all.

To admit this principle of individuality in economic life will also serve to call forth the best efforts in production and service. Competition will be useful when, within limits of the social interest, it is carried on under conditions of equal opportunity.¹ That equality is a function primarily of universal educa-

Incentives to
exertion

¹ Cf. B. Kidd, *Social Evolution*.

tion. Profit is legitimate in economic enterprise as a means of self-expression and as a motive in the production and services designed to satisfy the social needs. It demands regulation rather than abolition. The chances of amassing fabulous wealth will be curtailed under schemes of social control. But it must be understood that the longing for untold riches is not the only, nor the most powerful, incentive to exertion. The tendency to regard business as a profession is already present in some cases. It is pursued by some for the opportunities of organization and service which it offers. It demonstrates that man is not just 'a covetous machine'.¹

**Business as
a profession**

The principles of the social utility of wealth, equality of opportunity and incentive to exertion have an intimate bearing on the question of inheritance. **Inheritance** The present systems of inheritance are to a large extent rooted in the pain economy which set a premium on hoarding and its transmission to one's progeny or relations. The social aspects of inheritance necessarily change under conditions of plenty specially when education and opportunity come within the reach of increasing numbers. It may be admitted that the desire to give the children a fair start in life acts as one of the motives to exertion but it is a mistake to suppose that the limitation, as distinct from the abolition, of inheritance would seriously weaken the

¹ Mr. Walter S. Gifford, President, American Telephone and Telegraph Company, recently observed:—'More and more I encounter men of the highest ability who regard business not as a means to acquire personal wealth, but as a fascinating profession and as an opportunity for accomplishment. They do not seek more money from it than enough to give them comfortably only those things really worth having that money can buy—freedom from financial worry, security for their families, books, art and travel. But they do want an outlet for their energies, exercise for their brains, and above all they genuinely want to be useful. . . . Business is becoming a profession.'

incentive. On the other hand, it is not good for the children to inherit so much as to be deprived altogether of the financial motive to exertion and to be exposed to the temptations of idleness and functionless property. It gives them too much power over others and aggravates inequalities without any social justification.

The principle of death duties has already been accepted by modern finance and economic theory. In England, for instance, the State has imposed an estate duty on all estates of over £100 net, passing at death, progressive according to the total value of the estate, and rising to 30 per cent on estates worth £1 million and to 40 per cent on those worth more than £2 millions. The British exchequer also levies legacy and succession duties rising in proportion to distance of relationship of the legatee or successor.

The Italian economist Rignano suggests that the tax on inheritance should increase with increase in distance from the ancestor who accumulated the fortune. Besides, it is possible to reduce the claims to inheritance and to prescribe that, failing the nearly related heirs, the effects should escheat to the State. Every tax on inheritance and bequest should, as a necessary corollary, be accompanied by a tax on large gifts to relations or friends during life. The governing principle is that, subject to adequate provision for nearly related dependents, the community has the first claim on the large properties of its members.

The economic conditions and potentialities which justify the limitation of inheritance also supply the moral basis for heavy taxation on high incomes. Apart from the needs of the exchequer, society is amply justified in appropriating the social rent comprised in all incomes. Modern finance has recognized the principle until the State levy has mounted to 50 or 60 or even 75 per cent of the highest incomes in many countries.

New
economic
order

The limitation of inheritance, and progressive taxation of higher incomes, along with equal opportunities of education and a guaranteed minimum to all who work, or are willing to work or are genuinely incapacitated for work should go a long way to abolish fabulous riches and grinding poverty alike, and redress the gaping inequalities of remuneration. They would, in conjunction with social insurance and co-operative management, remove the basic causes of social strife and bitterness. Capital would find its proper function of developing, rather than controlling, the life of men.¹ Agriculture, industry and commerce would cease to represent a sordid struggle for existence or meaningless accumulation. They would be professionalized and elevated to the higher planes of social service and genuine adventure.

Conditions of
democracy

It is of course understood that every able-bodied person shall work and receive the guaranteed minimum as a dole only when he absolutely fails to find work. In proportion to this economic readjustment and diffusion of enlightenment will political democracy be a reality and not a formality. So far, the high expectations of nineteenth century liberalism have been realized in a scanty measure because the economic and intellectual foundations of democratic government have been weak. The average voter cannot generally rise above his immediate toil, worries and narrow sympathies, and falls a victim to those who can play on his ignorance, prejudices and indigence. Power falls into the hands of small cliques of politicians, demagogues, financiers, or

¹ 'There is a growing sense that those who do constructive work, whether as hand-workers or brain-workers, should no longer be wholly under the domination of those whose sole aim is to make money; The function of capital is becoming recognized to be that of a means rather than that of an end; to assist and to develop the labour of human beings, rather than to use human beings to serve it.'—Lord Haldane, Introduction to M. P. Follett's *The New State*, p. xvi.

industrialists. The experience of the last hundred and fifty years demonstrates that popular government is only the superstructure of democracy and that its foundations must be laid deep in instructed intelligence, world peace and economic well-being. Democracy is incompatible with poverty as with excessive private wealth. It may indeed be desirable to inaugurate popular government as the best available means, in spite of risks, to facilitate the new order, but this makes it all the more necessary to understand the economic and educational implications of political reform and to carry them out through careful planning and organized effort.

CHAPTER XIV

PLANNED ECONOMY

It has been suggested in the preceding chapters that universal enlightenment and well-being have now been brought within the frontier of possibilities and that their realization depends on large-scale co-operation and planning. Science has released forces which if properly comprehended and guided by moral purpose, can rapidly improve social conditions beyond all precedent. Left to the mercy of obsolete traditions and passions, the same forces can play havoc with the fortunes of humanity. Purpose and plan form the crux of the social problem of the present age. It is desirable to assess their role, because of that interpretation of evolution which was overweighted with a mechanical bias and which was led to underrate the efficacy of social effort. There were political writers in the nineteenth century, specially in Anglo-Saxon countries, who elevated drift to the rank of a principle and traced political success and economic prosperity to it. Empires were believed to have been founded in fits of absent-mindedness. Logic was decried and the virtues of muddling through extolled as the acme of statesmanship. Edmund Burke and other apostles of conservatism were often invoked to uphold the supremacy of tradition and to paint the horrors of a break with the past. The 'inevitability of gradualness' found an appeal in unexpected quarters. Nor has political thought yet liberated itself completely from this attitude.

In an increasing measure we are now understanding that life in evolution is 'interpenetrated with purpose'. There are large tracts of animal behaviour, specially of co-operative activity, for instance that of the beavers, which can be explained

**Plan and
drift**

**Purpose in
evolution**

only on the hypothesis of subjective or psychical activity, analogous to human purposing.¹ As Romanes said, wherever you tap organic nature, it seems to flow with purpose. Goal-seeking is the most characteristic feature of the activity of animals and of men. Hormic psychology, as the purposive school is sometimes called, bases itself on the primacy of striving or seeking. This is not to suggest that all activity is at all times informed by foresight. But it is important to stress the fact that striving is a process of reaching, of trial and error, that goals emerge in the course of it, and so the process continues. The element of foresight is vastly strengthened with man through the development of intelligence, acquisition of knowledge, and the multiplicity of situations calling for judgement and selective activity. So ideals emerge from realities and are inextricably intertwined with the means.² Thinking is pre-eminently an instrument of readjustment and reorganization in face of obstacles and is teleological in its nature.

Human telesis has inevitably been subject to all the imperfections of knowledge, experience and organization. Sometimes it has been so crude and perverted as to be a self-cancelling business or a hindrance rather than a help. But sociologically the most important fact is its prevalence through history. Man has constantly been planning his life, comprehensively or fragmentarily, on a large scale or on a narrow scale. His religious and ethical systems have aimed at a change of heart, at conformity to certain standards or ideals, or a reorganization of social relationships on given principles. Partly, custom represents inherited and solidified planning

Human
telesis

¹ J. A. Thomson, *Philosophy*, April 1931, pp. 153 ff.

² Cf. J. Dewey: 'Means and ends are two names for the same reality. The terms denote not a division in reality but a distinction in judgement. . . . "End" is a name for a series of acts taken collectively—like the term army. "Means" is a name for the same series taken distributively—like this soldier, that officer. To think of the end signifies to extend and enlarge our view of the act to be performed. . . .'—*Human Nature and Conduct*, p. 36.

and assumes a more dynamic form as law. Indeed religion, custom and law have sometimes carried planning to such excess as to hamper that release of personality which is symbolized by spontaneity and adventure. On the other hand, there are individuals who plan their lives with such understanding and mastery of self as to raise their capacities to the n th power. Planning is constantly in evidence in agricultural, industrial and commercial enterprise, in banking, currency and exchange, in education, propaganda and social adjustment.

The triumphs of statesmanship have largely flowed from opportune planning. Kings and politicians, it is true, have often drifted without compass or rudder, but there have sometimes been constructive minds at the helm to plan the future on a comprehensive scale. For instance, Asoka in the third century B.C. and Akbar in the sixteenth century A.D. in India tried, not altogether in vain, to initiate their subjects into new moral or political relations. Persian, Greek and Roman traditions knew of many statesmen who were law-givers and who tried to refashion the lives of their compatriots. Alfred the Great in England and Charlemagne on the Continent are only two among the many social and political architects during the Middle Ages in Europe. The New Monarchy which synchronized with the dawn of the modern age and which culminated in the Enlightened Despotism of the eighteenth century almost reorganized the life of large regions in Europe. Since the French Revolution fresh legislation has been the order of the day in the west and has now and then summed up or guided important trends of change. Russia has been twice transformed according to preconceived plans—by Peter the Great in the seventeenth century and by Lenin and his compeers since 1917. Japan modernized and reorganized herself according to plan in the last quarter of the nineteenth century and Turkey has become a different country in the course of a decade.

Planning in
statesman-
ship

It has been said that all science, in the final issue, is art and application. The physical sciences render the control of the physical environment possible. It is the function of social science to introduce control into the solution of social problems. Social science, or social philosophy as it was called, originated to supply human requirements rather than satisfy mere curiosity. It has consistently aimed not merely at wider and deeper knowledge of social processes but also at its externalization in institutions and practices. It has, accordingly, often been led to enunciate plans of social organization, sometimes in great detail.

Its masterpieces are in essence tracts of reform. Hindu or Chinese social theory always speaks in the imperative mood. The sonorous verse of the *Mahabharata* inculcates all that the king should do and all that he should leave undone. The *Dharma Sutras* and *Dharma Sastras* lay down the duties of rulers, of priests and of all others. In Greece, Plato stood forth as a radical reformer and Aristotle was concerned avowedly with the organization of happiness. The medieval schoolmen were deeply interested in the rival claims of the Church and the Empire, and attempted to light the path of all who held the reins of authority. The thinkers of the Conciliar epoch (fifteenth century) shifted the basis of authority in the Church and then in the State from mere prescription to consent. Machiavelli was a realist who threw ethics overboard, but modern students of *The Prince* are not sure that he had no national objective in his mind. In the seventeenth century Thomas Hobbes, the greatest of English political philosophers, was concerned to evolve order out of the chaos into which the Civil War seemed to have plunged this country. Harrington succeeded in influencing a revolution in England and later another across the Atlantic. Locke was almost avowedly the apologist of the Glorious Revolution and an advocate of constitutional

government and toleration. Montesquieu launched the historical method on the currents of European speculation but he also had many reforms to urge. Rousseau, perhaps the most influential of all modern thinkers, was the apostle of popular sovereignty, really one of the greatest agitators in history. Burke, whose philosophic insight into affairs recalls that of Aristotle, would have refused to build any *a priori* system of thought; but he scattered a code of civil and political wisdom in practical discussions on England, America, India and France. The Utilitarians from Bentham to John Stuart Mill were inspired by humanitarian motives and were, above all, reformers. The sociologists from Auguste Comte and Herbert Spencer to Lester F. Ward and E. A. Ross have not contented themselves with expositions of social development. They have been among the foremost of social critics and have urged various plans of reorganization. Hobhouse, Graham Wallas, Zimmern and Laski in England; Duguit, Blanc and others in France; Lippmann, Roscoe Pound and Dewey in the United States; Treitschke, Delbrück and Karl Marx in Germany; Kropotkin and Bakunin in Russia—all represent the teleological method in sociology and politics. Thus social planning has a tradition which goes back to the very beginnings of speculation.

The influence of social philosophy Social philosophy has not been altogether without influence on the march of events. If it was not more effective, it was because it had no adequate biological and psychological basis to build upon and was thus exposed to the dangers of *a priori* idealism. Nor was the world equipped with adequate resources to carry out the programmes of philosophers. These in their turn lost touch with affairs and gave freer rein to their fancy, which sometimes made philosophy synonymous with impracticability. The modern advances in the sciences and the development of resources should serve to establish a new and more intimate relation between social philosophy and human affairs.

**Planning and
the modern
world**

There is nothing new in planning as such, nor in social science taking it up in right earnest. What is new is the larger scale on which planning has to be conducted in the modern world. On the economic plane it has to take the whole of humanity in its purview. In response to present-day conditions, universal education must be an integral part of any successful plan of human welfare. Nor can it omit a revision of political institutions. Above all, planning must be based on a consideration of all the possibilities of fuller life which have been unfolded. The modern world has already begun to extend the range and alter the technique of planning, in response to the scientific revolution.

**The scale of
planning**

One of the tasks which confront social thought and statesmanship is to put planning on a scientific footing. At first sight the unprecedented complexities of our environment and the kaleidoscopic rapidity of change seem to militate against planning. They certainly render it more difficult but at the same time more urgent than ever before. When the affairs of the whole world are linked together, when stagnation, retrogression or maladjustment in one region affects many others, and when international co-operation is needed for the solution of all vital problems, it is essential to replace drift by mastery. The modern world-problem is the result not only of a conflict between inharmonious traditions and ideals but also of the lack of adaptation of our working ideas and institutions to the present conditions of life. This lack of adaptation inevitably proves embarrassing to society. As early as the eighteenth century Diderot felt convinced that human industry had gone too far and that mankind would not be the worse if it had stopped much earlier and if it were possible to simplify the results. Chateaubriand puts the same idea in more sweeping style when he declared that to attain the highest point of civilization was to be on the lowest stair of morality, for the heart

of man profited at the expense of his head, and his head at the expense of his heart.

The objectives of planning Now it is one of the objectives of social planning to accelerate this necessary adaptation. 'Progress', said Novicow, 'consists merely in abandoning the slower processes of adaptation to environment to adopt those that are more rapid.' Concerted planning is necessary partly to supplement and partly to replace the fragmentary planning which has already gone far in economic life. As Sir Arthur Salter and others have pointed out, supply and demand no longer adjust themselves to each other by virtue of competition and changes in prices. Owing to the growth of combines, cartels, monopolies, undertakings as to prices, tariffs, bounties, etc., 'the full flood of competition has been canalized, locked, dammed and diverted from its natural course'.¹ But some further steps are necessary to eliminate the waste caused by irregularities of demand. Planning would put our resources and capacities to maximum use and do away with those periodical depressions which are caused by unforeseen interruptions in consumption. Planning is now necessary to safeguard the interests of the consumer whom present-day industrial organization has deprived of the benefits of free competition.

Principles of Planning Our planning should be adequate to the scale and the complexities of modern life. It follows that it must be flexible, continuous, in short, dynamic. Subject to these conditions, it should firstly be pervaded by the spirit of science and make the fullest use of the knowledge which the physical, biological and human sciences have placed at the disposal of man. It should constantly associate trained *expertise* with the vision of the reformer and the commonsense of the man of affairs. In the second place it should be based on a clear perception of the forces which science, co-operation and organization

¹ A. Salter, *Recovery, the Second Effort*, p. 18.

have set in motion. It is the function of telesis to liberate energy for creative relations in the totality of the environment. For instance, it is futile to plan a return to the simple life when goods can be manufactured and distributed in plenty. Nor is there much point in planning a wholesale return to the cottage industry when machinery can save untold amounts of labour and furnish leisure for recreation and for artistic cultivation. Planning has to proceed on the principle of the corporate satisfaction rather than the repression of human cravings. The guiding motive ought to be the expansion and liberation of human personality in proportion to the available resources. The principle of ethics, as William James said, is 'to satisfy at all times as many demands as we can'. In the third place the social planning should be worldwide at the base, that is, all national or regional plans should, like avowedly international plans, recognize the welfare of humanity as the goal. For practical purposes, it is desirable to co-ordinate national plans. In the fourth place social plans should comprehend economic, political and educational advance in their scope. Compartmentalism will here involve waste and inefficiency. It has well been observed that it is the correct selection of ends which should now be the characteristic psychological element in the social process.

It is on these principles that social thought and practical programmes have to be based in the present age.

Planning and science It is necessary to found and endow international academies of social research and widen the horizon of national institutes of a similar character. A closer association of learning and leadership in national as in international affairs is one of the imperative needs of the times. The gigantic tasks of the late War made statesmanship dependent on applied science; the no less gigantic tasks of peace call for the same. If the basic requirements are satisfied, it will be perceived that programmes of world welfare are capable of realization.

Features of economic planning

In regard to national economic planning it is desirable to emphasize that it does not necessarily postulate complete socialization of the means of production. It does, however, presuppose an extension of social control of economic activities. Plans can be executed by Governments in co-operation with various functional organizations for which, in the last resort, they should be able effectively to legislate. Planning of this character would eliminate waste, balance production and consumption, forestall slumps and depressions, and facilitate adjustment with international aspects of economic life. In contradistinction to the planning of cartels and mergers, it would not restrict production in the interest of higher profits but would favour a fuller utilization of resources. It would liberate demands and aim at the elevation of the standard of life, through guaranteeing a high scale of remuneration to peasants, workers and others. It would ensure a circuit-flow of prosperity.

Acceleration of the democratic process

In short, this planning would represent a concerted effort to accelerate the democratic process. It would bring to rapid fruition the promise contained in the powers and possibilities of applied science. It would import the much-needed element of humanitarian purpose into the progress of events.

CHAPTER XV

SOCIAL CONTROL AND THE NEW ORDER

**Permanence
of social
regulation** SOCIAL regulation is, in its essence, a form of social construction and results from the necessities of living together, of co-operation, of harmonizing and integrating multitudinous activities, and of constricting anti-social behaviour. It is not a matter of purely external control. It seeks to socialize the individual. As religion it sanctifies social values and standards. As morality it touches and refines the springs of action. As custom and opinion it stresses the importance of social usages and transfuses the activities of the individual with those of the group. Regulation has certainly been carried to great lengths owing to the exigencies of struggle, conquest, subjection and social stratification. But it would persist even in a peaceful, classless, egalitarian world, to ensure co-operation and to harmonize the self-expression of all. Even there it would embody itself in institutions which would obviously be instruments of government. In fact civilization implies the idea of law and cannot co-exist with utter anarchy. Philosophic anarchism, as developed in the last century, stressed the abolition of State, law and property but it really failed to shut the door against regulation. Proudhon felt that the new order (requiring a growth, not exactly of equality but of equivalence in social function and status) would be best secured by a free mutualistic organization of exchange in the economic sphere and by a free federalistic organization in the political sphere. Similarly Kropotkin would establish territorial and professional groups, for the sake of production and consumption and for the satisfaction of the infinite variety of needs and aspirations of civilized life. The schemes of Proudhon and Kropotkin are scarce-

ly compatible with genuine anarchy and raise all the problems of social regulation and political organization. Regulation is necessary to canalize the expression of personality so as to allow the maximum expression to all.

**Democratic
element in
social control**

Social control has, in part, always been democratic at the base. Custom represents mass practices and experiences solidified in social traditions which are transmitted from generation to generation. Law derives its being from custom and seeks, partly, to standardize social behaviour at a fairly high point attained by the community. Opinion, through which a good deal of regulation is effected, is democratic in proportion as it is public, as distinguished from sectional, opinion. Custom and opinion prescribe limits which normally authority dare not transgress; they lay down standards to which it usually conforms. It has been well said that nine-tenths of us all belong to the masses. The democratic element is thus always present in social control, but it operates in conjunction with the factors of force, ascendancy, superior wealth, intelligence and organization. It is shared by classes and groups and the traditions which cluster round social stratification.

**Diffusion of
social control**

Social control has rarely been concentrated at a single source and has usually been diffused among all the associations which organize human co-operation, through which personality seeks expression, and which therefore command allegiance in varying measure. The family, the clan, the tribe, churches, guilds, academies, clubs, States, local bodies, inter-State organizations—all share in such control as obtains in a society. Seldom have their spheres been defined with precision; often they have overlapped and sometimes bitter conflicts have taken place. Their share of control has varied continuously in accordance with the rise of new needs, occupations, groupings and ideas. They have all usually pulled together partly because of this constant readjustment,

partly because of the common element of democracy at the base and partly because of a working compromise corresponding to the distribution of the power of brain, wealth and organization. For the rest, various principles such as those of kinship, the church and the guild, have been the chief bonds of communal life and the ultimate source of control. It has usually fallen to the State in history to acquire a certain pre-eminence and to harmonize and co-ordinate the working of the various associations.

The State, as Maitland said, belongs to the same genus as corporations but it has generally performed the crucial functions of defence and aggression, maintenance of law and order and administration of justice. It has claimed all the inhabitants of the land as its members, disposed of enormous resources and wielded great force. It has appropriated numerous functions which it alone is competent to perform efficiently on an adequate scale. It has a halo and prestige all its own and lays the first claim on the loyalty of the citizen. It has often asserted a superiority over all other associations, defined their scope of activity and claimed sovereignty for itself. Political theory has reflected this phase of social life from the earliest times.

Hindu political theory always insisted that the king should maintain Dharma—religion, morality and the social order—and protect the people in the sense of furthering their material and spiritual progress.¹ Kautilya proclaimed that politics was the supremè science and the supreme art, the foundation and the support of all other sciences.² Politics, said the *Mahabharata*, is the refuge of 'the whole world of life'.³

¹ Beni Prasad, *The Theory of Government in Ancient India*, *passim*.

² *The Arthashastra*, ed. Shamasastri, pp. 7-9; tr., pp. 8-10.

³ *Santi Parva*, lvi, 2-9.

**The State in
western
political
theory**

A similar tone is in evidence in the bulk of political speculation in Europe. For instance, Aristotle claimed for the State a natural priority to the family and to the individual. For, he said, the whole is of necessity prior to the part. The modern philosophy of regulation was until recently occupied almost entirely with the theory of the State. Hegel glorified the State as the *summum bonum* of life and declared that it carried back the individual, whose tendency it was to become a centre of his own, into the life of the universal substance.

**Theory of
sovereignty**

The juristic counterpart of this philosophy has a history stretching back to the Roman Empire. The Roman jurists worked out a theory of *Imperium* and found the source of the law in the will of the prince. In modern times the development of the theory of sovereignty coincided roughly with the growth of the State in power, functions and prestige. From Bodin, through Hobbes and Bentham, this juristic idea reached its climax in John Austin who defined the sovereign as the determinate human superior who was not in a habit of obedience to a like superior but who received habitual obedience from the bulk of a given society.¹

**Political
pluralism**

But the growth of associations, discharging various functions, in modern times has provoked a revolt against this monism and led to the political pluralism which constitutes one of the most remarkable movements in recent political theory. It has been declared that if political theory is to be 'philosophically true, scientifically sound, morally righteous, legally

¹ Emile Combes said: 'There are, there can be, no rights except the right of the State, and there are and there can be no other authority than the authority of the (French) Republic.' Compare the declaration of the French Revolutionary Assembly of 1791 to the effect that 'the abolition of every kind of corporation formed among citizens of the same State is a fundamental basis of the French constitution'.

implicit in codes and decisions, and practically convenient', it must recognize the personality of a corporation as a real and spontaneous entity, with an inherent life and activity of its own. Social life is organized and finds expression through numerous associations which do not derive their existence or rights from the State. From this point of view a State is a federation, an interlocking union of groups, assisting the discovery of self by each man with his diversified nature. Federalism itself is thus seen to be an integration of needs, cravings and aspirations, a chapter in constructive co-operation.¹

Political pluralism has a deep significance for the whole subject of social control. It shows that exclusively political reform can touch life only at a few points. Liberalism or democracy, for instance, fails in its purpose if it stops with the machinery of the State. Secondly in spite of an apparent depreciation of political authority, pluralism really demonstrates that the State is as natural as the family, the guild or any other association. Far from being an exotic imposition, the State is clearly seen to be integral with society. The antithesis drawn by writers like Thomas Paine between society and the State or Government is shown in this context to be pointless.² It is a mistake to

Significance
of political
pluralism

¹ 'What we actually see in the world,' writes J. N. Figgis, *Churches in the Modern State*, p. 70, 'is not on the one hand the State and on the other a mass of unrelated individuals, but a vast complex of gathered unions, in which alone we find individuals, families, clubs, trades unions, colleges, professions, and so forth, and further, that there are exercised functions within these groups which are of the nature of government, including its three aspects, legislative, executive and judicial, though of course only with reference to their own members. So far as the people who actually belong to it are concerned such a body is every whit as communal in its character as a municipal corporation or a provincial parliament.' On the whole subject, see H. J. Laski, *The Foundations of Sovereignty and Authority in the Modern State*.

² In the opening passage of *Commonsense*, Paine wrote that '... society is produced by our wants, and the Government by

suppose that pluralism discredits the State. Whatever the practical implications deduced by some writers, the essential thesis of pluralism really serves to bring out the co-ordinating function of the State. It compels attention to certain facts of experience which go to show that an organization often tends to expand its orbit and to magnify the interest of its members at the expense of others. Churches have sometimes gone so far as to assume political functions. Guilds have sometimes played the same role, as the history of medieval cities, specially those of Italy, shows. In our own times the unions of capitalists and labourers have tended, in all honesty, to equate their own welfare with the general good. Nor is a similar disposition wanting in professional associations, consisting of highly enlightened persons and usually following high standards of conduct.¹

our wickedness; the former promotes our happiness positively by uniting our affections, the latter negatively by restraining our vices. . . . The first is a patron, the last a punisher. Society in every state is a blessing, but Government, even in its best state, is but a necessary evil . . . in its worst state an intolerable one. . . .'

¹ Cf. 'Specialization not only produces single-faculty development: it also encourages and accentuates a spirit which we may call the spirit of occupationalism—a habit of turning away from the commonwealth to the interests and the claims of the profession, and of paying devotion and offering loyalty before the shrine of vocation.' E. Barker, *National Character*, p. 95.

A singularly dispassionate observer, the late Professor Graham Wallas, noted that 'the force which maintains the right division between barrister and solicitor is the fact that it causes an enormous amount of legal work to be done and paid for twice over: the whole legal profession opposes the formation of a "land-registry" which would shorten the process of transferring real property as the power-loom shortened the process of weaving cloth; the assize system and the monopoly of higher judicial work by the London Courts creates the greatest possible amount of labour for the least possible result in judicial decisions; the vacations close nearly all the courts for a third of the year. . . . The barristers fix their own prices for work of which they have obtained a legal monopoly. . . . In both branches of the law every attempt is made, by the exaction of large fees for admission, to secure that entrance to the profession shall be confined to young "gentlemen".'

**The State
and
associations**

Owing to the growing complexities of social and economic life, the associations are likely to multiply and assume new functions. They may evoke fervent loyalty as areas of functional self-government, as buffers between personality and mechanization, and as means of endowing labour with a sense of pride and dignity. Pluralism points out that they are likely to exercise a great deal of regulation and to occupy a position somewhat analogous to that of political authority. In this context it is the State alone which can stand forth as the representative of the general interest, as the embodiment of the general will. The State should keep the groups in their proper place and restrain them from injuring the individual or general interest. Speaking of organizations, Figgis concedes that the coercive power of the State exists largely to regulate the groups and to ensure that they do not transgress the bounds of justice.¹ Ernest Barker has put the whole case in a classical passage. 'We see the State', he writes, 'less as an association of individuals in a common life: we see it more as an association of individuals already united in various groups each with its common life, in a further and higher group for a further and more embracing common purpose. . . . But our doctrine will not exempt such associations from the control of the State. The State, as a general and embracing

. . . The main body of the barristers themselves have no effective power against the little clique of elderly "benchers" of the Inns of Court who rule the bar.' *Our Social Heritage*, pp. 122-23. To Medical Councils the world owes a deep debt of gratitude, but even here 'the professional ideal of the "general practitioner" is based on the principle which Mr. Cole calls "identity". He aims at securing that every practitioner shall enjoy a local monopoly, made effective by an organized boycott of all pushing intruders; that within the area of his monopoly he shall carry out any treatment which he deems proper, without the necessity of keeping his knowledge up to date, or the possibility of expert criticism or discipline; and that when he retires he shall be able to sell his "practice" to the highest bidder.' *Ibid.*, p. 129.

¹ *Churches in the Modern State*, p. 49.

scheme of life, must necessarily adjust the relations of associations to itself, to other associations and to their own members—to itself, in order to maintain the integrity of its own scheme; to other associations, in order to preserve the equality of associations before the law; and to their own members, in order to preserve the individual from the possible tyranny of the group. . . . Any unqualified theory of the “inherent rights” of associations is likely to do as much harm as the unqualified theory of the inherent or natural rights of the individual man once did. . . . We see the State invited to retreat before the advance of the guild, the national group, the Church. Yet whatever rights such groups may claim or gain, the State will also gain, perhaps even more than it loses, because it will be forced to deal with ever graver and ever weightier problems of adjustment.¹

Social harmony In co-ordinating the policies and relations of groups and infusing them with the general interest, the State will assist the emergence of social harmony. It will fuse the divergent elements of social life into a working unity, supply the deficiencies here and there and assist the cause of all-round development. It is to furnish the comprehensive standpoint, knowledge and experience through which the truly social mind works.² The State is indispensable to the planned

¹ *Political Thought in England from Spencer to Today*, pp. 177-80, 183.

² The idealistic view of the integrating character of the State is thus expressed by M. P. Follett:

“The true State must gather up every interest within itself. It must take our many loyalties and find how it can make them one. I have all these different allegiances, I should indeed lead a divided and therefore uninteresting life if I could not unify them. . . . The true State has my devotion because it gathers up into itself the various sides of me, is the symbol of my multiple self, is my multiple self brought to significance, to self-realization. If you leave me with my plural selves, you leave me in desolate places, my soul craving its meaning, its home. The home of my

economy which the present conjuncture of development demands.

There is yet another standpoint from which the State now derives additional significance and importance. International co-operation and organization spell the end of the sovereign independence of the State but in no manner do they envisage the dissolution of the State. World organization is likely to increase in future and directly to touch the individual at some points, but so far as we can see there is little prospect of world institutions being directly representative of individuals. For most purposes the State is likely to form the connecting link between the citizen and the world. For geographical reasons we are likely to move towards internationalism rather than cosmopolitanism, a federal union rather than a centralized unit. How far this federation of the future will tend to unitarianism in the yet more distant future, it is not possible even dimly to forecast. It is, however, clear that for a long time to come internationalism rather than cosmopolitanism will hold the field. Here the State, interdependent and co-operative in character, is called upon to assist the self-realization of the citizens not merely of one country but directly or indirectly of the whole world. It has to take a hand in the formation and execution of plans of universal welfare and harmonize co-operation all round.

soul is in the State. But the true State does not "demand" my allegiance. It is the spontaneously uniting, the instinctive self-unifying of our multiple interests. . . .—*The New State*, pp. 312-13.

No group has an isolated sovereignty. 'It is like the individual, with a general will which is distinctive, but a will the purposes of which fall within the larger purposes of the State group.' Haldane, *Introduction* to M. P. Follett's *The New State*, p. viii. 'No one group can completely enfold me, and that is because of the multiplicity of my nature. Nor can any number of groups exhaust the capacity of the modern citizen.' *Ibid.*, p. xi.

**Personality
and
organization** In the new phase of development, social control is likely to be greater than ever before. Organization is likely to occupy a correspondingly larger place in social life. It is therefore doubly necessary to see that social control keeps true to its constructive role and is not perverted by ignorance or sectionalism into repression. Organization has a tendency to disregard personality and to maim it in the process of the division of labour in the social interest.¹ Another subtle danger consists in frequent failure to retain the vitality of ideas and institutions, so that they fall into a mechanical routine and, far from assisting the growth of self, serve to enslave the living to the dead. A burning faith has often turned into ritual and works, while creative epochs in art and literature have often been followed by long spans of imitation. It is the letter which killeth and the spirit which maketh alive. Instruction itself may be devitalized so as to defeat its object. 'The natural enemy of any subject', said William James, 'is the professor thereof.' Law and custom have sometimes been so fossilized as to foster stagnation instead of development and to smother individuality. Government has often become a dead routine of administration, an impersonal bureaucracy steeped in red tape. Political parties have here and there become veritable machines, fighting elections on empty catchwords.

**Problem of
social
control** Sooner or later, it is true, personality asserts itself, new forces compel movement and the long pent up cravings burst into revolution in the realm of politics, social adjustment, art, literature or religion. But the cost of revolutions is often heavy and the baneful consequences of the preceding obstruction can never be made up for those who lived under it. The problem is how to associate social control with a capacity for continuous adaptation, an ever-active motive for humanitarian welfare and a vital regard for personality.

¹ *Supra*, ch. iv.

Science and
social control

This object can be achieved by two means—the infusion of social control with science and its democratization. The two may at first sight appear inconsistent with each other, but if enlightenment could be diffused among the people they would be seen to be, as they really are, complementary. It is the entire range of social regulation which has to be informed by the scientific spirit, and that is possible only with a large supply of scientific ability and a general appreciation of its value. From Plato onwards philosophy has dreamt of government by philosopher-kings or academies of scholars and scientists.¹ But the dream could not materi-

¹ 'Until philosophers are kings,' said Plato, 'or the kings and princes of this world have the spirit and power of philosophy, and political greatness and wisdom meet in one . . . cities will never cease from ill—no, nor the human race.'

In his *Project to Perfect the Government of States* the Abbé de Saint Pierre ascribed the shortcomings of Governments to the fact that its science had failed to attract the best talent to its service. Accordingly, he stressed the foundation of a political academy to cultivate the science of government and to advise ministers of State on all questions of public welfare. In his *Observations on the Continuous Progress of Universal Reason*, the Abbé makes the arresting remark that one of the handicaps to progress consisted in the jealousy of rulers who were afraid that progress in the science of politics might prove dangerous to them. For outlines of various cognate projects, see J. B. Bury, *History of the Idea of Progress*.

Saint-Simon would have, in his proposed parliament, (1) a House of Invention, consisting of civil engineers, architects, sculptors, poets and musicians. This should present projects of law which should be examined and passed upon by (2) the House of Examination consisting of physicists and mathematicians. Finally they were to be adopted by (3) the House of Execution consisting of the captains of industry. He believed that under his system society would be 'organized'—that is to say, it would be a true association instead of a confused mass of struggling and hostile groups and individuals.

Proudhon who yearned for the abolition of the 'brute engine' of political government would none the less establish social con-

alize because the importance of knowledge in the seats of authority was not generally understood. Social philosophy has had a share in social control; but sometimes it has been a mere Cassandra and 'pedantocracy' has been considered as a synonym for impracticable and eccentric idealism.

It is possible to transform the technique of social control, *pari passu* with the realization of a higher standard of life, the advance of the social sciences, and the diffusion of enlightenment.

Technique
of social
control

Public opinion should insist on a thorough intellectual grounding and scientific training in all public functionaries, including industrial entrepreneurs, members of all political bodies, civil servants, party leaders, journalists, etc. Advisory committees and chambers including trained experts can be associated with all legislatures and administrative departments in international, national and local government, to supply up-to-date knowledge, to conduct investigations in a scientific manner and to think out plans. Academies and universities can independently offer solutions of fundamental problems confronting the community.

trol on the basis of science. He wrote: 'Every question of domestic politics must be decided by departmental statistics; every question of foreign politics is a question of international statistics. The science of government rightly belongs to one of the sections of the Academy of Sciences, whose permanent secretary is necessarily prime minister; and since every citizen may address a memoir to the Academy, every citizen is a legislator. But the opinion of no one is of any value until its truth has been proven, nobody can substitute his will for reason—nobody is king.' Nor has this note been wanting in literature with a more practical bent. Lester F. Ward argued that executive policy be determined by the advice of a body of sociologists who would investigate the problems of society through statistical measurement and recommend measures and policies according to sociological principles. Cf. *The Psychic Factors of Civilization*, pp. 309-27; *Dynamic Sociology*, ii, pp. 245 ff.

Science and government The movement towards the association of science with government has made a little headway and is lifting difficult problems from the plane of humdrum politics and haphazard opinion to that of scientific inquiry and settlement. It has already yielded a few notable results, for instance, in the realm of international affairs. The plans associated with the names of General Dawes (1924) and Mr. Young (1929) for the payment of War Reparations by Germany were the handiwork of experts and were used by statesmen to tide over difficulties which diplomatic negotiations and conferences, threats and military sanctions had only aggravated. Whatever success the League of Nations and the International Labour Organization have achieved in the electric atmosphere of the post-war world is largely the outcome of the association of the trained knowledge and judgement of scientists with the Transit, Health, Opium, and other organizations. In national administrations commissions and committees of inquiry include experts and are now supplemented by regular advisory committees consisting partly of experts in France, England and elsewhere. Economic Councils for the investigation of special economic problems have been established during the last ten years in France, Germany, Italy, Poland, Belgium, Czecho-Slovakia, Spain and Great Britain, and constitute a modified application of the same principle. It is, however, necessary to systematize the procedure all round so as to transfer social problems to the largest extent possible from the domain of party controversy and lobbying to that of scientific investigation and scientific planning. Government will thus acquire a high degree of flexibility and ready adaptability without impairing its efficiency.¹

¹ Sending the chemist Lavoisier to the guillotine, Robespierre remarked: 'Science is aristocratic: the Republic has no need of savants.' No politician will sympathize with that attitude today.

Democratization

The infusion of the scientific spirit into the agencies of social control, including public opinion, is one of the prime needs of the present complex world order. Next in importance stands the need of democratizing the institutions. Democratization is likely to enhance the adaptability of organs of control, keep them true to the constructive role and offset the shortcomings of *expertise*. The possessors of power are liable to legislate and administer in terms of their own experience and aspirations and to equate their own welfare with the general welfare. Governments have often become narrow and exclusive and failed to avail themselves of a substantial part of the knowledge, judgement, and public spirit in the community. New intellectual and social influences, instead of being integrated harmoniously into the mechanism of control, have been driven into opposition and revolt until they have forced themselves into authority. But in the absence of a wide basis of democracy they have in their turn fallen into a narrow rut.

Scope for democracy

Democratization is likely to place vast resources of intellectual and moral power at the disposal of social and political institutions and to make them responsive to all the needs and interests of the community. The democratic principle has never yet had a fair chance in politics because of militarism, general poverty and ignorance and difficulties of communication. Now that it is possible for the world to outgrow these obstacles, it is also possible in the same proportion to bring a genuine democracy into being on a large scale.

It is one of the signs of the times that the British Labour Party stated in the course of a manifesto on 'Labour and the New Social Order', 1918, that 'in the still undeveloped science of society, the Labour Party stands for increased study, for the scientific investigation of each succeeding problem, for the deliberate organization of research and for a much more rapid dissemination among the whole people of all the science that exists'.

The principal difficulty lies in the period of transition when democratization precedes the complete realization of the conditions which are indispensable to a full-fledged political democracy. **Transition to democracy** The crux of the matter is that democratization helps to bring about those very conditions on which genuine democracy depends and that without it the adverse conditions tend to persist. Even partial democracy makes for quicker progress towards peace, enlightenment, and economic welfare than other forms of regulation. Unless the people are absolutely apathetic to the *res publica*, democratization forms the most feasible transition to complete democracy in the deeper sense of the term. It certainly involves a great deal of trial and error, mistakes in policy, corruption of polling booths, perversion of legislatures and occasional set-backs. Modern history is full of examples of these risks. But at the same time there are compensating advantages in the public awakening, moral elevation and general amelioration. Besides, democracy has a way of curing its excesses through slow readjustment, and through sudden assertions of public opinion. Sooner or later the cause of law, order and good government is espoused by the commonsense of the community and the experience is not always lost to posterity. The democratic process starts again and the net gain is greater than under tutelage. For tutelage tends to perpetuate itself by inhibiting the free exercise of the talents and energies which alone can supplant it.

CHAPTER XVI

DEMOCRATIC GOVERNMENT

SINCE the French Revolution popular government has been one of the burning questions and has occupied a conspicuous place in political philosophy.

Popular government The passions which it has roused have, however, obscured some of the main aspects of the problem and led to uncritical laudation and condemnation of democratic government. It is necessary to re-examine the essential points in the light of historical experience and the conclusions of the social sciences.

It is desirable to distinguish negative from positive democracy in the realm of government. We have seen that social control is permeated by the democratic principle in the sense that it must subserve some basic needs of the community, that it must respect some popular ideals, that it must conform to certain popular standards, and that it must be based on a certain measure of popular goodwill. No government can last long unless it refrains from invading the cherished ways of life, unless it keeps up to a minimum of efficiency and service and unless it commands popular acquiescence to a certain degree. Negative democracy has thus been a permanent feature of government in the sense that popular ideals, standards and habits have generally prohibited the rulers from certain courses of action.

Next, every government must be able to command the active support of a certain section of the people. Force by itself cannot sustain a government for long. As Talleyrand said, you can do anything with bayonets except sit on them. The most absolute of monarchs must rely on the willing support of a class for the recruitment of his armies and civil services

Consent as the basis of government

and for the execution of his decrees. The most exclusive of oligarchies must cultivate the goodwill of a wider circle. Again, when all allowance has been made for the support of armies and groups, the fact remains that the durability of every government depends on a certain measure of general consent, active or passive. It is this element in the character of government or rather of the State of which government is the executive organ, which Kant and specially Hegel, and after them, T. H. Green and Bosanquet, made the foundation of the idealistic theory of the State.

Criticism of Idealism The appeal of Idealism has been due primarily to this truth in its basis. But it has built itself so largely on the negative elements of democracy that it has tended to glorify them to the neglect of the positive elements. It has developed a conservative outlook so that S. G. Hobson stigmatizes it, though not with absolute justice, as part of the tactics of conservatism.

Positive democracy Positive democracy, in the sense of active participation in the management of common affairs, has been fairly frequent in a limited form. Slaves or serfs, the lower castes or classes, women and often immigrants were in former times generally excluded from share in power; but subject to these restrictions there has been a good deal of democratic government, within limits in localities. The village in India (specially in the south) and in China, the *mir* in Russia, the commune or township in Europe, consisting mostly of peasants of the same economic standing and mental calibre, long managed local affairs on democratic lines. Nor has functional democracy been rare in history. In the east as well as in the west, guilds have been democratic in their constitution.¹ Modern trade unions, medical councils, bar associations, and other professional bodies have transacted

¹ Cf. Radhakamal Mukerji, *Democracies of the East*.

their affairs generally on democratic principles. In India castes have always had their local gatherings which have been absolutely democratic and which, within their limits, have often exercised a great deal of authority, occasionally usurping some functions of the State.

Outside the spheres of local and functional government, the democratic principle has not had much vogue. The central government of territories was not democratic partly because of the difficulties of communication and partly because the masses were steeped in poverty, illiteracy and self-abasement and were torn by mutual discord and distrust. The field was clear for government by the few who were wealthier, better educated and organized, and when these or their head abused the power, the remedy was their replacement by another set through conspiracy or revolt. Political history is thus, partly, a succession of dynasties, aristocracies, wars and dissensions. Occasionally a favourable conjuncture of events admitted the democratic principle into the central government of States but the basic difficulties were so great that it never had a fair chance. Thus Athens which has become a byword for democracy had an adult citizen population of about 40,000, as against about 45,000 unfranchised adult alien residents and 80,000 slaves.¹ Strictly speaking, Athens was an oligarchy; at any rate, her democratic character had very serious limitations. Militarism and inequalities never allowed democracy even as much chance in Rome as it had at Athens. It is only in modern times that the democratic principle has been admitted into central governments through successive extensions of the franchise to the point of adult suffrage and through the dependence of the executive on popular representatives or directly on election and ultimately on public opinion.

Democracy
and central
government

¹ Professor Ernest Barker's estimate.

Modern democratic government has not, on the whole, proved a failure. It can certainly boast of solid achievements in popular welfare, but its working has not been altogether smooth and has not fulfilled all the expectations that had been formed of it. The experiment has been tried, in the modern as in the ancient world, in the midst of an unfavourable environment—militarism, poverty, ignorance and social discord. The foundations have been weak and the inevitable shortcomings and defects, together with the comparative novelty of this form of government, have brought odium on the democratic principle itself. Long ago Plato spoke of 'the passions and desires' of that 'huge and powerful brute, how to approach and handle it, at what times it becomes fiercest and most gentle, on what occasions it utters its several cries, and what sounds made by others soothe or irritate it'. In modern literature democracy has sometimes been equated with 'the Nemesis of Mediocrity'¹ and 'the Cult of Incompetence'.² It has been held to be detrimental to public morals and manners. Faguet concludes that 'rudeness' is democratic, and that politeness is anti-democratic, because democracy recognizes no superiority and has no sympathy with respect and personal devotion. Sir Henry Maine was afraid that popular government would not only destroy the stability of government but also check progress and inaugurate an era of Chinese stagnation. Lecky regarded democracy as too meddling and anti-

¹ De Tocqueville concluded that democracy led to a dead level of mediocrity. Cf. Ralph Adams Cram: 'Democracy has achieved its perfect work and has now reduced all mankind to a dead level of incapacity where great leaders are no longer wanted or brought into existence, while society is unable, of its own power as a whole, to lift itself from the nadir of its uniformity.'—*The Nemesis of Mediocrity*.

² Cf. E. Faguet who observes ironically that universal suffrage is 'an excellent thing. It is a source of information. When it recommends a certain course of action, it shows us that it is a thing which we must not do'.

thetical to liberty. Sir James Fitzjames Stephen upheld the principle of authority imposed from above and felt that democracy would not only be grossly inefficient but also throw power into the hands of a few manipulators. Universal suffrage, he was convinced, tended to invert the true and natural relation between wisdom and folly. Bismarck scoffed at democracy as 'blubbing sentimentality'. A formidable catalogue of failings is drawn up by Freiherr von Hexenküchen who condemns democracy as 'infirm of purpose, jealous, grudging, timid, changeable, unthorough, unready, without foresight, obscure in its aims, blundering along in an age of lucidity, guided only by a faltering and confused instinct.'¹ It seemed to Nietzsche that 'democracy is not only a degenerating form of political organization; it is also equivalent to a degenerating, declining type of man'.

Psychologically, all these criticisms are based on a low estimate of the populace, for which indeed the historical conditions afford some warrant. But in the heat of the controversy the sins of the multitude have been magnified and regarded, without any adequate evidence, as innate or ineradicable. Wholesale indictments of the populace have often buttressed anti-democratic theories. David Hume who was a Tory in politics declared that every man should be held to be a knave. His contemporary Voltaire would admit the suitability of republican government only to small countries and compared the people to oxen 'which need a yoke, a goad and hay'. He preferred to obey a fine lion, much stronger than two hundred rats of his own species. In the last century many writers condemned the people as 'an unmoral beast', or as essentially hateful. 'The mass is always idiotic.' 'The people is an eternal infant, and will always be the last in the hierarchy of social elements.'

¹ Quoted in F. J. C. Hearnshaw, *Democracy at the Crossways*, p. 69.

The low view of the mass of humanity has been countenanced by some recent eugenic hypotheses which depreciate the influence of training and education and damp all hope of raising the mass to a high level of intellectual and moral cultivation. Francis Galton indeed declared that eugenics deals 'with all the influences that improve the inborn qualities of the race and develop them to the utmost advantage'. But the most pronounced practical tendency of eugenics has been to concentrate on innate quality as the all-important factor in life. 'Experimentally and statistically', says Woods, 'there is not a grain of proof that ordinary environment can alter the salient mental and moral traits in any measurable degree from what they were predetermined to be through innate influences.' Another writer argues that hygiene, education, etc., are but 'fleeting palliatives at best, which in postponing but augment the difficulties they profess to solve. . . . Permanent progress is a question of breeding rather than of pedagogics; a matter of gametes, not of training'.¹ It is assumed that the stress of life brings the more capable to the top and that social stratification tends to represent the distribution of natural abilities more or less accurately. Some have concluded that no serious effort need be made to ameliorate the condition of the masses through economic improvement and education. Poverty is even held to possess a eugenic value 'helping as it does to hasten the extinction of stocks which are unequal to the burdens of civilization'. In any case the inferior stocks must be kept in their proper place, a hypothesis which leads logically to something like the caste system. 'Let there be a ladder from class to class, and occupation to occupation, but let it not be a very easy ladder to climb; great ability (as Faraday) will get up, and that is all that is socially advantageous.' As enunciated by Lapouge, the eugenic programme includes the establishment of special

¹ R. C. Punnett, *Mendelism*.

distinct castes and the creation of a race for universal domination. If, however, the argument were pushed to its logical conclusion, it would lead not so much to the dogma of class superiority as to the cult of the superman—a cult which found forceful expression in Nietzsche's work bearing the appropriate title *Beyond Good and Evil*.¹

In ultimate analysis the case against democracy rests on the assumption of innate incapacity of the mass of the people to put forth the intelligence, wisdom, character and organization which government demands. The broader aspects of this hypothesis have already been discussed from the ethnological point of view. But it is desirable to sum up the scientific position from the political point of view.

The vogue of eugenics rests partly on the undoubted fact that there are some congenital idiots, lunatics and confirmed criminals and that it is desirable, in the social interest, to prevent them from propagating. To this extent, negative eugenics has a solid basis. But beyond this it is difficult, in the present state of our knowledge, to be sure about any of its hypotheses, much less to build social relationships on them. Critics have rightly pointed out that eugenicists have not usually observed the caution necessary in applying the results of experiments on guinea-pigs, chickens and

¹ 'Good is no longer good when one's neighbour takes it into his mouth. And how could there be a common good? The expression contradicts itself: that which can be common is always of small value. In the end things must be as they are and always have been—the great things remain for the great, the abysses for the profound, the delicacies and thrills for the refined, and to sum up shortly, everything rare for the rare.' Again: 'The general welfare is no ideal, no goal, no notion that can be at all grasped, but is only a nostrum—what is fair to one *may not* be at all fair to another, the requirement of one morality for all is really a detriment to higher men, in short, there is a *distinction of rank* between man and man and consequently between morality and morality.'—Nietzsche.

salamanders, not to speak of sweet peas, to human characteristics. Now all that Weismann demonstrated was that the germ plasm descended intact, and there was nothing in his experiments to warrant the conclusion that the potentialities contained in the germ plasm were not influenced in each individual case by the experiences of life. We cannot yet be sure to what degree and in what manner the potentialities and tendencies in the germ plasm react to environmental factors. There is considerable force in the contention of a high scientific authority that earlier geneticists made the mistake of regarding physical and even psychic traits as unit characters, that according to our present knowledge scores of thousands of genetic factors enter into man, that their interaction with one another, with the egg cytoplasm and the blood stream is responsible for embryonic development, that this development is so plastic as to admit of the production of different traits under the influence of different environments. Professor Jennings puts the matter emphatically: 'More properly, characteristics are not inherited at all; what one inherits is certain material, that under certain conditions will produce a particular characteristic: if these conditions are not supplied, some other characteristic is produced.'¹ In the second place eugenic writers have often failed to distinguish clearly between the qualities which pertain to the germ plasm and those which are psycho-social. There are ethical or social traits which are not carried along in the germ plasm but which are inherited through imitation and education. In the third place it is difficult, in the face of our institutions of inheritance and limitations of opportunity, to maintain that there is any correlation between wealth or enlightenment and quality.² On the

¹ *The Scientific Monthly*, September 1924.

² Madison Grant, *The Passing of the Great Race* (1916), declares that 'modern anthropology has demonstrated that racial lines are not only absolutely independent of both national and linguistic groupings, but that in many cases these racial lines cut through

other hand, the poor and ignorant often display a great deal of kindness and generosity and the sterner qualities which enable them to face risks and hardships. Fourthly it is impossible to dogmatize on the value of any particular traits of mind and character. They can be so integrated into different personalities as to favour very different results. Eccentricities may be allied to genius or to insanity, and courage may be deeply social or flagrantly anti-social in its consequences. The scale of values has changed from time to time and place to place. Galton was content to fasten on qualities which led to certain types of success in a transient phase of a single civilization. Scientifically, we cannot be sure what strains are best worth preserving, or best deserving of power. Nothing can be more hazardous than to improve humanity on the basis of eugenic programmes, beyond those restrictions on propagation which negative eugenics clearly warrants. The caste system has had a long trial in India and elsewhere and offers a warning rather than an example. To create fresh castes on the

them at sharp angles and correspond closely with the divisions of social cleavage'. Such a demonstration would establish innate differences among races as well as among different classes in the same nation but no such demonstration is to be found in scientific literature on anthropology.

William McDougall, in his Lowell Lecture on 'Anthropology and History, or the Influence of Anthropologic Constitution on the Destinies of Nations', tries to prove that American social stratification is 'positively correlated with a corresponding stratification of innate moral and intellectual quality'. Again, 'every human being, every community of human beings, every populace, inherits from its ancestry a stock of innate qualities which enable it to enjoy, to sustain, to promote, a civilization of a certain degree of complexity.' Criticizing such views, Professor Raymond Pearl has said that eugenics has fallen into disrepute 'because of the ill-advised zeal with which some of its more ardent devotees have assigned such complex and heterogeneous phenomena as poverty, insanity, crime, prostitution, cancer, etc., to the operation of either single genes or to other simple and utterly hypothetical Mendelian mechanisms'.

basis of the supposed inheritance of supposed superiorities is neither desirable nor practicable in the modern age.

In the present state of our knowledge the only position scientifically tenable is that the environment largely determines the unfolding of capacities and that education and opportunity are likely to raise the human average to the level which has so far been attained only by the favoured few. There is no valid psychological ground for pessimism in regard to the mass or the multitude—their capacity for knowledge, judgement, organization and social efficiency. Whether a people should have a democratic form of government is a question which admits of no general answer, specially during the interval which must elapse before the abolition of poverty, ignorance and militarism. It is the sum total of the environment of a given country and age which must determine the suitability of any form of government. Here every test must be pragmatic rather than absolute. But so far as general conclusions are permissible it is clear that the monarchic and aristocratic forms of government are becoming less and less suited to the modern intellectual and political climate, that democracy is better adapted to present conditions and that mixed forms of government with an increasing democratic element promise best to tide over the difficulties of the transition to full democracy.

Monarchy flourishes best in ages in which it can appeal as something mysterious to the popular mind.

Mystery of monarchy It was a correct appreciation of political psychology that led to the theory of the divine right of kings. Hindu political theory raised the king to super-human heights. For instance, the *Mahabharata* compares him to gods—Indra, Yama, Aditya and Vaishravana. 'The very gods do not disregard a righteous king who is truly an eternal god.' The king should be obeyed, gratified and worshipped, for to slight him is to lose the fruit of all gifts, libations and offerings to the *pitris*, the ancestral

gods.¹ Manu, the greatest of the Hindu lawgivers, declares kinship to be divine in origin and holds that the king is composed out of the internal particles of seven gods.² Among the Persians, the great king was looked upon as a veritable god. The Romans raised temples to the Emperor and literally worshipped his image. During the Middle Ages and later, the king posed as divine.³ Joseph de Maistre who upheld monarchical sovereignty felt that there was a mystery in the State which mortal intelligence could not penetrate. To this attitude of mind the progress and application of science in the modern age have ceased to be favourable not only in the west but also in the east, and the monarchical institution has lost one of its strongest supports. Many autocratic crowns have made way for republics during the last thirty years. Constitutional monarchs still remain as the dignified heads of parliamentary democracies but the world has outgrown the kingship as the practical embodiment of the State.

There is indeed one exceptional conjuncture of circumstances in which the monarchy, permanent or temporary, still has a function to perform. Chronic dissensions bordering on civil war within the community may render parliamentarism unworkable and may fix the gaze on the king or the dictator

Utility of the monarchy

¹ *Santi Parva*, lxxv, lxxvii, lxxii.

² *Manu*, vii, 3-12. Cf. *Sukraniti*, trans. B. K. Sarkar, pp. 1, 2, 4, 11.

³ Cf. *The Fundamental Laws of the Russian Empire* promulgated on 6 May 1906, Article 4: 'The Emperor of all the Russias wields the supreme autocratic power. To obey his authority, not only through fear but for the sake of conscience, is ordered by God himself.'

James I of England (1603-25) in *The True Law of Free Monarchies* tried to prove from scripture and from law, natural and human, that kings ruled by divine right. 'It is atheism and blasphemy to dispute what God can do . . .' said he, 'so it is presumption and high contempt in a subject to dispute what a king can do or say that a king cannot do this or that.'

as the Messiah. In such a background it is possible to understand why von Stein believed that the monarchy was the purest embodiment of the principle of liberty and that it had sustained the interest of the oppressed against the oppressors. Hegel went further and held that the monarchic power was the only really philosophic principle of sovereignty. But the monarchy, as a remedy for civil discord, exhausts its efficacy as enlightenment dissolves the racial or religious prejudices and as the fundamental issues of removing poverty and ignorance come to the forefront. Besides, there is the risk of autocracy allying itself with a faction or silently countenancing the disunion from which it derives nourishment. Montesquieu discerned that education was contrary to the principles of despotism.

The shortcomings of representation and parliamentarism have often imparted to the monarchical principle a fresh appeal. Carlyle regarded parliamentarism as 'a self-cancelling business', as 'nothing except emptiness' and as 'paralytic', and equated manhood suffrage with Horsehood and Doghood Ditto. 'There is in every community', he said, 'a fittest, a wisest, bravest, best; whom could we find and make king over us, all were in very truth well.' But how are we to find him? Here at least the prophet was true to his gospel of silence.¹ Real popular election would mean an approach towards democracy of the presidential

¹ 'To discover the perfect ruler for human society,' said Rousseau, 'we must find a superior intelligence who has seen all the passions of man but has experienced none of them, who has had no sort of relations with our nature but who knows it to the core, whose happiness is not dependent on us, but who wishes to promote our welfare, in a word, one who aims at a distant renown, in a remote future, and who is content to labour in one age and to enjoy it another.' Such an ideal cannot perhaps be satisfied under any political conditions but an approach is possible only in the case of such high statesmanship as democracy may be able to throw up.

type and would imply qualities of judgement which, except in emergencies, would suffice for democratic government itself. If on the other hand the ideal king were sought in an hereditary dynasty, history has proved that genius is not always transmitted from father to son. Sooner or later the sceptre falls into unworthy or incapable hands and the round of tyranny, intrigue, conspiracy and revolt begins. Hereditary succession is the weakest point of the monarchical institution, while the theory of elective monarchy means periodical civil war, as in the Roman Empire and in Islamic countries.

One-man rule has often such a narrow basis that it is constantly haunted by a sense of insecurity and
Tyranny often led into a course of repression in self-defence. Long ago Aristotle summed up 'the ancient prescriptions for the preservation of a tyranny', the unconstitutional monarchy of the Greeks. 'The tyrant', he wrote, 'should lop off those who are too high; he must put to death men of spirit; he must not allow common meals, clubs, education and the like; he must be upon his guard against anything which is likely to inspire either courage or confidence among his subjects; he must prohibit literary assemblies or other meetings for discussion, and he must take every means to prevent people from knowing one another (for acquaintance begets mutual confidence). . . . Another art of the tyrant is to sow quarrels among the citizens; friends should be embroiled with friends, the people with the notables, and the rich with one another. Also he should impoverish his subjects; he thus provides money for the support of his guards, and the people, having to keep hard at work, are prevented from conspiring. . . . The tyrant is also fond of making war in order that his subjects may have something to do and be always in want of a leader. . . . Tyrants are always fond of bad men, because they love to be flattered. . . .'¹ Tacitus accused

¹ Cf. Machiavelli, *The Prince*.

a working harmony. He professes to function as the embodiment of national unity. In this respect the dictatorship performs the function which the monarchy, or tyrannis of the Greek type, has often performed before. Thirdly the dictatorship may represent a social doctrine, a plan of reform, altogether a new way of life, a totalitarian philosophy, such as Bolshevism or Fascism, or sheer modernism as in Turkey and, for a brief interval, in Afghanistan. Here then appears the principle of the enlightened despotism, reinforced by the modern resources of technique and propaganda and doubly liable to be entangled with a rigid creed. The modern dictatorship has reproduced certain features of a theocracy like that of Savonarola or Calvin. Thus the dictatorship attempts to impose solutions of some problems from above. It rests on the principle of tutelage and presupposes an imperfectly developed mentality and appreciation of liberty. It marks a reaction against the administrative drawbacks, specially the dilatoriness of the parliamentarism inherited from the nineteenth century. Fourthly the modern dictatorship attempts in some cases to improve the condition of the masses by providing order and security, better means of sanitation, communication and economic amelioration, and by diffusing, though also controlling, education. In this respect it marks the continuation, in its own peculiar manner, of certain features of the democratic process. So long as militarism, nationalistic fervour, social intolerance and intellectual backwardness endure, there will remain a possibility of constitutional government lapsing into dictatorship. But unless the latter quickly makes room for democracy, the dictatorship will reproduce the shortcomings which historical experience associates with one-man rule. A succession of capable dictators is an inherent difficulty. The inevitable insecurity of its basis may prompt repression at home and questionable adventures abroad. There is the additional risk of a narrow creed being pushed too far, of the liberty of thought, expression and association being

stified and the stature of the people being dwarfed. Besides, the dictatorship rests on the horns of a dilemma. Unless it improves the condition of the people it would soon forfeit public support. If it carries out economic and educational reform, it is outgrown by the people. It toys with war but military defeat may seal its fate. By its very nature, the dictatorship is incapable of furnishing an effective solution of the political problem. Its appeal would diminish as parliamentarism improves its procedure and administrative mechanism.

**Case for
democracy** Negatively, the case for democratic government is that under present conditions no better alternative is open to mankind. In spite of its failings, it is, as a rule, the most appropriate form of government for modern times. In the logical sequence of evolution, it leapt into vogue when government had become more complicated and had begun to touch life at more points than ever before and when the environment had begun to alter quickly. Democracy is informative¹ and is the only conduit for social forces that is at all adequate in modern times. It admits the will of all members into the determination of social policy, secures the representation of all views and feelings and is therefore more responsive to social and economic changes. It taps sources of political talent which lie beyond the purview of other systems of government. It is best qualified constantly to adjust the supply of control to social need and favours a wholesome social equilibrium. It deepens the sense of social obligation.²

¹ This point is conceded by E. Faguet, who writes: 'A democratic element is required in the government of a people because it is very dangerous that the people should be an enigma. It is necessary to know what it thinks, what it feels, what it suffers, what it desires, what it fears, what it hopes, and all this can be learnt only from the people itself.'

² 'Self-government', says L. T. Hobhouse, 'is the natural instrument of a growing sense of social solidarity, and the appropriate organ of a stirring national life. In a word, it is the

**Mixed
forms of
government**

So long as wealth and enlightenment are not widely diffused, the extension of the franchise is likely to result in a combination of the democratic with aristocratic and plutocratic principles in government. Democracy may for long remain a matter of degree and raise its own crop of difficult problems. Fortunately it is capable of supplying its greatest needs—flexibility and inventiveness—and tiding over the incidental dangers. As in the case of Switzerland, democratization may help the harmonization of diverse elements in the body politic. Electorates which are scarcely capable of correct judgement on political details often display sagacity in choosing men or parties for offices and legislatures and in saying Yes or No to broad questions of domestic and foreign policy. When all allowance has been made, the fact remains that the common man has a contribution to make to politics in the shape of common sense. The working of the parliamentary system serves often to bring issues in a simplified form before the electorate. If it is true that government gravitates into the hands of the few, a democracy is, under present conditions, best qualified to evolve that aristocracy of talent and service of which Saint-Simon and others have dreamt.¹

political expression of the idea of Right on which the modern State rests.'—*Liberalism*, pp. 228-32.

¹ Cf. Aristotle: 'There is a manner of combining democracy and aristocracy—which consists in so arranging matters that both the distinguished citizens and the masses have what they want. The right of every man to aspire to magisterial appointments is a democratic principle, but the admission of distinguished citizens only is an aristocratic principle.'

Cf. Pericles: 'It is true that we are called a democracy, for the administration is in the hands of the many and not of the few. But while the law secures equal justice to all alike in their private disputes, the claim of excellence is also recognized.'—*The Funeral Oration*.

'Democracy', said Mazzini, 'is the progress of all through all under the leading of the best and wisest.'—*The Duties of Man*.

Achievements of democracy

No country has yet achieved democracy in the fuller and deeper sense of the term. The Governments which have assumed a democratic form have worked against heavy odds and imperfections of the environment. Nevertheless, partially democratic Governments already have a record of achievement behind them. They have facilitated the emergence or maintenance of conditions more favourable to self-realization than what the countries in question had known before. They have been instrumental in raising the standard of life in North America, Western Europe and the British Dominions. The progress of democratization has been partly responsible for the diffusion and improvement of education, for the widening of opportunity and for rousing aspirations for a higher life. The democratic experiment has raised the stature of the ordinary citizen and enhanced the dignity of man as man. It has not yet succeeded in stamping out war but it is not its fault that scientific inventions have added new terrors to warfare. The fact remains that under its auspices the abolition of war and armaments has for the first time been brought within the range of practical discussion. It has certainly offered scope for corruption, hypocritical promises and flattery of the electorate; but history shows that corruption and sycophancy had an easier and longer run in non-democratic regimes. However faulty a legislative chamber may be, an ante-chamber is worse, as Cavour said. If modern dictatorships can boast of some achievements, it is because they have had a

'No one can have had some years' experience of the conduct of affairs in a legislature or an administration without observing how extremely small is the number of persons by whom the world is governed.'—J. Bryce, *Modern Democracies*, ii, p. 542. Also: 'The time-hallowed classification of forms of government divides them into monarchies, oligarchies and democracies. In reality there is only one form of government. That form is the Rule of the Few.'—*American Political Science Review*, iii, p. 18.

Cf. also W. H. Mallock, *Limits of Pure Democracy*, who argues that the oligarchic principle permeates every domain of life.

democratic flavour about them, because they have adopted some democratic forms and because they have taken up some of the ideas and programmes which had grown up under democratic auspices.

It was only natural that democracy should function most smoothly in countries which are comparatively free from militarism and from extremes of wealth and poverty. For instance Switzerland is one of the most democratic States in the world. Its Government is purer and more efficient than that of most autocracies in historical times. Under democratic auspices Switzerland has raised the intellectual and economic average of the citizen body to a level not yet attained by most other countries.

Democratic ideas have been gaining ground among non-European races, specially during the last thirty years. There is no reason to doubt that in Asia and Africa democratization will prove on the whole as beneficial as anywhere else. It has already been pointed out that the theories of inherent disabilities of races and classes are built on foundations of sand. Yet the belief in the inherent incapacity of certain peoples for self-government is still so widely prevalent as to constitute one of the chief obstacles to world progress. It is partly the intellectualized expression of group pride and ascendancy and partly a hasty generalization on the basis of limited experience. It stands on a par with many other convictions which history has exploded. For instance, autocrats and oligarchs were convinced for long that all peoples, Western or Eastern, were unfitted for self-government and that democracy was a synonym for anarchy. The Greeks concluded from their experience that democracy was a function of the small City State, or rather that only a small State could be a true State.¹ Their political categories forbade them to imagine that a large

¹ 'Ten men are too few for a State, one hundred thousand are too many.' Aristotle.

community could conduce to good life, much less that it could, through the devices of representation, organize itself on democratic principles. The incidents of French history after the Revolution led many to dogmatize that the French were temperamentally incapable of self-government. Yet the Third République constitutes a practical refutation of the charge. Latin America has been cited to prove the futility of imposing democracy on those unfitted for it. Yet in spite of grave difficulties inherited from the past, democratic principles are forging the way to success in Argentina, Brazil and Chile. To quote Bryce, 'those who understand what South America had been under the Viceroy and what she was when she emerged from the long struggle for independence will not despond of her future'.¹ Forebodings about the incapacity of Asiatic or African peoples for self-government are likely to prove as baseless as those about the various nations of the western world. As a matter of fact, political democracy is only an extension of the principle of group or local self-government which has been in operation among all peoples. It is a question not of inherent capacity but of a peaceful environment, opportunity, education and economic progress.

The historical perspective Democratic government is part of the wider process of the development of man. It signifies the coming of age of peoples and is an aspect of their rise to the opportunities which culture, science and organization have unfolded. It is the political counterpart of the process which the scientific revolution has accelerated. Historically, it means that man is outgrowing the institutions which the older economy of want, toil and conflict set up and which have now lost their validity. The moral implication is that control is to be more and more internal, and that authority is to be replaced more and more by responsibility..

¹ *Modern Democracies*, i, p. 232.

CHAPTER XVII

THE MACHINERY OF THE DEMOCRATIC STATE

DEMOCRACY is a principle of social life, a mental attitude, a *Weltanschauung*.¹ It can find adequate political expression only by adapting to its own purposes institutions which arose to meet the requirements of other forms of government.

Democracy
and machinery
of government

One of the reasons which account for the failure of democracy or rather of parliamentarism in several countries is that an outworn machinery of government was allowed to impede and pervert the application of the democratic principle. The advent of democracy was due largely to the same causes that led to a change in the character of government itself. The latter ceased to be predominantly negative and acquired a more and more positive role. That in itself called for an overhauling of the political mechanism. Now it is as impossible as futile to lay down a rigid constitution for a democratized world. None can foresee the exact character of the institutions which are likely to grow up when peace, enlightenment and economic welfare have been universalized. In any case, a great deal of variety is inevitable from place to place and age to age. But it is clear that the present stage in political evolution calls for some change of a general character in the scheme of government. It is one of the symptoms of the new age that administration now occupies the minds of the acutest of political thinkers.

¹ Sir Henry Maine, *Popular Government*, p. 59, regarded democracy as 'simply and solely a form of government'. James Russell Lowell also said that 'democracy is nothing more than an experiment in government'.

There are four principles to which the new government should conform. In the first place it should be so designed as to associate science with all its policies. Secondly it should subserve the ends of international regulation and co-operation and yet be able to adapt the execution of international or national projects to local needs. Thirdly it should be capable of continuous adjustment to changing conditions. Fourthly it should be able to reconcile large-scale organization with the expression of personality in politics.

Principles of the new government These principles involve a fresh estimate of the value of local self-government. It has rightly been held that local self-government is the training ground of democracy, that it is an invaluable antidote against the bureaucratic spirit, and that it facilitates an informed discussion and appropriate solution of local problems. Neighbourhood organization is eminently fitted to teach the creative use of leisure, to encourage a consciously creative life all round. The perfect unit of self-government is a familiar environment in which, as Aristotle would say, people can know one another's character. In villages, townships or communes, autonomy reproduces the advantages of direct democracy, rousing civic patriotism,¹ lifting the individual beyond himself, encouraging habits of co-operation, training the judgement and imparting administrative experience to millions who cannot hope to enter representative assemblies or services at a distance. Local self-government in towns or districts lightens the burden of central legislatures and administrations. In the big States of the modern world, it has the

¹ Cf. Edmund Burke: 'To be attached to the sub-division, to love the little platoon we belong to in society, is the first principle, the germ as it were of public affections. It is the first link in the series by which we proceed towards a love to our country and mankind. . . .' See also M. P. Follett, *The New State*, Part III.

sovereign merit of preventing the individual from being submerged in huge electorates. These tend to 'inspire a sort of awe, a sense of individual impotence like that which man feels when he contemplates the majestic and eternal forces of the inanimate world'.¹ The resulting fatalism of the multitude, as Bryce has termed it, is best corrected by local self-government.²

¹ E. A. Ross, *Social Psychology*, p. 40.

² The sense of insignificance and helplessness which comes over the individual under democratic government in present circumstances has been perceived and well described by the two greatest students of American institutions. Writing in 1835, De Tocqueville, *Democracy in America*, II, ch. ii, observed: 'When the inhabitant of a democratic country compares himself individually with all those about him, he feels with pride that he is the equal of any one of them; but when he comes to survey the totality of his fellows, and to place himself in contrast with so huge a body, he is instantly overwhelmed by the sense of his own insignificance and weakness. The same quality which renders him independent of each of his fellow citizens, taken severally, exposes him alone and unprotected to the influence of the greater number. The public has therefore among a democratic people, a singular power, which aristocratic nations cannot conceive of; for it does not persuade to certain opinions, but it enforces them, and infuses them into the intellect by a sort of enormous pressure of the minds of all upon the reason of each.'

Writing towards the close of the century, Bryce expressed the same idea as follows: 'Out of the mingled feelings that the multitude will prevail, and that the multitude, because it will prevail, must be right, there grows a self-distrust, a despondency, a disposition to fall into line, to acquiesce in the dominant opinion, to submit thought as well as action to the encompassing of numbers. . . . This tendency to acquiescence and submission, this sense of the insignificance of individual effort, this belief that the affairs of men are swayed by large forces whose movement may be studied but cannot be turned, I have ventured to call the Fatalism of the Multitude.'—*The American Commonwealth*, II, ch. lxxxiv. The prestige of the demos may paralyse the critical faculty. 'A sense of power in others seems to involve a sense of their inscrutability.' Cf. C. H. Cooley, *Human Nature and the Social Order*, pp. 313-15.

**The new
role of local
self-
government**

Nevertheless modern conditions require large-scale planning, legislation and administration which do not accord with the parochialism inevitable in local institutions. There is scarcely a major problem in education, public health, communications, police or socio-economic relations which can now be left to purely local solutions. The real neighbourhood has altered in scale and significance and widened into large functional or cultural associations and vast territories until in ultimate analysis it has become conterminous with the world. The line between local or national and international affairs has become so faint that no exclusive jurisdiction can be assigned to localities. The only method of retaining the advantages of local autonomy consistently with the larger interests is to combine centralized normative legislation with a process of local by-laws and administration. The broad lines of policy must be laid down by national or international legislatures and conferences. Policy may be translated into administration partly by local bodies in conformity with prescribed principles. These should not merely receive advice, guidance and co-ordination from above but should be encouraged to co-operate among themselves for loco-national purposes.

Federalism

The same principles apply *mutatis mutandis* to federalism. In large countries like the United States, Canada, India and China, federalism is calculated to afford scope for local development and administrative experimentation, to localize discord, to prevent 'apoplexy at the centre' and 'anæmia at the circumference' and to checkmate the tendency of a metropolis to absorb all control. It would save national legislatures from being overweighted and overwhelmed with business. But the autonomy of the constituent States of a federation must now be of a somewhat different order from that with which political theory and American experience have familiarized us. Consistently with the vital interests of the modern world,

there can be no question of placing agriculture, industry, commerce, finance, education, sanitation or transport exclusively under provincial management. The doctrine of State-rights cannot be pushed far in an age which is outgrowing national independence itself. So far as the major activities of the State are concerned, there is an imperative need of centralized normative legislation, leaving supplementary legislation and administration to federal units. They can have a freer hand in minor affairs. Yet, on the whole, the range of co-operative activities is becoming so vast and the need of local adaptation, administrative decentralization and all-round consultation so urgent that federal units may be expected to retain a large share in the transaction of public affairs. While they may lose in height, they are likely to gain in breadth.

National government, whether federal or unitary, should carry out international agreements and conventions, manage national affairs in general and co-ordinate the working of local, provincial and functional authorities. The international interest, now inseparable from the national, calls for a unified national legislature and administration which may be able to speak for the whole nation at international gatherings and to implement international decisions. Here is the chief weakness of certain schemes of legislative bifurcation which have recently been propounded. For instance Mr. G. D. H. Cole argued some time ago that a Political Parliament and a Guild Congress be established and that a balance be maintained between the two so that neither the one nor the other could claim to be ultimately sovereign. He did find it necessary to establish a Democratic Supreme Court of Functional Equity to arbitrate between the two and to enforce its decisions by coercion. But it was not clear how a country with three such organs was to co-operate in international regulation and administration. The whole scheme was conceived too exclusively on national

**National
governments**

lines.¹ It ignored the desirability of States being able to give speedy effect to international recommendations. It is noteworthy that S. G. Hobson who would reserve all industrial matters, in fact all economic affairs, to the national guild and entrust defence, law, order, general administration, education and morality to the State, recognizes that in ultimate analysis, the State as representing the community at large, must be the final arbiter in social relations. Nevertheless the bifurcation would not only be too artificial under our complex economy but would hamper the smooth working of international schemes. A similar objection applies to the political reorganization proposed by Sidney and Beatrice Webb.²

The national assembly has generally comprised two houses in modern times. The bicameral system can be traced to a chapter of accidents in English history, but statesmanship has made it serve a variety of purposes and philosophy has discerned

**The National
Assembly**

¹ G. D. H. Cole, *The Future of Local Government*, p. 177, advocated 'the substitution for the universalized representative system . . . of a system of functional representation. . . . In order to get a healthy society well administered and responding effectively to the will of its members, it is necessary to do at least two things. In the first place it is necessary to organize society throughout on functional lines and to make the form of organization designed for the fulfilment of each social purpose, appropriate to that purpose; and in the second place, it is necessary, within the organization set up for each of these purposes, to adopt the basis of representative democracy, which only under these conditions, that is when it is combined with the idea of function, becomes a real instrument of effective popular control. In other words, what is wanted is a merging of the ideas of medieval functionalism with those of Victorian democracy. Out of this union will spring the real *functional democracy* of the future.' Mr. Cole has since retracted his thesis of Guild Socialism but his earlier writings can still be referred to as illustrating a trend in modern social philosophy.

² Cf. Sidney and Beatrice Webb, *A Constitution for the Socialist Commonwealth of Great Britain*. Also Beatrice Webb, *The Political Quarterly*, January-March, 1931, pp. 1 ff.

profound wisdom behind it. The second chamber has been looked upon as a check on hasty legislation, a brake on impetuous democracy, a ballast in political life, a Philip sober entertaining appeals from Philip drunk! It has served to represent the State principle in federations like the American Union, the Australian Commonwealth, the Swiss Federation, and, until lately, in Germany. As a stronghold of the nobility or the upper classes in general, vetoing or delaying radical measures, the Upper House is an anachronism in an age of democracy. It has been re-organized on popular principles in many States but in some of them it has been doomed to comparative futility and restricted to bare revision, haphazard debate and occasional delay. The greatest objection to second chambers, as they have usually been constituted so far, is that they hamper the rapidity of action, and therefore detract from the political efficiency, which the present environment demands.

**Functions of
the second
chamber**

Under modern conditions the checks to the majority in the popular chamber should be sought primarily in the Opposition as a ready-made alternative Government, in the organic law including judicial control, in public opinion and in the vigorous functioning of international institutions. The second chamber should now be put to more effective and creative use. It should be so constituted as to make itself felt through opportunities of organized co-operation with the other organs of government. It should suggest and criticize measures, deliberate on important affairs and assist in planning. But it should not be able to create deadlocks, to interpose long delays or to nullify the policy of the lower chamber.

**Composition
of the second
chamber**

Accepting the principle of efficiency and the implications of democratic government, specially the legislative and financial supremacy of the popularly elected lower chamber, it is possible to turn the second chamber to some much-needed

purposes of modern organization. It can be made to represent the principles of science, *expertise* and localism. The seats may be divided among constituent States in federations or among local representatives in unitary States on something like the French collegiate plan; among the vocational organizations and among the leading sociologists, economists and political scientists. Under the first two categories the members should always be elected, while those under the last may either be elected by the appropriate academies or nominated by the government. The functions of such a chamber should be to suggest, to investigate and to revise; specially to assist in planning the national economy; in short, to act as a thought-organization and as a forum of the widest consultation. Several countries have during the last fifteen years set up economic advisory bodies. These have to be systematized and integrated yet more closely into the framework of government. The second chamber into which they may be merged can function as a regular, though secondary, legislative chamber with power to originate bills, to consider all bills, to formulate plans of national welfare and to discuss all matters of public importance, on the understanding that the last word rests with the lower chamber. An upper house of this character will furnish a continuous opportunity of organized expression and consultation to all local and functional interests and bring science to bear on public affairs without detracting from the efficiency and unity of government. *Mutatis mutandis* it is desirable to associate second chambers of this description with provincial, regional, district and municipal governments so as to inform the whole machinery of administration with knowledge.

It has recently been suggested by some thinkers that the whole legislature should be constituted on the functional, instead of the territorial, principle. The theme is a variation of Rousseau's dogma that sovereignty is unrepresentable.

The lower
chamber

Mr. G. D. H. Cole argued that no one could represent another and that no one's will could be treated as a substitute for or representation of the wills of others. He concluded that it is 'impossible to represent human beings as selves or centres of consciousness; it is quite possible to represent, though with an inevitable element of distortion . . . so much of human beings as they themselves put into associated effort for a specific purpose'.¹ It has accordingly been suggested that all representatives should be elected by guilds of producers or professional associations. It is, however, forgotten that while a man is a producer of one commodity, he is a consumer of many and that over and above it all, he is a citizen with an interest in culture and general welfare. The vocational associations should send representatives to the upper chamber; but to make them the sole constituencies for the lower house as well is to succumb to a very one-sided view of social life. The general interest can find adequate expression only through territorial representation. It is not proposed here to discuss parliamentary procedure but it may be pointed out that in order to cope with the ever-increasing mass of business it will be desirable to develop the committee system in the legislature—confining the latter to the discussion and settlement of general principles alone.

The structure of the executive calls for equally extensive reform in consonance with the heavy and multifarious responsibilities of modern administration. The cabinet ministers must not only see that the departments are properly run but must also think out policies and reforms in a systematic manner. The cabinet may be divided into two sections, one of which should be released from ordinary departmental supervision and be charged with the function of large-scale administrative thinking. The cabinet would resign, not on snap votes, but only on a

The
executive

¹ *Social Theory*, pp. 105-106.

clear vote of no-confidence by the lower chamber of the legislature. Secondly the political executive should be associated with a Planning Commission, consisting partly of experts and partly of nominated spokesmen of vocational associations and working, whenever necessary, through committees. It must survey national economy as a whole and submit annual or periodical plans for balancing production and consumption in terms of the highest possible standard of life. The plans must be considered by the cabinet and laid before the legislature. The Planning Commission must be consulted in regard to the framing of the budget. A National Investment Board should be charged with the function of assisting, through loans and purchase of shares, agricultural and industrial enterprise in consonance with the national plans as finally approved. It may derive its resources from Government savings banks, the public share in the profits of subsidized enterprises and through loans. But it would also work in collaboration with the Central Bank and, through it, the other joint-stock banks and see to it that adequate capital at reasonable rates of interest was forthcoming for agricultural and industrial development. Social control of banking is the necessary financial counterpart of planned economy. Similarly boards can be established for the management of the tariff, railways and means of transport, forestry, etc. Their operations would be subject to parliamentary scrutiny in connexion with the grant of supplies and appropriations. They would function within the limits of statutory enactments and their members, mostly experts appointed by the executive, would be removable, before the expiry of their normal term, on the presentation of an address by Parliament. But, subject to these provisos, they would enjoy a large measure of autonomy and lift numerous questions from the heat of party strife to the dispassionate atmosphere of scientific investigation. They would integrate themselves with the administrative tradition and soon gain a position analogous to that which public services

commissions already occupy in some countries. They would relieve the political executive as well as the ordinary permanent officials of a vast amount of work for which they are not usually fit. They would not only represent the principle of science in government but would also make for expedition of business.

The ever-widening range of governmental functions means a bureaucracy at all points of political **Bureaucracy** control and service. These experts, in hierarchies, embody knowledge and experience, exercise the profoundest influence on responsible ministers and chiefly determine the execution, if not also the inception, of policies. The departments supply the details of statutes, many of which must necessarily be of the nature of skeletons, and by virtue of them perform not merely legislative but also quasi-judicial functions, often without publicity, without recognized rules of procedure and without further appeal. This 'New Despotism'¹ has recently called forth vigorous protest. On wider grounds it has been argued that the administrative expert often fails to see the wood for the trees, that he tends to develop a contempt for lay opinion², and that he falls into a deep rut.

¹ Lord Hewart, in *The New Despotism*, has shown that the rules, orders and regulations emanating from the Civil Service in England were officially registered as 2,473 in number in the year 1920 and as 1,349 in 1927. Twenty-six out of the forty-three general Acts passed by parliament in 1927 contemplated or authorized the making of Orders in Council, rules or regulations. Lord Hewart calls attention to a number of statutes in which the general scheme and the particular provisions evade the rights of Parliament.

² A Victorian Civil Servant is said to have remarked on the House of Commons: 'How much better things would go, if *that* didn't interpose itself.'

Lord Hewart quotes the story of a distinguished Anglo-Indian official who, when the Houses of Parliament were pointed out to him, exclaimed, 'Really, does that rubbish still go on?' Cf. also H. Finer, *The Theory and Practice of Modern Government*, ii, p. 1164.

Departmentalism It has often been noted that the habit of departmental minuting may impose inordinate delay in business. Commenting on a classic case the late Marquess Curzon remarked that 'departmentalism is not a moral delinquency. It is an intellectual hiatus—the complete absence of thought or apprehension of anything outside the purely departmental aspects of the matter under discussion. For fourteen months it never occurred to a single human being in the departments to mention the matter, or to suggest that it should be mentioned. Round and round, like the diurnal revolution of the earth went the file, stately, solemn, sure and slow; and now, in due season, it has completed its orbit, and I am invited to register the concluding stage! How can I bring home to those who are responsible, the gravity of the blunder or the absurdity of the situation?'

Merit system The bureaucracy must now play such a large part in national and international life that it is necessary to adopt measures for the correction of its weaknesses. In the first place it is necessary to extend the system of recruiting the public services through competitive examinations, which is also calculated to democratize the administration in proportion to the diffusion of education. The merit system has now had a long trial in India, in some countries of Europe, and in a lesser measure in the United States and elsewhere, not only in various national and provincial services but also in some local bodies. By universal admission it has enhanced the efficiency of the services,¹ reduced corruption and

¹ After the inauguration of the merit system in England, Mr. Lowe remarked that 'under the former system there never was such a thing known as a man being appointed because he was supposed to be fit for the place'. The Civil Service was wittily described as the outdoor relief department of the British aristocracy. In their evidence before a commission high officials confessed that their departments were full of idle, incapable, aye, illiterate nominees. A select committee in 1853 declared that the

favouritism,¹ raised the tone of public life² and furnished an incentive to education.³ It conduces to economy by removing the temptation to create posts for relations, friends and partisans. Above all, it is calculated to ensure in the services that intellectual background without which they are sure to fall into a mechanical rut. The potentialities of the system have not yet been exhausted. Through carefully planned tests, oral and written, it is capable of application, for example to various grades of the railway and shipping services. It will go a long way to rid local bodies of the evils which have overtaken them in the United States, Japan, India and elsewhere. It is desirable to extent the system to all but a few posts at the top and a few at the bottom in most branches of the local, national and international services.⁴

Civil Service had become the dumping ground of the unambitious, the indolent and the worthless.

¹ Cf. J. Bryce: 'Artemus Ward's description of Abraham Lincoln swept along from room to room in the White House by a rising tide of office-seekers is hardly an exaggeration. From 4 March when Mr. Garfield came into power, till he was shot in the July following, he was engaged almost incessantly in questions of patronages.'—*American Commonwealth*, i, p. 64.

² It may be recalled that while the reform was under discussion in England, Sir James Stephen of the Colonial office wrote to Trevelyan: 'The world we live in is not, I think, half moralized enough for the acceptance of such a scheme of stern morality as this.'

³ 'The opening of the civil and military services, in its influence upon national education, is equivalent to a hundred thousand scholarships and exhibitions of the most valuable kind—because unlike such rewards in general, they are for life—offered for the encouragement of youthful learning and good conduct in every class of the community.'—Sir Charles Trevelyan.

⁴ It is believed by some that preparation for the examinations has a deleterious effect on the young men. E. Faguet remarks that 'preparation for examination is responsible for intellectual indigestion, for minds overloaded with useless information, and for a system of cramming, which at once takes the heart out of men, perhaps with good ability, just at the age when their mental activ-

But if the brilliant young men recruited through competition are not to lose their freshness and keenness of mind, they must realize themselves as members of learned professions. Civil servants should be encouraged to study, to think for themselves and to conduct investigations on the subjects entrusted to them.¹ A movement has already begun in that direction. For instance, the German Society for Continued Education in Political Science has done a great deal for the Civil Service.² At the same time it is necessary to provide regular machinery for administrative planning which may keep the administration abreast of new requirements.

**The Services
and
thinking**

Lastly a network of advisory committees consisting of scientific experts and public men and associated with departments of administration or their branches in the whole hierarchy of government, should bring the services into organic association with public opinion, let in a continuous stream of ideas and suggestions and perform the equally necessary function of educating public opinion. The officials and experts would thus become advisers of one another and of the public. The cross-fertilization would largely change the spirit of

**Advisory
Committees**

ity is most keen; which, further, as the result of this surfeit, disgusts for the rest of his life and renders impotent for all intellectual effort, the unfortunate patient who has been condemned to undergo this treatment for five, eight and sometimes ten years of his youth'. All this may be valid as a plea for the reorganization of education and examination but it does not prove the unsuitability of the competitive system for recruitment to the public services.

¹ For some useful suggestions, cf. *The Development of the Civil Service* by Sir William Beveridge and others. Also Graham Wallas, *The Great Society*, chs. xi and xii.

² In England, the Civil Service University and Professional Association aims at the encouragement and furtherance of higher education among civil servants and preparation for degrees, diplomas and certificates in subjects useful to civil servants.

administration. Says Sir Arthur Salter: 'Committees are an invaluable instrument for breaking administrative measures on to the back of the public. Modern government often involves action affecting the interests and requiring the goodwill, either of large sections of the community or of the community as a whole. The action cannot be made acceptable without detailed explanation of this necessity, for which mere announcements in the press are insufficient. In such cases the prior explanation and the assent of committees of representative men who, if convinced will carry assent of the several sections of the community who look to them as leaders, will be of the greatest possible value.'¹

Thought organizations These thought-organizations would supply a need which has long been felt but which is more urgent now than ever before. They would counteract the tendency of legislatures and cabinets to function primarily as will-organizations² and of the services to turn into soulless machines. They would establish an organic relationship between government, knowledge and experience of life, and bring the administration into line with

¹ Cf. the Report of the Haldane Committee on the Machinery of Government in England, p. 12:—'We think that the more they are regarded as the integral part of the normal organization of a department the more will ministers be enabled to command the confidence of parliament and the public in their administration of the services which seem likely in an increasing degree to affect the lives of large sections of the community.' On the whole subject, cf. H. J. Laski, *A Grammar of Politics*, pp. 376 ff.

² In the will-organizations of modern government the inadequacy of thinking has long been realized. In 1878 Gladstone confessed that protracted experience of public affairs had convinced him that 'of the more difficult descriptions of the public business, apart from simple routine, it is only a small part that is transacted with the requisite knowledge, care and thoroughness'. In 1899 Lord Rosebery wrote of cabinet meetings as 'the collection of heads of departments at sparse intervals to discuss hurriedly topics for which they are often unprepared'.

democratic requirements. Thus will political democracy become creative.¹

¹ 'Democracy is not worked out at the polling booths; it is the bringing forth of a genuine collective will, one to which every single being must contribute the whole of his complex life, as one which every single being must express the whole of at one point. Thus the essence of democracy is creating.' M. P. Follett, *The New State*, p. 7. 'The fallacy of self-and-others fades away and there is only self-in-and-through-others, only others so firmly rooted in the self and so fruitfully growing there that sundering is impossible.'—*Ibid.*, p. 8.

CHAPTER XVIII

PUBLIC OPINION

ALL co-operation and regulation rest largely on opinion.¹

Public
opinion and
democracy

It is 'an organization of separate individual judgements, a co-operative product of communication and reciprocal influence'.² It represents at once a working measure of common agreement and a driving force. It has always commanded great prestige and has now and then been invested almost with superhuman dignity. The Greeks said that there was a divinity in the voice of the multitude and the later dictum, *vox populi vox dei*, has had an immense appeal. It is true that opinion has often been perverted and distorted by social disharmonies and that it has often split into sectional opinions. But in spite of all its imperfection, it has played an invaluable part in the working of political institutions. Under democracy it not only organizes purpose and reform but serves as the most potent agency of co-ordination. For instance, it smooths the course of presidential government, bringing the executive and the legislature into harmony, without the one being responsible to the other. It prevents or solves deadlocks between co-ordinate legislative chambers. It keeps the various organs of government from pushing their powers to the extreme and often secures a certain measure of fair play to minorities. It throws outworn laws into desuetude and influences judicial pronouncements, bringing the administration of justice abreast of the times. It keeps all agencies of control and service up to certain standards of behaviour. It is a truism that

¹ Cf. 'It is . . . on opinion only that government is founded, and this maxim extends to the most despotic and most military governments as well as to the most free and most popular.' David Hume, *The First Principles of Government*.

² C. H. Cooley, *Social Organization*, p. 121.

democracy means government by public opinion. In the new era it acquires a fresh significance and importance from certain major developments.

Internationalism and public opinion In the first place international law and government will depend primarily on public opinion for their efficacy until they have struck deeper roots in traditions. The League of Nations would have exercised much greater influence if public opinion in various countries had rallied more emphatically and more cordially to its support. The recommendations of the International Labour Organization would similarly have been honoured more extensively in national legislation if public opinion had taken up the matter more vigorously. The new international order in fact presupposes an alert world opinion in its favour and can develop only with its active support.

Approach to conditions of direct democracy The second factor which makes public opinion more important than ever before is the approach in national States to conditions of direct democracy brought about by the new means of communication and transport. For long have citizens read the same news and speeches at the same time over breakfast. They have listened to the same leaders and statesmen as the latter sweep the country in their whirlwind campaigns. Now the radio literally fulfils the condition prescribed by the philosopher for the direct democracy of the classical State, viz. that the citizens should be able to hear the same crier simultaneously. These tendencies towards direct democracy have been strengthened by the shifting of population from the country to the town and the extension of State activities. Hence a decline in representative government, a growth of the influence of nationally organized parties and a new sensitiveness to the press, the platform and by-elections on the part of legislatures and executives. In this situation public opinion has to play a rôle infinitely more important than that which fell to it in the halcyon days of representative government.

Direct popular authority The change is typified by the Referendum, the Initiative and the Recall, which originated in Switzerland, the modern home of direct democracy. The first two have been adopted in some other European countries and some States of the the American Union and of the Australian Commonwealth. The distrust of legislatures and the parties which control them, has also led to direct exercise of power by the people through the Organic Law over the heads of ministers and parliaments alike. Constitutions binding on all the organs of government have become lengthy documents containing all sorts of provisions, sometimes with details which would scarcely be deemed worthy of an ordinary statute. Constitutional amendment has, in some States of the American Union, become a species of direct legislation. Through all these devices public opinion now rules independently of representative assemblies.

Representation v. Delegation This phase of political development is also illustrated by the extent to which the classical theory of representation has been supplanted by that of delegation. Edmund Burke wanted the representative to exercise his judgement freely and ruled out all authoritative instructions or mandates from constituents.¹ In several countries the organic law has

¹ Burke said to his Bristol constituents: ' . . . It ought to be the happiness and glory of a representative to live in the strictest union, the closest correspondence, and the most unreserved communication with his constituents. Their wishes ought to have great weight with him; their opinions high respect, their business unremitted attention. It is his duty to sacrifice his repose, his pleasure, his satisfactions, to theirs, and above all, ever and in all cases, to prefer their interest to his own. But his unbiassed opinion, his mature judgement, his enlightened conscience, he ought not to sacrifice to you, to any man or to any set of men living. . . . If government were a matter of will upon any side, yours, without question, ought to be superior. But government and legislation are matters of reason and judgement and not of inclination. . . . Authoritative instructions, mandates issued, which the member is

enunciated the same maxim.¹ But the approach to the conditions of direct democracy has reduced the representative to the status of a delegate who feels morally bound to resign when he no longer shares the views of the electors. Proportional representation has not served to improve the position of representatives. It has bound them more tightly to the party machine and diminished their independence. All representative chambers now get over crucial difficulties by fresh elections with explicit or implicit mandates. It is public opinion which has to untie the Gordian knots of politics.

A third factor which enhances the importance of opinion is the multitudinous growth of vocational associations and combines, local, regional, national and international. Their co-ordination among themselves and with the organs of government and consultation depends in the last resort on an alert and instructed opinion.

Associations
and public
opinion

bound blindly and implicitly to obey, to vote and to argue for, though contrary to the clearest convictions of his judgement and conscience, these are things utterly unknown to the laws of this land and which arise from a fundamental mistake of the whole order and tenor of our constitution.'

¹ The French Constitution of 1791 laid down that 'the representatives elected in the departments will not be representative of a particular department, but of the whole nation, and they may not be given any mandate'. Compare the French Organic Law of November 1875, Sec. 13.

Repeating, with an unimportant variation, a provision of the constitution of 1871, the German Constitution of 1919 says: 'The deputies are representatives of the whole people; they are subject only to their conscience, and are not bound by mandates.'

'The members of the two councils vote without instructions.'
—The Swiss Constitution of 1874.

The Czecho-Slovak Constitution of 1920, Art. 91, ordains that members of parliament 'shall not receive orders from anybody'.

In these cases instructions are feared lest they should threaten the unity of the nation.

Criteria of public opinion So public opinion has now to stabilize international control, to link it with national policy, to frame and amend constitutions, to formulate policies, to hold legislatures and executives to account and to co-ordinate the working of public and private bodies. Such a role can be played only by a genuine public opinion as distinguished from sectional opinion. The new public is the whole world and public opinion should consort with world welfare. Distinguishing the General Will from the will of all, Rousseau declared that the former must be disinterested and concern the general welfare. Our public opinion has to correspond to Rousseau's General Will on the international scale. Secondly, public opinion should be founded on knowledge and be informed by the scientific spirit. Under the new conditions it is desirable to take as many problems as possible out of politics and entrust them to experts, but ultimate control will necessarily rest with public opinion. The latter must be well educated and alert and represent critically thought-out social judgements.¹

The average citizen Mr. Walter Lippmann has pointed out that our world being beyond the reach, the sight, and the mind of the ordinary 'shut-in' man, has to be explored, reported and imagined, and that he really responds not to facts but to a pseudo-environment, a most inadequate picture of the Great Society.² The demand of democracy is that he should respond to the real facts, rather than to 'stereotypes', and respond with the fullness of human sympathy. The man in the street cannot be expected to form an opinion on the details of public questions but he should be able to discern whether the Government keep up to the requisite standards of popular welfare. He should be able to judge of the broad principles of the rival policies placed before him. He should be able

¹ Cf. F. H. Giddings, *Inductive Sociology*.

² *Public Opinion*, pp. 15, 25, 29, 48, 50.

to discover whether a party is genuinely seeking to promote the general welfare.

The tone of public opinion depends largely on the general character of social institutions and relationships, on the adjustment of loyalties to the family, to associations, to the nation and to humanity. **Education** It is moulded specifically by education, periodical literature and the press, the operation of the party system, and the opportunities of contact between the average citizen and the administration. The more complex the environment, the greater is the need of education—of developing capacities, training the powers and acquiring social habits. Education was recognized by Plato and Aristotle as one of the fundamental problems of politics.¹ Rousseau, the modern apostle of popular sovereignty, perceived the importance of education and sought to reorganize it. Never were its diffusion and reorganization more urgent than in an age which is called upon to entrust problems of unprecedented magnitude and complexity to the average man. Ignorance in motion, said Goethe, is the most terrible force in nature. The human mind refuses to be satisfied with negatives, longs for positive opinions and, in the absence of knowledge and trained judgement, clutches at prejudices, dogmas and catchwords. Education would prevent the paralysis of the mind and the will, which is produced by the mass emotion of the crowd and which is familiar to students of religious and political phenomena. It will improve the quality of leadership, which depends so largely on the tenor of popular expectations and standards.

Fortunately it is now possible to spread mass education with unprecedented rapidity. Not to speak of the modern facilities of imparting knowledge, no State can validly

¹ It may be recalled that education was the base and the goal of the political philosophy of the Chinese Confucianists. Government was worth while only as a means of education. The city, the country and the whole world were looked upon as schools. Liang Chi Chao, *History of Chinese Political Thought*, p. 183.

complain of lack of funds for educational expansion.

**Extension of
education**

Every State can now plan economic development and, through socialized enterprise or taxation, appropriate part of the new wealth for education and other social services. In any case, mass education should be the first charge on every exchequer, to be met, if necessary, by retrenchment in the army and economies on the salaries enjoyed by public servants, or by loans such as those which were raised to defray the costs of the last war. The possibilities of augmenting wealth are now so tremendous and the need of universal education so pressing that there must be something radically wrong with a Government which cannot find money for public instruction. Nor should any community be satisfied with a gradual progress of education. Therein lurks a danger. Education can be so gradual as to allow the educated few to be absorbed afresh by the inertia and habits of the uninstructed mass. Education produces its best effect not when it trickles slowly but when it is rapidly universalized.

**Educational
reform**

Education should be regarded not merely as preparation for a vocation or as transmission of culture but also as a vision of the meaning of life, the starting point of a spiritual adventure. No system of instruction should take undue advantage of the plasticity of the young and inculcate mere imitation of the mental patterns of adults. Education is essentially growth and therefore an end in itself. True education is moral and intellectual expansion, and not a training into conformity with any beliefs or social habits. Education would thus be socially renovating, facilitating change and development in traditions which otherwise engulf the average man. It should be permeated by the scientific spirit,¹ and liberated

¹ Cf. T. H. Huxley: 'Science seems to me to teach in the highest and strongest manner the great truth which is embodied in the Christian conception of entire surrender to the will of God. Sit down before fact as a little child, be prepared to give up every pre-conceived notion, follow humbly whenever, and to whatever

from the influences of dogma, whether religious, political, or nationalistic. Churches and States have tried frequently to impose their own views on young minds and regarded the teachers as propagandists in their interest.¹ Big business has sometimes attempted to play the same role, while the cumulative pressure of current traditions and prejudices has too often been overwhelming.²

No subject of study has suffered more than history.

**The teaching
of history**

Too readily, the historian identifies himself with his nation and begins to talk in the first person plural. The textbooks malign the foreigner and inculcate 'patriotic' views of great events and transactions. Phrynichos was fined for reminding the Greeks of their defeat at Miletus. Modern historians have

abysses nature leads, or you shall learn nothing My business is to teach my aspirations to conform themselves to fact, not to try and make facts harmonize with my aspirations.'

¹ Cf. Montesquieu: 'The laws of education will thus differ in each sort of government. In monarchies they will have as their object, honour; in republics, virtue; in a despotism, fear.' In pre-war Germany certain official regulations required that teachers be qualified to arouse and to nourish in pupils love for the Fatherland and for the ruling dynasty. According to an order of the Kaiser William II, 'the schools must create in the youth the conviction that the doctrines of socialism are contrary not only to God's decrees and Christian moral teaching, but in reality incapable of application and destructive both to the individual and the State'

A recent Italian decree imposes the following oath on University teachers: 'I swear allegiance to the king, his royal successors and to the Fascist regime. I promise loyally to obey the constitution and other laws of the State, to teach and to fulfil all other academic duties with the purpose of educating honest citizens, faithfully to the country and to the Fascist regime' Thus is destroyed that freedom which is the life blood of a true University. Practically all the modern dictatorships seek to control education.

² Sociologists complain that in Universities ideas that shock prevalent habits of thought invite social and even academic opposition and endanger one's position. (C. H. Cooley, *The Social Process*, p. 367.)

often been in such utter sympathy with national sentiment that they have given an 'acceptable' version of the relations of their country with others. This tendency has generally been encouraged by those in control of education.¹ Imperialism has distorted the history of subject peoples so as to subdue the young mind to its stern psychological necessities. A major educational reform will have been accomplished when history is written and taught not as propaganda of any kind but as history proper; a record of human evolution, not a school of patriotism or imperialism; in short an analysis of social forces and changes affecting humanity as a whole.

It is desirable similarly to widen the canvas of the study of polite literature, sociology, ethics, philosophy and political science. This will liberate and socialize the imagination which lies at the root of moral progress. The right attitude of mind can be inculcated in primary and secondary schools by the teacher, who is more important than anything else at the school stage. Humanitarian culture must be grounded in ethics—humanitarian ethics. All true culture should be regarded as the heritage of humanity and no authors should be brushed aside as foreign to make room for indigenous

¹ The Committee on Studies and Textbooks of the public schools of New York City (consisting of principals and teachers) laid down in the course of their report dated 27 March 1922:— 'The textbook must contain no statement in derogation or in disparagement of the achievements of American heroes. It must not question the sincerity of the aims and purposes of the founders of the Republic or of those who have guided its destinies. . . . (In discussing the American Revolution) everything essential is accomplished when it is made plain to the pupils, that the Colonists had just grievances; that they rebelled because they could obtain no redress; that they were inspired by a fierce love of liberty; that they counted neither the cost nor the odds against them; that the dominating spirit of the Revolution is found in the words of Nathan Hale: "I regret that I have but one life to lose for my country".' C. Hayes, *Essays on Nationalism*, p. 114, quoting the *Historical Outlook*, vol. xiii, October 1922, pp. 250-55.

productions. At the same time every advanced student should be made to feel perfectly at home in at least one living language other than his own. It is desirable to extend and systematize the movement for the temporary interchange of students and teachers among various countries.

Only thus will educational institutions be able to liberate the young minds and meet the demands of the new order. The school has now become 'the residuary legatee of all society's otherwise undischarged educative functions'. It should be able not merely to renew an existing cultural community but also to assist the pursuit and sharing of all in the wider interests which modern developments have opened. It demands integration with a new order based on science and internationalism. The universities should be able to turn out men and women to whom it will be natural to think on a large scale, to see life steadily and as a whole, to take the whole world as the orbit of their minds. Every modern scheme of education should include academies of research including research in the social sciences; the fullest provision for adult education; a widespread system of libraries; and the use of the theatre and the cinema on a large scale for educational purposes. Such education is the life-breath of democracy and indispensable to the emergence of a sound public opinion.

**Responsible
association
with ad-
ministration**

General education, however, must be supplemented by specifically political education on an adequate scale. Apart from the democratic right to vote, it is necessary to emphasize that the chances of service on international bodies, national legislatures, local boards, functional organizations and advisory committees would go a long way to acquaint a large number of people with the spirit and trend of public affairs. Aristotle defined citizenship in terms of active participation in civic affairs. As our political life approaches the standard of the responsible association of the many with

administration, we may expect an alert and responsible opinion. It will go a long way to remove that popular apathy which modern observers have noted as one of the stumbling-blocks of democratic government. Repose and liberty, said Rousseau, are incompatible, but repose can be disturbed only by the tangible incentives to mental exertion which public life affords.

An extraordinarily powerful agency in the formation of public opinion is periodical literature—pamphlets, magazines, election manifestos, etc. and above all the daily press. Their tone depends largely on the intellectual calibre, the tastes and predilections of those to whom they are addressed. The discussion of foreign affairs in particular often accords with nationalistic or imperialistic fervour. To a large extent then periodical literature is likely to improve with the diffusion of enlightenment, social reform and international concord. At the same time a high standard of university training in the social sciences and in journalism for prospective writers would go a long way to improve the quality of periodical literature.

It is specially necessary to protect literature from the debilitating effects of official dictation. The Government and periodical literature censorship has not only encouraged hypocrisy but often inhibited creative thought.¹ More than one modern government has established an open and systematic supervision over the press. Else-

¹ The effect of the censorship even on creative power of the highest order may be illustrated from the career of Tolstoy. 'You would not believe,' he exclaimed, 'how, from the very commencement that horrible Censor question had tormented me! I wanted to write what I felt; but at the same time it occurred to me that what I wrote would not be permitted; and involuntarily I had to abandon the work. I abandoned and went on abandoning, and meanwhile the years passed away.' *Life* by A. Maude, ii, p. 378.

The rigid Bolshevik control of literature tends to produce a very one-sided outlook. Cf. Julian Huxley, *A Scientist among the Soviets*, p. 38.

where ministers of State have been known to ring up editors in the evening to give the keynote for the morrow. Too often has the press been converted into an agency of official propaganda. In times of excitement or agitation, Governments have been known to control the access to facts and to strike at the roots of independent opinion.

Even more sinister than Government control is the influence of wealth.¹ Big business has been capturing the Press and treating it as a commercial proposition. The huge costs of production and dependence on advertisements have made a large section of the press an appendage of capitalism in many countries. Newspapers have been syndicated and sold like mechanical plants to the highest bidders. The changing whims and caprices of press magnates have sometimes been reflected with such fidelity in the daily press as to make it a laughing-stock.

**The Press as
a commercial
proposition**

The low standards of the reading public, the control by Governments and the influence of wealth have served to bring the press into discredit. It has been charged with keeping all discussion at a low level, fomenting social and international bickerings, and pandering to the morbid curiosities of sex and crime.² Armament firms have been known to corrupt newspapers and to use them for exciting passions of war. News is sometimes edited with an astonishing degree of suppression of truth and suggestion of falsehood. The papers change their opinion so rapidly to catch every passing breeze of popular sentiment or the whims of the powers-that-be that recent students have filled volumes with piquant

**Reform of
the Press**

¹ Cf. J. Bryce, *Modern Democracies*, ii, p. 533: 'Democracy may say, as Dante said, when he reached in his journey through hell the dwelling of the god of riches, "Here we found Wealth, the great enemy".'

² After two years of research J. L. Holmes concluded that newspaper treatment of crime encouraged criminal behaviour.

illustrations.¹ Walter Lippmann has suggested the institution of fact-finding bodies to counteract the 'stereotypes' of opinion.² Lasting improvement depends on enlightenment, readjustment of social and international relationships and an approach towards economic equality. But something may be done through journalistic enterprise by academies of the social sciences.

The control of opinion is shared with education and periodical literature by the activities of party organizations. Party divisions arise from differences of temperament and intellectual conviction, cleavages of race and religion, force of tradition and personalities, real or supposed divergence of economic interests and historical accidents. It is the organization through which interest-groups seek to realize their objects and aspirations. In so far as parties are based on important but not fundamental issues, they are a valuable contrivance for the smooth working of popular government. Party organizations sift issues and select candidates for presentation to the electorate which would otherwise be lost in a multiplicity of names and problems. The choice between alternatives presented by the different parties stimulates thinking. Parties have forced many reforms to the statute book while their interaction has in many cases gone a long way to harmonize progress with order.³

The party system

¹ See Walter Lippmann, *Public Opinion*, pp. 35 ff.

² Cf. E. Cabet's *Icaria*: 'The paper shall bear the character of simple records, noting facts without any critical review on the part of the journalists.'

³ Cf. L. F. Ward who defines party strife as social synergy and regards it as a powerful creative force. 'The vigorous interaction of the two forces, which looks so much like antagonism, strife and struggle, transforms force into energy and energy into power, and builds political and social structures. And after they are constructed, the same influences transform them, and it is this that constitutes social progress. Political institutions—the laws of every country—are the product of this political synergy, the crystallized action of legislative bodies created by political parties.' *The American Journal of Sociology*, xiii, pp. 440-1.

On the other hand party often accentuates the differences on which it is based and tends to look on citizens primarily as voters to be caught rather than convinced.¹ It reduces politics to what Bryce has termed a branch of the science and art of advertisement. Acute observers have pointed out that party managers are now using psychology to manufacture spurious consent. Graham Wallas, Walter Lippmann and others have demonstrated how the chief appeal made by parties comes through symbols and shibboleths calculated to rouse an emotional response. Graham Wallas indeed describes the empirical art of politics as 'the creation of opinion by the deliberate exploitation of sub-conscious, non-rational inference'. For long party has also evinced a tendency to throw power into the hands of a small coterie of managers and create a secret government of rings and bosses.²

The party system is really integrated with the intellectual and social fabric of the community and depends for its reform on general progress. But there are three specific ways in which its disadvantages can be counteracted to an appreciable extent. It has already been pointed out how it is desirable to take many questions out of politics and entrust them to experts. Secondly patronage should be lifted out of the reach of politicians and made over to Public Service

**Reform of
the party
system**

¹ J. Bryce, *The American Commonwealth*, 1913, p. 334, notes that the tendency of party platforms is 'neither to define nor to convince, but rather to attract and to confuse'.

² Robert Michels quotes a Marxist as saying: 'The concentration of power in the Marx party is more evident than the concentration of capital in economic life. The candidates are not determined by the constituents but by the bosses of the parties.' He tries to demonstrate that in the Social Democratic party in Germany democracy had been replaced by an oligarchy. In modern democracies elections are often determined by very small groups which have undertaken the selection of candidates.

G. D. H. Cole complains that 'the Trade Union leaders of today tend to become an official caste, divorced from close contact with their members'.

Commissions acting generally on the basis of competitive examinations. Lastly party organizations should be democratized. From 1890 onwards the majority of the States of the American Union have passed laws to democratize the Nominating Conventions of the parties and, though the professional politicians often try to get round them, they mark a distinct improvement. As party is reformed and rid of temptations, it may be expected to render greater service to the cause of a sound public opinion than it has done so far.

**World
opinion** It is in consonance with large-scale economic progress, educational expansion and political reform that public opinion can rise to the great tasks which confront it at present. It is called upon to function not only on a national but also on a world scale. As already pointed out, world opinion is emerging into form and claiming the attention of Governments and agitators. But it is still feeble and intermittent. One of the prime needs of the future is that it should be trained through educational reform, to judgement and strength and enabled to become a permanent factor in human affairs.



CHAPTER XIX

TRANSFORMATION

It has been observed that the master trend of human development is towards the emancipation of the psyche and the increasing dominance of the mental aspect of life. In the course of the ages the sphere of brute force and conflict has appreciably shrunk and that of sympathy and co-operation has expanded in range. The scale of organization has widened far beyond the tribe and the clan. Over large tracts of associated life force has ceased to be the substance of authority and has become a mere incident thereof. In a large number of countries Governments now change through elections rather than through violent revolutions. 'The trend from force to rational persuasion' is one of the surest criteria of progress, but it has to be universalized. Knowledge, organizing capacity and material development have already advanced to a point when it is possible for man to raise himself completely out of the stress and struggle which he inherited from his ancestors. It is at last feasible to eliminate force almost completely from human relationships and to lift human life to the truly ethical plane. A certain degree of force may indeed be needed for police purposes, for restraining manifestly unsocial conduct which would not yield to persuasion and for securing a minimum of co-operation; but this is to be the exception rather than the rule, the ultimate sanction for a few cases of an abnormal type rather than a workaday principle. 'The State, as the operative criticism of all institutions, is necessarily force,' says Bosanquet. But that is scarcely true of the advanced forms of the State at present. The general tenor of affairs can now follow the rule of non-violence.

Non-violence was preached as a guiding principle of all action by the founders of Jainism and Buddhism in India and later by Jesus Christ in Palestine. Not merely saints and sages in all countries but some notable communities both in the east and the west have tried to put it into practice. In our own day the principle has been brought into prominence by Count Tolstoy and Mahatma Gandhi, who have both raised it to the rank of a religion.¹ The elimination of force would clear the field for the free play of the intellect and the moral sense, for the reign of merit and justice, for the full development of the faculties of co-operation. It would inaugurate an era of genuine freedom and foster variety in development. It is the ethical counterpart of democracy and is in fact indispensable to its full realization.

Non-violence, however, does not imply the maintenance of the *status quo* in international or other relationships. On the other hand, it demands a revision of relationships which rest at present wholly or partly on force. The full implications of non-violence comprise not only abstinence from the use of force in future but also the elimination of the force imbedded in existing arrangements. It means the termination of imperialistic subjection, of the repression of minorities, no less than of stringent diplomatic pressure, of war and armaments. As a method of political action force defeats the chances of enlisting the co-operation of many of those affected by the objective. Human relations are often so juxtaposed and interlaced that force can settle their problems only if it is pushed to the extremity of annihilating one of the parties concerned. Even then it must leave thorny problems behind for the victors. But when it is to stop, as under present conditions it must stop, short of total annihilation, it always creates more difficulties than

¹ Tolstoy, *What I Believe In: A Short Exposition of the Gospels*; M. K. Gandhi, *Indian Home Rule* (Madras, 1922), pp. 61 ff., 69 ff.

it removes. Its incidence shifts so often, at times so rapidly, that it tends to create a vicious circle. One of the great things about the League of Nations is that it attempts to perform its difficult tasks through peaceful means. To place irresistible force at its disposal might temporarily make it, or rather a few Great Powers, supreme; but it would scarcely be calculated to usher perpetual peace.¹ Peace is an ideal as well as a method. In spite of temporary set-backs, the League of Nations may ultimately establish a principle of peaceful co-operation which will reinforce similar tendencies in human relations in general.²

The doctrine of which non-violence is a part finds its positive counterpart in human solidarity. It implies that the colour and race prejudices, national antipathies, class animosities, and sectarian bickerings are outgrown through enlightenment, moral endeavour and a reorganization of political and economic relationships and that the dogmas of the inherent superiority or incapacity of different groups, which never had any scientific basis, are given up. Everywhere the public must learn to think in wholes, and statesmanship should take men in the long perspective of their purposes. The basis of politics must be all the needs of all men. The day may not be far distant when all economic aggrandizement at the expense of others will excite as spontaneous disapproval as slavery does at present. World co-operation

¹ For a contrary view, D. Davies, *The Problem of the Twentieth Century*.

² F. H. Giddings in *Democracy and Empire*, thinks that war can cease only with vast empires engulfing small States and further that 'only when the democratic empire has compassed the uttermost parts of the world will there be that perfect understanding among men which is necessary for the growth of moral kinship. Only in the spiritual brotherhood of that secular republic created by blood and iron not less than by thought and love will the kingdom of heaven be established on the earth'. In this maze of contradictions, both liberty and peace are lost.

is implicit in the new conditions of life which have made practically every important matter a concern of humanity.

In this background there emerges a new role for the principle of democracy. Its application, in association with science, to social organization in all its phases, will conserve that liberty which lies at the root of all personal growth and character. A deadening fixation of activities by specialization and division of labour would split personality and reduce man to a function. Personality at bottom represents a harmonious synthesis of individualization and socialization in expression.¹ As an exercise of personality, freedom is essentially creative and self-transcending. When suffused with the principle of democracy, division of labour brings about the organic solidarity which Durkheim distinguishes from the mechanical solidarity of the more primitive life. It means a social return from all and a social return to all. And the essential function of law is seen to be not constraint but creative integration, a release of energy, the satisfaction of wants and the opening of the way to new wants. This is the note which the new jurisprudence is striking.

Human solidarity, liberty and democracy may enrich life in a measure which we can scarcely foresee today. They will favour the development of qualities which the highest ethics has valued most in character. Men have often been demoralized because the received tradition has permitted them to use force against others and because self-defence has compelled them to use fraud, insincerity, hypocrisy, and deception against superior force, open or covert. So widespread has this phenomenon been that Ferrero declares that so far man has produced only two types of civilization—the violent

¹ To Bergson, in *Creative Evolution*, nature seemed constantly to vibrate between the two poles of individuality and sociality, as if hesitating whether she shall make a society or an individual. But there is no room for any such hesitation. With all his singularity, the individual is a collective self-consciousness.

and the fraudulent. The second debasing influence has been want, which has put a premium on the use of force, on exclusiveness, on selfish aggrandizement. These two influences, assisted by ignorance and error, have established traditions of individual and group selfishness, greed and narrowness. The flow of human sympathies has been hampered and moral growth has been stunted. Ethical effort has often relied on repression to curb the unsavoury manifestations of individuality and succeeded only to a very limited extent in elevating the tone of personality. To abolish want, to banish ignorance, and to eliminate force is to open the way to genuine development of character. 'Morals means growth of conduct in meaning; at least it means that kind of expansion which is consequent upon observations of the conditions and outcome of conduct. It is all one with growing. . . . In the largest sense of the word, morals is education.'¹

Human nature is neither good nor bad;² it is eminently resilient and flexible, and tends to fit into the environment it encounters. The essence of character is the liberation of spiritual energy, but that depends for stimuli upon the environment. Society has to be so organized as to guarantee the most favourable conditions of inward growth. Paradoxical as it may seem, expansion is the way to genuine self-control. The argument has been very well put by Hobhouse. 'To find vent for the capacities of feeling, of

Human
nature and
environment

¹ J. Dewey, *Human Nature and Conduct*, p. 280.

² 'The conception of a primitive egoism on which sociability is somehow overlaid is without foundation either in biology or psychology.'—L. T. Hobhouse, *Mind in Evolution*, p. 339.

'Variation and natural selection can as easily establish innate impulses in the individual toward action favourable to others or to the race as to self. We find in original human nature both altruistic or other-regarding impulses, and egoistic or self-regarding. . . . Which impulses will be stronger in the adult individual is . . . a matter of education and opportunity.'—C. A. Ellwood, *The Psychology of Human Society*, p. 79.

emotion, of thought, of action, is to find oneself. The result is no anarchy. The self so found has as the pivot of its life the power of control. To introduce some unity into life, some harmony into thought, action and feeling, is its central achievement, and to realize its relation to others and guide its own life thereby, its noblest rule. But the essential of control is that it should be self-control.¹ Again, 'there is no true opposition between liberty as such and control as such, for every liberty rests on a corresponding act of control. The true opposition is between the control that cramps the personal life and the spiritual order, and the control that is aimed at securing the external and material conditions of their free and unimpeded development.'² To transform the environment is to transform the interpenetration of habits which is called character. Either is hampered by the force of inherited traditions. Hence the present epoch calls for a great moral effort on the part of all who have caught a vision of the world as it might be. It demands that the moral fibre be strengthened to cope with the great tasks of reconstruction.

There is scarcely a moral quality which is more urgently needed today than toleration. Democracy recognizes the infinite worth of every individual, concedes freedom of development to all and therefore has to accommodate itself to the resulting diversities of modes of belief, action and development, unless they are manifestly anti-social in their tendencies. The supposed interests of group solidarity, allied to fanaticism and a mistaken psychology, have often placed an exaggerated value on social uniformity and standardized convictions and found their climax in persecution. Religious history is red with the blood of martyrs and unfolds an equally woeful tale of unintelligent imitation, make-believe and hypocrisy, damaging to the moral fibre. Differences

¹ *Liberalism*, p. iii.

² *Ibid.*, p. 147.

in moral and political codes have sometimes roused hatred or contempt and banned co-operation. Even distinctions of food, clothing and other externals have sometimes kept groups apart from one another in barbarous as well as in civilized society. All this intolerance arises at bottom from moral insistence on the unity, the homogeneity, the perfect solidarity of every narrow group. The intolerance diminishes in proportion as this need is merged into wider ones and the bounds of communal life extended. The movement towards general toleration has still an enormous leeway to make up and calls for concerted effort. It should be emphasized that, as Acton said, the security enjoyed by minorities is the most certain test of national freedom. The spirit of democracy is infinitely comprehensive, infinitely complementary and infinitely creative. It is in the integration of wills that the democratic character of majority rule consists. Now that the world with all its diversities has drawn together, universal toleration is a dictate of humanitarianism and of sheer prudence alike.

An international society, organized on the principles of democracy and permeated by the spirit of toleration, will hold out to all an opportunity of creative life, a chance to share in the process of spiritual becoming. Evolution consists in the development and expansion of an immanent nature.¹ The true adventure of personality consists in the inward struggle to unfold all its possibilities, a struggle towards knowledge, balance, universal sympathy and universal love. Progress consists in those social, economic and cultural changes which release and integrate the purposes of men in society. In ultimate analysis it is bound up with democracy.²

¹ Cf. Aristotle, *Politics*: 'For what each thing is when fully developed, that we call its nature.'

² Cf. J. Dewey: Regarded as an idea, democracy is not 'an alternative to other principles of social life. It is the idea of community life itself. It is an ideal in the only intelligible sense of

Long ago man practically ceased to evolve in his physical and mental texture and ever since his progress has run on social lines. His whole history revolves round the art of living together. That art consists in 'the multiplication of human life at its highest standard'. Militarism and autocracy are thus seen to be antithetical to the principles of civilization and progress.¹ As the State is released from their grip, it assumes the role of organized public co-operation and service. In many countries the police are no longer mere thief-catchers; the ministers of State are not mere administrators; the judiciary are not mere interpreters of the law. They are being integrated with leadership in social co-operation and reform. Political science now talks not so much in terms of obedience and command, subjection and sovereignty, as in terms of organized co-operative public service.

an ideal: namely, the tendency or movement of something which exists carried to its final limit, viewed as completed, perfected. . . . Wherever there is conjoint activity whose consequences are appreciated as good by all singular persons who take part in it, and where the realization of the good is such as to effect an energetic desire and effort to sustain it in being just because it is a good shared by all, there is in so far a community. The clear consciousness of a communal life in all its implications constitutes the idea of democracy.'—*The Public and its Problems*, p. 148.

¹ Cf. T. H. Huxley:—'Social progress means a checking of the cosmic process at every step, and the substitution for it of another which may be called the ethical process; the end of which is not the survival of those who may happen to be the fittest, in respect of the whole of the conditions which obtain, but of those who are ethically the best. . . . In place of ruthless self-assertion it demands self-restraint; in place of thrusting aside or treading down all competitors, it requires that the individual shall not merely respect but shall help his fellows; influence is directed not so much to the survival of the fittest as to the fitting of as many as possible to survive.' *Romanes Lecture*. F. H. Giddings views progress as 'the amelioration of the biological antagonism between individual interest and race interest'.



Moving along these lines, the State will approach the ideal which the eloquence of Burke enunciated.

The ideal of the State The State, he said, 'is a partnership in all science, a partnership in all art, a partnership in every virtue and in all perfection. As the ends of such a partnership cannot be obtained in many generations, it becomes a partnership not only between those who are living, but between those who are dead and those who are to be born.'¹ But the partnership is not a static one. Order, in fact, does not mean stereotyping the *status quo*. It means harmonized and balanced development.

At first sight the demands which the new era makes on man may seem incapable of satisfaction. To


The social objective universalize enlightenment and economic comfort on the basis of perpetual peace, international co-operation and non-violence and to harmonize human solidarity with the equally imperative needs of liberty and toleration is certainly a large order. But civilization is only ten thousand years old and is capable of almost infinite refinement. Discoveries like those of fire, the wheel, the canoe have become the common property of mankind. In the course of a century the railway, the telegraph, the steamship have encompassed the earth. Ideas which originated in the mind of a Buddha in India or a Christ in Palestine or a Luther in Germany spread, though with some limitations, modifications and perversions, in the course of a few centuries among the masses

¹ The hindrance of hindrances, apparently a negative formula of State action, resolved itself in the hands of T. H. Green, *inter alia* into the duties of spreading education, promoting temperance and regulating the distribution of land. It is capable of further extension until *a priori* limits to State activity vanish altogether. Once again we return to Aristotle: 'Every State is a community of some kind, and every community is established with a view to some good . . . but if all communities aim at some good, the State or political community which is the highest of all, and which embraces all the rest, aims, and in a greater degree than any other, at the highest good.'

over continents. Political doctrines have leapt one frontier after another in quick succession. All the achievement in earlier times was brought about in the face of tremendous obstacles, and without the aid of a concerted plan or of modern facilities.

The new psychology has given us a glimpse of the reserves of energy latent in the individual. **Transformation** Sociology has indicated untold possibilities of advance. If our economic and cultural resources, now vastly augmented, could be pooled together and operated by an intelligent humanitarian purpose which has been developing of late, the world could be transformed more quickly than the most optimistic among us imagine today. That is the only goal which it is worth while for philosophy to set up and for social effort to strive for. The world-wide restlessness is symptomatic of the deep disharmony of transition and indicates the need of a well planned onward move in liberation and reconstruction. Once this is clearly understood, a good many of our 'problems' will fade into insignificance along with the difficulties which they create. It will scarcely seem worth while to quarrel over dogmas and over patches of trade or territory. The narrow issues would pass into history or be merged into a vast co-operative enterprise.

Social service The world has always thrown up a number of men whose social affections are so deep and so dynamic that they live for themselves only as they live for others, and who devote all their energies to the service of society. Reformers, philanthropists, savants and sages have had a large share in building up the social and ethical fabric. Then there are the millions who respond to the call of country or religion or ideal by choosing a path of suffering and sacrifice. In merging their life in that of the whole, they find a richness and fulness not to be found anywhere else. This supreme transvaluation of values represents the highest point of



personality. Without a dash of it, life remains incomplete and fragmentary.¹

Thanks to the urge of social sympathies, the inclination towards social service is much more widespread than is sometimes realized.² But it spends itself mainly in the cause of numberless sects, fraternities, groups, associations and parties without the concert which the recognition of a large purpose imparts. So the philanthropic energy largely cancels or neutralizes itself. If it could draw itself together, it would flow like a mighty stream. As the new way of life is better understood and is integrated into the social tradition,³ the moral energy will be enlisted in the service of humanity, rather than of groups, classes and nations. Already there are men and women who labour for the good of all mankind, or whose activities, at any rate, are inspired by broad humanitarian purposes. As the number of such persons multiplies, the whole life of men will be enriched and find fuller expression. To rouse the individual to these possibilities is the surest safeguard against unsocial conduct. Nothing can better promote morality than an all-round community life drawing the youth into its orbit. Large vision, large purpose, have to be integrated with the large resources and the large knowledge now at the disposal of humanity. In other words, social control must catch up with science and invention.

¹ Cf. J. H. Muirhead, *The Service of the State*, pp. 36-7:—
‘The good is not merely personal and social. It is the one precisely so far as it is the other. It is just in so far as a man is able to set aside merely private ends and identify himself with the larger purposes of society that his life becomes rounded into the unity in which personality in the full sense of the word consists.’

² P. Kropotkin, *Mutual Aid*, chs. iii-viii.

³ ‘Education, habit and the cultivation of the sentiments will make a common man dig or weave for his country as readily as fight for his country.’—J. S. Mill.

Such is the essence of the democratic process in terms of a world order. The welfare of all the inhabitants of all countries in the world is the ethical and political counterpart of the scientific developments which have opened a decisively new era in history. All institutions, economic, political and cultural, ought to rest on principles consistent with equality of maximum opportunity for self-realization—liberty, growth and happiness—to every human being on earth. Social effort has to be directed to the organization of talent, energy and material wealth so as to universalize enlightenment and comfort with the utmost rapidity and keep the door perpetually open to further improvement. Mankind has to outgrow the prejudices and traditions which survive as anachronisms and which uphold poverty, ignorance, love of power *qua* power and the subordination of the welfare of some to that of others. Society has to build up the truly social tradition of equal and maximum regard for the personality of every man, woman and child.



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